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ABSTRACT
RIGHTS IN PROPERTY AND PROPERTY IN RIGHTS:
PRIVACY, CONTRACT AND OWNSERSHIP OF THE BODY IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT
MAY 2016
GARY L. GARRISON, B.A., THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
J.D., CAPITAL UNIVERSITY
L.L.M., CAPITAL UNIERSITY
M.A., MIAMI UNIVERISTY
Ph.D., UNIVERISTY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Daniel Gordon
This dissertation examines the history of the idea that people possess property
rights in their own bodies. I also argue such rights are an alternative foundation on which
to base the right to privacy recognized by the Supreme Court in 1965. The Court found
privacy to exist in an admittedly nebulous “penumbras formed by emanations” from other
parts of the Bill of Rights. I argue that privacy can be grounded on property rights as
well.
Modern notions of property are far more rigid then they were two centuries ago.
In a 1792 essay titled Property, James Madison explained man owned property in, among
other things, religious beliefs, opinions and the liberty of his person. Madison, like many
founders, was well-schooled in Enlightenment era thought and writings of John Locke
and Adam Smith that argued men had property rights in their bodies. Unfortunately, like
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many founders, Madison asserted property rights in bodies of others (slaves) and similar
ownership interests in wives and children.
With abolition of slavery and emancipation of married women from the status of
femme covert, the notion of ownership rights in the body fell from favor. If white men
could no longer assert claims to property in other bodies, there was nothing to stop the
government from stepping in to fill the void. The rise of the “regulatory state” in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw a proliferation of laws attempting to regulate lives
of Americans, particularly in the area of reproduction. From eugenic laws mandating
some people be sterilized and prohibited from bearing children, to anti-contraception and
anti-abortion laws essentially mandating other people be forced to bear them, government
control of the body expanded.
Through it all, however, ownership interests in one’s own body remained an
economic fact if not a widely recognized constitutional right. Commodification of the
body, be it through sale of tissue or even renting of a womb through surrogacy contracts,
is a modern day reflection of the fact that we still acknowledge property rights in our own
body. A government “taking” of that right should be treated as any other taking of
property.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

If the United States mean [sic] to obtain or
deserve the full praise due to wise and just
governments, they will equally respect the
rights of property, and the property in
rights.1

As illustrated by the above epigram, more than two centuries ago, James
Madison, our fourth president, and arguably the greatest intellect of his (or any other)
time envisioned a fluidity of rights in general and of property rights, in particular.
Ownership of property was a right to be sure but, at the same time, incorporeal rights—
our thoughts, beliefs and most intimate interactions with one another—were also
considered property in which we all had interests. The reciprocal nature of rights in
property, and property in rights, is summarized no better than the contemporary stories of
Susette Kelo and LeRoy Carhart.
Kelo and Carhart would appear, at first glance, to have little in common with one
another. The former was a twice-divorced paramedic who bought a small house near the
waterfront in New London, Connecticut, in 1997, which she promptly painted pink. The

1

Madison, James, “Property” in Madison, Writings, Jack N. Rakove, ed., Literary
Classics of America (1909) 515, 517.
1

house was run down, but Kelo was no stranger to poverty and, eventually, made it the
sort of home she always dreamed of owning for herself. Unbeknownst, to her at the time,
however, Connecticut had successfully wooed Pfizer Pharmaceutical Company to build a
new research facility in the general area of her home. Inasmuch as Pfizer did not want to
build a world-class research facility within what was considered to be a “rundown” part
of town, the company encouraged the city’s New London Development Corporation
(NLDC), to entice its developer to transform the area into a part of town more conducive
to hosting a renowned national and international corporation. This would require that
NLDC buy up all real estate in the area necessary to accomplish that end.2
In 1998, a realtor working on behalf of NLDC offered to buy Kelo’s home but she
refused to sell. The day before Thanksgiving, 2000, the sheriff posted a notice on her
door alerting Kelo her home was about to be taken by the city under its power of eminent
domain. Kelo hired an attorney to fight the condemnation proceeding who challenged the
seizure throughout the state system but lost in the Connecticut state courts. Kelo then
turned to the United States Supreme Court when the Connecticut Supreme Court afforded
her no relief.3

2

Jeff Benedict, Little Pink House: A True Story of Defiance and Courage (New York:
Grand Central Publishing, 2009). The color Kelo painted the house, she insisted, was not
really pink but “Odessa Rose” – a color which she claimed to have gotten off the
“historic paint chart at Benjamin Moore.” Id. at 26.
3

Id. at 1-119. The FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, under which Kelo appealed the condemnation of her land, prohibits
seizure of private property unless (1) the owner is afforded fair compensation and (2) the
seizure serves a valid public purpose. It was the latter of these two requirements under
which Kelo challenged the taking of her house, arguing that the transfer of her property to
another private interest did not meet the “public purpose” requirements of the Fifth
Amendment given that her land was transferred to another private interest which, in fact,
stood to make a profit from her property.
2

LeRoy Carhart, by contrast, came from a very different background. He received
his medical degree in 1973 and later served as chief of surgery and emergency medicine
from 1978 to 1985 at the medical facility on Offutt Air Force base in Nebraska. He
retired from the U.S. Air Force as a lieutenant-colonel and went into private medical
practice serving, for awhile, as an assistant professor of surgery at Creighton University
School of Medicine and then the University of Nebraska Medical Center.4 Part of his
obstetrics practice included providing abortions for women. In 1991, an anti-abortion
activist set fire to his home, which destroyed everything, he and his family owned. Dr.
Carhart, nevertheless, continued with his practice serving women. Even after his friend
and colleague, Dr. George Tiller of Kansas, was assassinated—shot and killed while
attending church in 2009 by an anti-abortion extremist—Carhart still continued to
provide medical services for women in his area.
When Nebraska passed a law in 2000 that banned late term abortion procedures,
Carhart took the case to court and won. The United States Supreme Court struck down
the Nebraska law in Stenberg v. Carhart on grounds it made no exception for provision
of these abortions where it was necessary to protect the health of the mother.5 In
response, the United States Congress passed a so-called “Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act”
in 2003 prohibiting the very same late term abortions nationwide that was struck down in

4

For a discussion of Carhart’s background, see Carhart v. Stenberg (D.Neb. 1998), 11
F.Supp.2d 1099.
5

See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
3

Stenberg.6 Because this law, likewise, made no exception for the health of the mother,
Dr. Carhart was confident it, too, would be struck down by federal courts. That optimism
proved justified only in the lower federal courts. But, the make-up of the Supreme Court
changed after Stenberg7 and Carhart’s opponents were determined to seek further review
now that a newer, and more conservative, justice had been appointed and confirmed.
Both Kelo and Carhart lost their cases in the Supreme Court. This begs the question,
though: why are their case important, though, and how are they connected? The answer
is that they both involved property interests.
In 2005, the Court upheld the use of eminent domain to take Kelo’s home and
transfer it to a private developer. While acknowledging a “sovereign may not take the
property of A for the sole reason of transferring it to it to another private party, B,” the
Court essentially blessed just such an arrangement in Kelo v. New London, ruling the
NLDC project promoted economic development in the Fort Trumbull area of New
London, Connecticut, and it provided jobs as well as increased tax revenues, thereby
meeting the “public use” requirement under the Fifth Amendment.8 The Supreme
Court’s majority brushed aside any “hypothetical” argument this could lead to a city
taking land from person A and transfer it to person B simply because person B may put
that land to more productive economic use. But, Justice O’Connor called out the

6

Similar bills were passed by Congress in 1995 and 1997 but were vetoed by President
Bill Clinton. President George W. Bush was sworn into office in 2001 and quickly made
it clear he would sign such a bill if presented to him. It was, and the bill became law.
7

Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who was part of the majority in Stenberg,
retired from the bench in 2006 and was replaced by Associate Justice Samuel Alito.
8

Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477, 483-484 (2005).
4

majority on this point, anyway, and noted all private property, anywhere, of any kind,
was now vulnerable to being taken for any reason so long as it increased a city’s tax base.
There was nothing, Justice O’Connor remarked, to prevent a state from replacing
a Motel 6 with a Ritz Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a
factory. Indeed, while Kelo suffered the most immediate loss from the decision, all
private property owners were now made vulnerable to takings of their property if there
was a chance that it could be put to greater economic use.9 The only recourse private
property owners had was to various state constitutions which might provide them with
greater protection from such takings than the U.S. Constitution now that the U.S.
Supreme Court afforded no such road-block to it.
Two years later, Leroy Carhart lost his case in the high Court as well. In
Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court upheld a federal ban on certain late term
abortion procedures.10 Though the earlier Stenberg case was not explicitly overruled—
indeed, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to try and distinguish the two cases on
their facts even though they are largely indistinguishable—the new decision certainly
undermined Stenberg if not overruled it, sub silento.11 No exception was needed to

9

Kelo, supra at 486-487 & 494, 503 (O’Connor, J. Dissenting). New London
subsequently paid Kelo $442,000 for the property. Having understandably no interest in
remaining a citizen of that city, she moved across the river to Groton. By the fall of
2008, all homes in the area had been demolished but the project never broke ground. The
developer was unable to secure financing – most likely because of the financial crisis
which hit that year – and the land continues to sit vacant, a “barren wasteland of weeds,
litter, and rubble.” Benedict, Little Pink House, at 374-377.
10

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).

11

The term sub silento means “under silence” and “without any notice being taken.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1979) 1280. I use the term here
in the context of suggesting that the United States Supreme Court overruled the Stenberg
5

protect the health of the mother in this case, the Supreme Court opined, because there
existed other options for late term abortions rather than the dilation and extraction, or
dilation and evacuation, procedure covered by the federal act. The Court was somewhat
vague on its medical reasoning but governments (state or federal), the majority held, had
a legitimate interest in preserving fetal life. The Court noted women sometimes came to
regret their decisions to have an abortion and, thus, it was within the province of
government to safeguard them from their own bad decision-making.
Justice Ruth Bader-Ginsburg, writing for the four dissenting justices, was quick to
point out how the majority opinion, literally, dripped with condescension regarding
women forced to obtain abortions under dire circumstances. “[T]he Court deprives
women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their own
safety” and, essentially, “reflect[ed the] ancient notions about women’s place in the
family.”12 What justified upholding the federal ban, in the absence of an exception to
protect the mother’s health, was one of many points, which particularly galled Ginsburg
and many others. The 2003 Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act did not really promote fetal
life, some argued, because it did not ban various other late term procedures. Congress
simply decided to ban certain procedures it found objectionable—a procedure many
obstetricians (like Carhart) believed were safer than other late term abortion methods.
The state, in short, rather than a physician, or the patient herself, was now to be the final
determinative on how obstetrics was practiced. If the state’s determination interfered
case in Gonzales but did not want to come right out and say that this was what it was
doing.
12

Gonzales v. Carhart, supra at 145, 159, 161-167; Id. at 184-185 (Ginsburg, J.
Dissenting).
6

with a woman’s individual choice or interfered with the advice of her physician, women
could at least take solace in the fact that they were prohibited from making choices which
they may otherwise come to regret!
As I suggested earlier, at first glance, these cases appear to have nothing in
common. The first concerns a city government’s use of its eminent domain power to take
real estate (with, or without, any clearly stated, public purpose) whereas the second is
about elimination of an abortion procedure within a physician’s obstetrics practice. But,
there are two important, if not immediately obvious, similarities between them. The first
is both cases are emblematic of the increasing reach of what I describe throughout my
dissertation as the regulatory state. While the historical antecedents of this so-called
regulatory state can be found earlier in American history,13 the modern regulatory state

13

As early as Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass, 53 (1851), Massachusetts Chief Judge
Lemuel Shaw ruled “[w]e think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well
ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified
may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated,
that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. All property in
this commonwealth, as well that in the interior as that bordering on tide waters, is derived
directly or indirectly from the government, and held subject to those general regulations,
which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all
other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment, as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints
and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.” Id. at 8485. Few cases so succinctly summarize the principle of salus populi suprema lexest
which, contrary to a myth of unrestrained laissez faire society of the nineteenth century,
was a pivotal part of nineteenth century legal regulation. See William J. Novak, The
People’s Welfare: Law & Regulation in Nineteenth Century America (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996) 1-18.
7

arguably began during the Progressive era (c. 1877-1917)14 but expanded during the
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt15 and has continued its expansion even to this day.
In a larger sense, though, the Gonzales case also concerns a loss of rights by
Carhart’s patients to obtain a particular late-term abortion procedure. It is, in this larger
sense, which I suggest Carhart’s patients share more in common with Suzette Kelo than
first meets the eye. Specifically, I argue the right to control one’s own body—including
the right have an abortion without government interference—is as much a property right
as the interest Suzette Kelo asserted to her “little pink house” in Connecticut.16 I further
contend our bodies are as much property as any real estate or personal property (chattel)
to which we claim right. Compared to other forms of property we own—real estate,
14

Defining the “Progressive Era” is, at best, a term of art. I choose the end of
Reconstruction in 1877 as the start of this period as it roughly coincides with the
beginning of the mass industrialization that began after the Civil War. Likewise, I choose
1917 as the end period for this date as it marks the U.S. entry into World War I which, for
most purposes, ended the movements of unions in the United States if not the push for
regulatory reform at the federal level.
15

I spend no time in this dissertation discussing creation of the social safety net during
the New Deal or the further regulation of property rights during this time period as that
subject has been treated exhaustively elsewhere. But, what is important to one of my
primary arguments is rejection during this time period of the highly controversial
principle of liberty of contract. I spend considerable time addressing the formation, and
rejection, of this principle later in my dissertation and will not repeat it here.
16

Linda Gordon, for example, argues the political control of reproductive rights—either
prohibiting childbearing through involuntary sterilization, or encouraging it through
denial of access to birth control—as affecting what she calls the moral property of
women. See Linda Gordon, The Moral Property of Women: A History of the Birth
Control Politics in America (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002) 342-347.
Although Gordon never gives her reader an exact definition of what she means by “moral
property,” the story of Puerto Rican women, as well as poor white women and women of
color in the United States being forcibly sterilized at the same time wealthy white women
in the U.S. were prohibited from access to any birth control, clearly speaks to the
violation of a property right women have in their own bodies—a property right similar to
the one Suzette Kelo had to her house in Connecticut.
8

stocks, household goods, etc.—bodily property interests are sui generis,17 to be sure, but
are still property nonetheless.
If a comparison of bodily property rights and economic property rights seems a
bit of a stretch for modern readers, it is only because contemporary language as well as
contemporary thought surrounding property and the body has changed considerably over
the previous two centuries. It is this change over time upon which I focus my
dissertation.
Not only were property rights enormously important to our founders but, as
illustrated by the Madison quote above, the term itself had far more reaching implications
than today. For Madison and many others in the waning years of the eighteenth century,
property meant more than just land or other economic assets. It also meant the right to
such diverse things as one’s political beliefs, religious views and—as I argue herein—
control over the private sphere of one’s own body. To deny someone of a bodily
property right was, thus, to deny them of their property.
This rhetoric of rights has been lost over the last two plus centuries. I argue
herein that there are three principle reasons for this. The first is that Americans
eventually came to realize the evils associated with owning property rights in bodies of
others. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and, over the course of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, American law and society also (albeit slowly) rejected
as well the assertion of ownership rights in wives and children. As a result, today, the

17

This is a Latin phrase meaning of its “own kind” or “peculiar.” Black’s Law
Dictionary, supra at 1286. Property rights in our own bodies are different than property
right is land or personalty like cars, stocks or bank accounts but it is still property which
can yield significant financial gains as I discuss in final the few chapters of this work.
9

notion of property rights in the body strikes us as something unseemly or unnatural. We
thus, naturally, recoil from the implication that property rights in the body could be a
basis for liberty and privacy.
The second reason we no longer consider the existence of ownership rights in the
body as a basis for privacy is attributable to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868. The guarantees of this amendment were that no state would deprive any of its
citizens either Due Process of law or Equal Protection of the law. No sane person would
argue equal treatment under the law is a bad thing and I will not do so here. What I do
suggest, however, is that the focus on equality of laws has obscured most of the nation
from the importance of property laws which, as I discuss next, have been forced to take a
second, even third, seat at the back of the bus insofar as constitutional rights are
concerned.
The third reason we no longer consider the existence of ownership rights in the
body, I maintain, is because of our acquiescence to state and federal government
assumption of those rights. During the same century which saw state sanctions of slavery
fall, and coverture begin to fall, both state and federal government stepped up to assume
those rights rather than allow them to be claimed by the people themselves. This was a
process I characterize as the rise of the regulatory state. This regulatory state, under
auspices of progressivism and waiving a banner of protecting the poor and abused, began
to regulate the economy with the goal of protecting those less fortunate from the so-called
robber barons of the nineteenth century.
Though admirable in intent, this movement was disastrous in effect. The
regulatory state managed, to one degree or another, over time, to reign in the worst of

10

industrial excess, but also set a precedent for regulation of the very people that it meant to
protect. Rejection over eugenic control of the body, I maintain, is yet another reason why
many contemporaries are reluctant to recognize property rights in the body as a basis for
privacy. If government can regulate liberty of (economic) contract between two persons,
what is there to stop it from trying to regulate (bodily) contracts between these people as
well?
This is the subject of chapter two, which I title the “Legacy of the
Enlightenment.” Notions of property and contract reigned supreme from the latter part of
the seventeenth century to the time of the American Revolution. Not only was there a
transfer of importance from land to chattel (feudalism to capitalism) but, at the same
time, economic and contractual obligation replaced obligation born of status. The oldEnglish adage a man’s home was his castle extended not just to the aristocracy but to
middling colonials in America and the idea only Parliament could vote revenue to the
monarch was replaced by cries of “no taxation without representation” from periphery
colonials who had no say in the core’s (London) Parliament whatsoever.
After laying the philosophical groundwork for the importance of property and
contract to Anglo-American thought, I examine the practical effects of those beliefs for
life in the United States. The most important of those effects—which I cover in chapter
three—was chattel slavery. There was no law, or even a philosophy, of slavery in the
beginning but no lesser intellects than Thomas Jefferson, John C. Calhoun and George
Fitzhugh felt compelled to provide some degree of philosophical justification for the
notion that one human being could own property in another and that such principle did
not violate the foundational precept that all men are created equal.
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Chapter four examines the patriarchal control—if not outright ownership—in both
white women and children. If white men did not outright own their wives, as they owned
slaves, they at least could claim legally enforceable rights in them not just to their
property but also for sexual intercourse and labor. Children occupied a similar role in the
household. Offspring were viewed as economic units whose labor was controlled by the
patriarch. A father was just as entitled to the earnings of his children as he was that of his
wife and the notion of liberty of contract which I discuss at great length in the following
chapter, was used as a justification to oppose child labor laws. Indeed, children are still
exempt today from child labor laws insofar as they apply to family farms. Whereas law
regarded women as part and parcel of the patriarch’s household in the eighteenth century,
a century later, they were essentially wards of the state who needed to be taken care of so
as to protect their procreative ability.18
Chapter five looks to the rise of what I deem the regulatory state and this is the
turning point for my narrative. Contemporaneous with the rise of the Fourteenth
Amendment as the perceived protection for all of American liberty, federal and state
governments began to try and regulate the excesses of what Mark Twain characterized as
the Gilded Age. As activists like Jacob Riis brought attention to how the other half lived
in this time-period, state legislatures passed work-place regulations meant to control
wages, hours and working conditions. Many, if not all, of these regulations were struck
down by state and federal courts under the doctrine of liberty of contract. The gist of this
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See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 , 28 S.Ct. 324, 52 L.Ed. 551. “[A]s healthy
mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes
an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the
race.”
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doctrine was employers and employees enjoyed perfect freedom to devise whatever
employment contract they desired and neither state nor federal law could constitutionally
regule of such contracts. The most famous (or infamous) announcement of this doctrine
came from the U.S. Supreme Court in 1905.19
Unfortunately, liberty of contract came to be associated with the largely
discredited notion of substantive due process which—though loosely anchored on the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—was relegated to the purgatory of legal
doctrine as a proverbial black-hole from which all manner of legal doctrine could be
extracted whether it bore any actual resemblance to the constitution or not. Indeed, it is
now de rigueur both in American law schools and organizations like the Federalist
Society to attack this doctrine as little more than judicial activism. But, substantive due
process is not the same as inventing rights out of thin air and, in the case of liberty of
contract, this was a right which was certainly implied in the Constitution long before the
Fourteenth Amendment became law in 1868.20
By 1937, however, liberty of contract was all but dead.21 The United States
Supreme Court and state courts may well have continued striking down labor legislation
indefinitely but for the advent of the Great Depression and the constitutional crisis that
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See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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I would make the argument that substantive due process is simply another way of
recognizing unenumerated rights – the existence of which are guaranteed by the
aformenetioned Ninth Amendment to the Constitution – but this is a subject well beyond
the scope of this dissertation.
21

See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) which held liberty of contract
was not sacrosanct and could be overcome by government legislation. I discuss this case
in greater detail in chapter seven.
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was provoked by the willingness of the Supreme Court to decimate President Roosevelt’s
first New Deal. After a constitutional game of chicken—known to most Americans as the
proverbial court-packing scheme between the Supreme Court and President Roosevelt—
the Supreme Court blinked and the switch in time that saved nine allowed Congress and
the states to pass laws in derogation of liberty of contract.22
The rise of the regulatory state affected not only property but also the body as
well which I discuss in chapter seven. There is no doubt that some very intelligent
people viewed Eugenics—the so-called science of better breeding—as humane at the
time23 but it is difficult to imagine even the most steadfast opponent of civil liberties
recoiling at the idea that state governments, with the sanction of the United States
Supreme Court, could forcibly sterilize large swaths of people against their will.24 White
patriarchs no longer had claims to bodies of color or to white women; those claims had
passed to government.
My dissertation then examines the rise, and partial fall, of the right to privacy.
Chapter four examines the origins of this right as theorized by future Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis. As I chronicle in chapter nine, though, it was Associate Justice
William Douglas who Brandeis’s theory, incorporated it into law and invoked it as a
22

Id.
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, for instance, offered “[i]t is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind.” Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 2007 (1927).
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Some states which sanctioned Eugenic sterilization have even considered the idea of
reparation payments to the survivors – North Carolina proposed it in 2012 only to have
the measure die in legislative committee – but victims of such practices have little
political power and are rarely a constituency to which legislators listen.
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shield against government control of the body. Numerous attempts were made in the
1950s and 1960s to repeal anti-contraceptive laws in Connecticut. When those attempts
failed, its opponents challenged it in state court. That case was later dismissed on a legal
technicality. A second attempt, which went to the United States Supreme Court, was
more effective and recognized privacy rights between married couples. It was almost a
decade later before privacy was recognized as a right enjoyed by single people as well as
those who were married.
Chapter five examines the extension of that right from contraception to abortion.
This was the holding of Roe v. Wade25 authored by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harry
Blackmun who simply carried the Brandeis theory, as expanded by Douglas, to its logical
conclusion. The core holding of Roe—that privacy extended to the right to terminate a
fetus—still stands today though the trimester system announced in that case is no longer
law.26
The Roe case in 1973 was the proverbial high-water mark of privacy
jurisprudence and, as noted earlier in this introduction, reproductive rights to one degree
or another have been retreating from assault by the regulatory state ever since. The right
to an abortion has been chipped away at to such an extent that it what is left, bears little
resemblance, to the broad right pronounced in 1973. Moreover, it is almost impossible
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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The trimester system in Roe was based on the concept of fetal viability and, as now
retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor remarked in a series of cases in the 1980s and
1990’s, improvements in science and medicine put the trimester system on a “collision
course” with itself. This is an issue I discuss in more depth in chapter ten and, thus, do
not do so here.
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today to find the word privacy anymore used by the Supreme Court. It is either ignored
almost entirely or replaced by words like “liberty.”
I would anticipate that, in twentieth and twenty-first century America, it seems
strange to talk about property rights in our own bodies and that such rights are a
justifiable basis on which to ground privacy rights. The truth of the matter, however, is
that we continue to this day to treat the body—or parts of the body—as valuable
commodities and this is what I address in chapter six. I highlight the extent to which we
have commodified both corpses and body tissues as well as turned women’s bodies into
rental property in the case of surrogacy contracts. No example of this is more poignant
than the case of Henrietta Lacks, who nominally held a degree of property interests in her
own body while alive, but then suffered the indignity (as did her family) of her body
being used as a mine from which to extract valuable property by those who harvested her
cervical cancer cells—and made millions of dollars—after her death. Federal law has
done well to protect the medical industry and the almost unimaginable profits they make
from harvesting the bodies of the poor, but have done almost virtually nothing to protect
the bodies and the claims to those bodies by their families.
Finally, in chapter six, I address the link between contract, property and marriage,
particularly with the regard to the controversial (but now settled) issue of same-sex
marriage. The United States Supreme Court held in Obergefell v. Hodges that state bans
against same-sex marriage were a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 Though I
agree that allowing some people access to a marriage contract, but not others, is a
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Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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violation of Equal Protection rights, wholly absent from the Court’s decision was any
discussion of property rights.
Scholars have long agreed there is a wealth effect to marriage and this was
certainly the underlying basis for the Court’s prior decision in Windsor v United States,
which had nothing to do with love or public recognition of same-sex relationships but,
instead, economics.28 Because Windsor was not legally recognized as a surviving spouse
under federal law, she was forced to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in estate taxes
as beneficiary of her spouse’s estate that she would not have had to pay had she been in
an opposite-sex marriage. The point here is that, as with privacy rights, so with marriage,
courts focus on the Fourteenth Amendment as the arbiter of rights rather than the implied
right of property.
What I hope to show by the conclusion of my dissertation is not that American
thought, in general, or judicial thought, in particular, was wrong to rely on the Fourteenth
Amendment as a panacea to every ill affecting our republic. Rather, I mean to argue that
there is an older—more pedigreed—principle to accomplish the same objectives and that
is the right to acquire, own and dispose of property along with the concomitant right to
enter into contracts. With America’s eventual (and much welcomed) rejection of claims
to ownership in the bodies of others, as well as the rise of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, our insistence on property rights has atrophied. But, the taxonomy of
rights should no more be held hostage to passage of time than it should be rejected on the
grounds of more innovative constitutional triangulations.
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Windsor v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
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CHAPTER II
THE LEGACY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Property should be . . . as a general rule,
private; for, when everyone has a distinct
interest, men will not complain of one
another, and they will make more progress,
because everyone will be attending to his
own business.29

My argument in this dissertation is that the Constitutional right to privacy is
neither found in “emanations formed by penumbras”30 as Justice William Douglas and
several other of his fellow justices believed—although that phrase, and its reasoning,
provide an historical justification for recognition of the right—nor was it invented out of
thin-air as critics, both historical and legal, contend. Instead, the notion of an individual
privacy rights against an overweening government has an historical lineage that is
traceable in one form or another all the way back to antiquity. In Athenian democracy,
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Aristotle, Politics (Mineola: Dover Publications, Inc. 2000) 62.
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Griswold, supra at 484. The Griswold case is correctly described as a plurality opinion
meaning there was no majority opinion as to where the right of privacy arose. Justice
Douglas and three other justices relied on the “emanations from penumbras” language
whereas three others relied on the Ninth Amendment which I discuss in detail later in the
dissertation. Two justices dissented altogether. Justice Douglas was the only supreme
court justice to ever use this phrase and he only did it once again, see Osborne v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323, 87 S.Ct. 439 (1966). Otherwise, as mentioned earlier, the phrase is
taken as one of derision by scholars and courts alike.
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for instance, where majorities could pass laws infringing on the rights of others, the
above noted epigram expresses Artistotle’s belief that the best way to keep everyone out
one’s else’s own business (or private life) was to ensure that property was private. While
Aristotle may not have had the concept of bodily property in mind, his comment
nevertheless illustrates the connection between property and privacy.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest Aristotelian property rights philosophy
justifies recognition of an unenumerated American Constitutional Right to privacy. What
I do maintain, however, is that this and other pre-Enlightenment thoughts on the issue(s)
form the ancient antecedents to Enlightenment era thinking on the body and property. I
will not address antiquity any more than my reference to Aristotle as this part of the
dissertation looks, instead, to early modern English property law, Enlightenment era
thinking on the concepts of property, contract, the body and privacy and then how those
thoughts both influenced the founding and early republican eras in American history.
Certainly, by the time I reach Part V of this work everything—from Aristotle though the
Enlightenment—can fairly be characterized as a lost rhetoric of Anglo-American
property rights.
For now, however, I address only English and, later, Anglo-American thinking on
the matters. As this point lays the foundation for the rest of my arguments set out herein,
the part necessarily requires a considerable amount of detail. Determining the existence,
and enforceability of property rights, even if only for purposes of taxation, was the
impetus behind theDomesday Book31 in eleventh century England and securing the rights
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On the importance of Domesday Book to English property law, see Thomas F.T.
Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Company,
1956) 12-13. This record of land tenures was not important simply for tax purposes,
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of property owners against arbitrary infringement by the king was an important part of
Magna Charta in the thirteenth century.32 These were the foundations upon which
English, and later, colonial-British, property rights (indeed, the very notion of liberty
itself) were grounded. If a man owned enough real property upon which to grow food for
his family, and perhaps some extra to use as barter for the other necessities of his family,
than he had liberty from his feudal lord. The importance of property rights to AngloAmerican political, constitutional and philosophical development, in short, is almost as
old as western civilization itself.
If medieval English property rights hold little sway among contemporary
Americans, then surely the repeated cries of no taxation without representation as a solid
placeholder for both rhetorical and intellectual stock-in-trade used by colonials toward
advocating revolution against Great Britain which refused to afford what American
colonials believed was their inherent rights to property. Even before then, however, the
European Enlightenment of the seventeenth century stressed the vital importance of
individual rights, which, ultimately, were based on property rights. Indeed, it was an
arguably disastrous oversight on the part of America’s founders to protect private
property from seizure by the government, as part of a bill of rights (originally left out of
the Constitution when first drafted in 1787) that formed one of many arrows in the
ideological quiver used by anti-federalists to oppose ratification of the new framework of
however, but also recorded the various rights and interests feudal landowners held in the
property. See Blackstone, Commentaries, II:49-99.
32

Though the importance of Magna Charta in representing real property rights as civil
rights against overweening government is often overstated, the legal restraints that it
placed on government against infringement of property rights (even if only those of
feudal lords) was a first step in recognizing the centrality of property – any variation of
property – in the Anglo-American mindset.
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government. Protection of property rights—at least that of wealthy white males—was, in
short, an important part of Anglo-American history for centuries and the disregard for
such rights was as much a reason for rebellion against Great Britain as it was for the antiFederalists to oppose ratification of the proposed constitution of 1787.
Though it may seem that way at times, this part of my dissertation is not meant to
be a history of property law in England or even the English (later British) North
American colonies. Admittedly, I spend considerable time in this part addressing the
issue of property and contract rights in English law. But, as is noted above, this is
necessary to prove my point that property and contract rights operate as dual-theoretical
constructs lay at the heart of all Anglo-American intellectual, political and constitutional
thought—particularly in the years following the Enlightenment. Property and contract
rights, as such, were so important to the founding generation (the generation which
As drafted and ratified the Constitution, as well as the so-called Bill of Rights)
that it is not only appropriate—but necessary—to spend time chronicling their thought in
Part I of this dissertation. This is important because, property and contract, while not
spelled out as rights in the Constitution, were at least assumed to be implicit rights just
the same, as I maintain, was privacy.
Even then, what interests me most—and what I explore most in the chapters that
follow—is the affect this period had on American constitutionalism.33 The idea of
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Unless otherwise noted, I use the phrase constitutionalism in the same general way the
late constitutional historian, Charles H. McIlwain used it to mean “a legal limitation on
government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic government; the
government of will instead of law. . .” “[T]rue [c]onstitutionalism,” he maintained
represented “limitations of government by law.” Charles H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism:
Ancient and Modern (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press, 2007) 21. While the adjectives
used in McIlwain’s definition may suggest to some that the arbitrary rule to which he
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property, I maintain, was among the most important—if not the most important—idea
behind both English Whig34 as well as (elite) American colonial thought. Property
represented not only real estate and an ability to sustain life as a subsistence farmer but
was also a mark of both citizenship and the right to participate in civic affairs as a citizen
of the polity. Property (both in those days and still today) signified power and the
absence of property, as it still does today, signified powerlessness. White men, if they
did not own property, had no control over the vicissitudes of government. Government
could pass whatever laws thought necessary to maintain control over those without
property and left out of the Social Contract. The same was true for all women, children,
free-blacks and slaves to at least claimed to own property. Property, in short, according
James W. Ely, was not just an important right during the founding of American history,
but was, in fact, the guardian of every other right written into the Bill of Rights.35
Ownership of land (no matter how meager) not only guaranteed the farmer who owned it
a subsistence living but also assured him the status of citizenship—under a social
mentioned was a monarchy, his references to ancient Greek constitutions suggests the
limitation on arbitrary rule applied to democratic states as well as autocratic ones. See
generally Id. at 33-38. McIlwain’s definition is still relevant today, I believe and I
continue to use it in my own classes on Constitutional law.
34

I realize the term “whig” is a term of art and throughout this dissertation (unless
otherwise noted), I use it in the same context as did Bernard Bailyn in his most seminal of
work. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution>>>
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James W. Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of
Property Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). With a nod to the notion of
change over time, Ely writes that, “[i]n 1955 Justice Felix Frankfurter observed,
‘Yesterday, the active area in this field [constitutional law] was concerned with property.
Today, it is civil liberties.” Id. at 3. This is just one of many instances throughout this
dissertation where I note that property and civil liberty are interchangeable concepts. I
am, thus, not the first person to suggest that privacy and property are philosophically
interrelated.
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contract—and also guaranteed his right to participate in the affairs of the body politic.
Lack of property ownership, by contrast, excluded African-Americans (even free blacks),
women and children from any participation in the affairs of state in the new republic.
Rights in property, therefore, were not only an economic asset which sustained life but
were also a means by which to participate in the government or, at the very least, to
obtain personal protection against the government itself.
The absence of property ownership then, much as it is today, virtually guarantees
the individual has no protection against state or federal government authority. Property
rights that could be asserted against an overweening government, however,was essential
to the announcement to the Declaration of Independence in 1776 as well as maintenance
of independence today.36 Property, therefore, has always meant life and freedom for
those who strove to find their place in American society.
To that end, this chapter is dedicated to illustrating the importance of property in
general to Englishmen37as well as the added importance it took on as an element of the
Enlightenment in Anglo-American political thought. Chapter two is devoted to the
36

I use property in this context to denote not only real estate, but also chattel property in
the form of money, stocks, bonds and other financial instruments. With the decline of
feudalism, and the rise of capitalism, these instruments of chattel property would only
become more important as the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries of
American history progressed. As historians and legal jurists of the time noted, one
feature which distinguished America from Europe was the absence of a feudal state in
what would become the United States. The American Revolution, among other things,
led to abolishment of British property rights concerning entail and primogeniture. See St.
George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States with Selected Writings, Ed.
Clyde N. Wilson, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999) 9.
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I choose the gendered term “Englishmen” purposely in this contest rather than a more
generic reference to the “English” because, as I discuss subsequently in this dissertation,
women (particularly, married women) were not only excluded from individual ownership
of property but were also excluded from the status ownership brought them in the context
of the so-called “social contract.”
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importance property played, not just in construction of the Constitution, but also the Bill
of Rights. If the Declaration of Independence can be likened to a birth announcement of
the new nation, then the Constitution of 1791 was a birth certificate setting out the
important legal parameters of this nation’s conception. A Constitution is incomplete,
however, without the addition of a bill of rights securing property rights and chapter three
looks to the intellectual antecedents of an American Bill of Rights and the important role
property played in early republican thought.
Equally important to this dissertation, chapters one, two and three incorporate the
importance of contract to Anglo-American economic and political thought during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Contract was a notion that served dual purposes in
Anglo-American thought for several centuries. On the one hand, it was an economic
construct which allowed for the easy trade of assets between peoples. While the
development of free-market capitalism is an issue well beyond the scope of this
dissertation, suffice it to say that markets could not exist without recognition and
enforcement of contract. On the other hand, contract also served another—more
political—function. As a result of the Enlightenment, contract became the means by
which individual citizens defined their relationships with each other and with the polity.
Civil society—according to philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean
Jacques Rousseau—was no longer determined by one’s status at birth, as it had been in
earlier European history but, instead, in the seventeenth century by contract.
Contemporaries may query who cared what these two Englishmen and a Swiss
thought? But, as I explain throughout Part I of this dissertation, their writings, the
writings of their contemporaries (men such as Smith, Montesquieu and Burlamaqui) and
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the writings of their followers both in Great Britain and here in America were critical in
shaping American political thought and what later became American Constitutionalism.
It is true that contemporary notions of property rights are very different than they were
two, or even three, centuries ago. That is why the concept of privacy, as a property right,
may seem foreign to so many and why it is necessary to retrace this period of American
history. Privacy, I maintain, has strong historical roots in property rights. Part one of my
dissertation is intended to review the importance of property rights in colonial AngloAmerican thought and Part II of my dissertation exhibits the importance of those interests
on more practical matters of the time period—that is to say, as a basis for slavery, for
coverture and for patriarchal domination of children. But, Part II would make little sense
absent an explanation of why property interests (in general) and property interests in the
body (in particular) were so important, to the founding generation. Property and contract
fell out of favor during the nineteenth century—as I discuss in part three of my
dissertation—for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1868. But, proper
understanding of privacy and liberty interests in the twentieth century requires—to
borrow an archaeological metaphor—nothing short of a complete excavation of earlier
notions of property to fully understand the meanings of those terms in historical AngloAmerican thought.

A: Anglo-American Views on Property and Contract
Anna Gordon was the daughter of a wealthy merchant in colonial Boston.
William Martin was an up-and-coming artillery officer dispatched by Great Britain to
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protect the North American portion of its’ empire. The two met, fell in love and married
sometime before 1752. When Anna’s father, James Gordon, died in 1770, her brother
inherited two-thirds of his estate and she inherited the other one-third—a mixture of
developed and undeveloped properties scattered throughout Massachusetts and New
Hampshire. The revolution broke out six years later at which time William’s military
career took him and his family, first, to Nova Scotia and, later, to British occupied New
York. William eventually rose to the rank of commander in the Royal Artillery but he
and Anna left New York during the evacuation of 1783 and returned to Great Britain.
Anna never saw her native homeland again.38
The Martin land in Massachusetts was confiscated in 1781 under a statute that
called for seizure of property owned by those who remained loyal to the empire. Though
Anna was the actual recipient of her father’s land, in actuality, greater title passed to
William. Under the doctrine of Coverture, all rights of landownership in what was the
Bay Colony, later the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, passed from a femme covert
(married woman) to her husband with one exception and that was a right of remainderin
real estate.39 That said, it is easy to understand why Massachusetts moved to seize any
land held by a British artillery officer. This was a man who, after all, took up arms
against the Commonwealth that protected his and his wife’s property interests. What
Massachusetts did not anticipate was that, years later, their forty-one year old son, James,
38

All my factual recitations prior to the judicial decision in Martin v. Commonwealth
comes from the detailed research into this case by Linda Kerber in “The Paradox of
Women’s Citizenship in the Early Republic: The Case of Martin vs. Massachusetts,
1805,” 97 American Historical Review (1992) 349-378.
39

A “right of remainder” is a legal concept which means the fee (overall ownership)
interest in the property would revert to Anna if she survived her husband.
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would, one day, return from Britain and file suit to reclaim his mother’s interest in the
family real estate.40
The son’s attorneys took the position in Martin v. Commonwealth that the
Confiscation Act did not apply to their client’s mother. The law was drafted in such a
way as it applied only to “members” of the Commonwealth. Was Anna Martin a
“member” of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts? George Blake one of Martin’s
attorneys, argued she was not. Femme coverts were not required to take an oath of
allegiance to the republic. Their allegiance, under common law, was to their husband and
to no one else. Furthermore, what, precisely, did the commonwealth’s legislature think
the role of women should be in a time of war? Were femme coverts expected to take up
arms, even against their own husbands, and resist an invasion? Was there any real fear
they would give aid or comfort to the enemy against the directives of their own petit
commonwealth?
The Massachusetts legislature, Blake argued, clearly did not anticipate a femme
covertcould be part of a class to which the Commonwealth’s Confiscation Act would
apply.41 The Commonwealth, put in a difficult position of having to justify a seizure of
property eighteen years earlier, turned to the only argument it could logically make and
that was to argue Anna Martin was within the scope of the statute because, as an
autonomous individual, exercising her own agency, she had power to defy her husband
and then could have remained in America and loyal to its government. The
Massachusetts high court was not convinced and all judges agreed the Commonwealth’s
40

Ibid. I discuss the legal system of coverture in the next chapter and therefore will not
duplicate it here.
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Martin v. Commonwealth, 1 Mass. 347, 362-363 (1895)
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legislature would have never intended the Confiscation Act to apply so as to take the
property interest of a femme covert. Judge Sedgwick filed an opinion which, after noting
significant precedent holding a femme covert could not be found liable for committing
crimes under direction of her husband, opined he could not even begin to envision how
the Massachusetts legislature meant to include women. “Can it be believed,” an
incredulous Sedgwick asked, “that a humane and just legislature ever intended that wives
should be subjected to the horrid alternative of, either, on the one hand, separating from
their husbands and disobeying them, or, on the other, of sacrificing their property? It is
[certainly] impossible for me to suppose that such was ever their intention.”42 Another
judge, Strong, agreed noting that married women had no will of their own and were, thus,
bound to obey their husbands or open themselves up to possible punishment from their
husbands.43 In the end, however, James Martin still recovered the property his
grandfather had left to his mother. Ownership rights in property—despite the passions of
that particular period—triumphed over the politics of the day.
In many ways, Martin v. Commonwealth is the legal history equivalent of a
Rorschach test where everyone sees something different.44 What follows is my own
42
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My interpretation of the Martin case, admittedly, is different than most. Historian
Linda Kerber has probably spent more time dealing with this case than anyone else of
whom I am aware. She describes the arguments made by Massachusetts as
“unprecedented” for the time period as they asserted the agency of women. Kerber, “The
Paradox of Women’s Citizenship,” at 370. But, did they really argue, as Kerber asserts
elsewhere, that “if patriarchy in politics is rejected, so too must be patriarchy in
marriage”? See Linda Kerber, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the
Obligations of Citizenship (New York: Hill and Wang, 1988) 32. I am not so sure this is
the argument they were making. First, as noted above, the Commonwealth attorneys
were placed in situation of trying to defend the confiscation and were ethically charged to
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interpretation of the case, or what I find important from its history and holding which,
admittedly, is different than most. To begin, the holding in Martin reifies the sanctity of
private property against government interference. The Court was clearly bothered by
depriving the son of a former traitor (William Martin) to forfeit ancestral lands and allow
them to be confiscated from his family in which it had been, presumably, been for
generations. This unwillingness to allow government intervention, I maintain, is a
narrative we can detect in American history at least through the Progressive Era before
meeting its demise in the mid 1930s. Second, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts refused to permit a statue, duly passed by the legislature, to interfere with
the private relationship that existed between husband and wife.
Nowhere in the Court’s opinion do the words “private” or “privacy” ever appear
but, in the end, what triumphs is the sanctity of the private sphere over the public one.
Indeed, the head of the petit commonwealth (meaning Anna’s husband) could impose
domestic law superseding that of the larger Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Positive
law (a statute that was enacted by a democratically elected legislature) could not trump
laws regarding a private marital relationship even if that relationship was, in part, defined
by law. The relationship between Martin and his wife, in short, was a private matter over

make any argument in support of their client. Second, both sides were arguing
interpretation of the Commonwealth Confiscation Act and whether Anna Martin, as a
femme covert, was an actual “member of society.” I have never thought, in several
readings of the case, that they were making a larger argument for ending patriarchy in
general. Joan Hoff, on the other hand, omits reference to the argument altogether and
simply states the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts “thought it dangerous to
encourage women to disobey their husbands their husband . . .” Joan Hoff, Law Gender
and Injustice: A Legal History of U.S. Women (New York: New York University Press,
1991) 93. This is a much more pessimistic view of this case than Kerber or others,
including one of my own advisors on this very dissertation, takes away from it.
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which a legislature could not tread.45 The common law doctrine of Coverture, however
repellant it may seem to our modern sensibilities, was said to be natural law whereas the
Confiscation Act, passed by a democratically elected legislature which tried to insert
itself into the privacy of the Martin household and thus alter the relationship between
husband and wife was positive law which sought to alter the natural relation of things.
The operative effect of the Martin decision, much like that of the Griswold case over a
century and a half later, was to say that there existed a zone of privacy around a marital
relationship against which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts could not interfere.46
The purpose of Chapter I, as I have already said, is to explain not only the
significance but the near sacrosanct importance of property and contract rights in English
and, then later, Anglo-American thought. America was a polyglot of nations from the
very beginning but, even if you were not English in origin, you quickly developed an
affinity for English property rights which (in essence) defined the very concept of liberty.
As Enlightenment era philosophers sought to explain, among other things, the very
purpose of government, they recognized man had an inherent property interest in his own
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The primacy of English (later British) common law over positive (statutory) law is a
common theme in American history until the 1930s and the death of liberty of contract
which I discuss supra in this dissertation.
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Although Griswold could arguably be construed as stressing the personal privacy of the
married woman to use contraceptives, whereas Martin clearly stressed the control of a
husband over his wife, the important part to take away from these two cases is that they
both stressed a zone of privacy around the marital relationship into which the government
could not tread. As long as principles of coverture remained the law of the land, the
benefit of that decision would have inured to the husband. With the demise of patriarchy
in general, and coverture in particular, that privacy right should have inured to the benefit
of the wife (or child or slave). What stopped that from happening, however, as I argue in
Part V of this dissertation, was the rise of the regulatory state which assumed the role of
the patriarch or parens patriae.
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body. The legal fiction of the so-called Social Contract, in fact, had no real basis without
the notion of property rights and the conversion of common property into personal
property.
Contract is also a fundamental part of my thesis. The majority of my dissertation
focuses on the relationship between property and privacy, cut contract is essential to
understanding that relationship for two reasons. First, contract is what gives property
most of its value. All of the land on Manhattan is worthless if you cannot sell, lease or
mortgage it and those transactions are all accomplished through contracts. Contract also
led industrial capitalism to flourish in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
and the fight to preserve contract gave rise to one of the arguably most notorious
decisions in United States Supreme Court history.47 Contract is also important in AngloAmerican constitutional culture because it defined the relationship between the citizen
and the state as part of the so-called Social Compact.

1. Anglo-American Principles of Property
Although the most important strands of Anglo-American political thought on
property came from the Enlightenment, the intellectual building-blocks for that idea
already had strong foundations prior to that time. The earliest known dialectic on the
value of private property rights was between Aristotle and his mentor, Plato. The
opening epigram to this chapter was Aristotle’s response to his teacher’s advocacy of
communal property ownership. Although Peter Garnsey of Cambridge University
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By this I mean Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) which I discuss at length in
various future chapters of this dissertation and, thus, will not do so here.
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challenges Aristotle’s reading of his predecessor’s texts—indeed, even labeling him a
“bad historian of philosophy”—even Garnsey concedes the dichotomy between the two
philosophers were a primary concern in early Christendom. This was particularly true
given how much Platonic philosophy found its way into early Christian, or Catholic,
theology.48
Christendom, or at least Christians wrestling with biblical text, changed Western
European ideas on property. After all, God supposedly gave to man a common dominion
over the earth. By the end of the first millennium, CE, both ecclesiastics and nonecclesiastics claimed private ownership rights in land. How was it possible for early
Christendom—of which England was a part—to justify private, as opposed to communal,
ownership rights in land? This was both a spiritual question as well as a political one as
the Roman Catholic Church was a significant landowner both in the British Isles and the
rest of continental Europe. Politics—most notably, warfare—presented private property
as a fait accompli by the end of the first millennia but it was up to the Church and bar,
with help from classical philosophy, to justify private rather than communal ownership.
After the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, the new King—William I (“the
Conqueror”)—considered himself owner of all land in England. In turn, the new king
subinfeudated his land to loyal nobles in return for services to the crown. Those nobles,
then, further sub-infeudated with their own vassals who agreed to provide service to their
48

Peter Garnsey, Thinking about Property: From Antiquity to the Age of the
Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 6-58. Garnsey’s
comment on Aristotle as a bad historical philosopher can be found at ibid. at 31. Wrong
or not, Aristotle made a spirited defense for private property rights. “”if [men] do not
share equally in enjoyment and toils, those who labour much and get little will
necessarily complain of those who labour little and receive or consume much.” Aristotle,
Politics, at 61; “It is clearly better that property should be private. . .” Ibid., at 62.
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lords. Real property was, therefore, not only a means of support, in which subsistence
farming staved off starvation for both noble and vassals, but was also a marker of wealth,
power and privilege within the English caste system; English nobles provided for their
new king, while the lesser nobility, and then yeomen farmers, provided for their nobles.
The Norman invaders were so thorough at obliterating Anglo-Saxon land tenures, and
then listing and defining their own, that their so-called Domesday Book delineated
Norman ownership down to local farmer. Any loss of these rights would impact both
one’s own economic well-being as well as his place in society. The Church, though still
holding tenure under Norman kings, held in “free alms” which alleviated them of any
earthly service.49 Clearly, the Catholic Church had an enormous interest in rejecting both
the Platonic view of communalism as well as the biblical pronouncement of dominion.
Two centuries after the Norman Conquest, St. Thomas Aquinas came up with an
answer in his Summa Theologica. Though true Hebrew Scripture said God had
dominium over everything on earth, man should still be able to exercise dominion over
parts of the earth because God created those things for his use and because it was
necessary for survival. As for acquiring private property, to the exclusion of other
claimants, Aquinas also reasoned that this was necessary for man’s survival and, in any
event, it provided for more peaceful relations between men who would surely argue
amongst themselves if they all claimed use of property in common. Human affairs are
also conducted in a more orderly manner if each man is charged for the care of something
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Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (Boston: Little,
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(London: Cavendish Publishing, 2001) 21.
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his own.50 I concede this is a vast over-simplification of centuries of legal and
theological thought but my objective here is to show how Europe—particularly
England—rejected what they believed was Platonic communality in favor of private
property ownership.
Though Norman regulation proved a precise system for defining land rights for a
generation or two after conquest, tenuous feudal claims eventually led to conflict between
descendants of both king and vassal who no longer appreciated (or, for that matter,
remembered) the purpose of the relationship to begin with. The lack of institutional
memory between crown and vassal would, as one might expect, eventually lead to
conflict between them.51 Less than two centuries after conquest, open rebellion broke out
between king and vassal. This rebellion ultimately led to King John I submitting to the
first Magna Charta in 1215. Because Magna Charta only affected king and his nobles,
many argue its importance is overstated in Anglo-American history. Perhaps. But the
Great Charter would evolve and take on greater importance over time and, even if it had
50

Gen. 1:26 (“And God said, “Let us make in our image, after our likeness: and let them
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subdue it . . .”). See Aquinas, Political Writings, ed. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002) 205-208. Development of natural law theory, both under
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natural law is self-preservation. Howard P. Kainz, Natural Law: An Introduction and ReExamination (Chicago: Open Court, 2004) 15-30. It naturally follows that claiming land,
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One of the greatest, if not the greatest, recorded breaks from English common law in
colonial America was considered was the re-ordering of rights in real property. St.
George Tucker, who edited one of the first editions of Blackstone’s Commentaries on
English law for an American audience, noted both “abolition of entails” and the right to
primogeniture” was one of the bulwarks of the American system of jurisprudence. St.
George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States With Selected Writings
(Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1999) 9.
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not, Magna Charta still forms the foundation of legal thought regarding property that
would, five centuries later, would form the bulwark of American Constitutional law
regarding property.
First, it regulated relations between king and nobles thereby affecting all the
obligations nobles owed to their king under feudal law. Second, and more importantly, it
also regulated (albeit, to a far more limited extent) the relation between noble and their
“undertenants.” Over time, this grew into a singular statement of opposition by
landowners against the state. The legal device employed to explain this change were the
rhetorical concepts of dominium and usufruct. The English king may have retained
dominium (or right of ownership) over the land but his vassals gained a concomitant
legally recognized right of usufruct (or right of enjoyment without the right of actual
ownership)52. Ownership, combined with the right of exclusive use, was only
represented by the higher title of dominium directumet utile.53 The distinction between
dominium and usufruct is not a dry and ancient rhetorical device that played with words
but would, later, have a significant impact on property rulings by the United States
Supreme Courts as well as state supreme courts throughout the republic.54
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As I discuss later in chapter three, these principles, if not the precise rhetoric, found its
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Much of the intellectual, if not legal, justification for early private ownership rights
came from clergyman who sought to justify such rights for the Roman Catholic Church.
To that end, scholars have long noted the interplay of ancient thought with medieval
philosophy. William of Ockham, and others, came close to enunciating that private
property inured to the individual. See K. Pennington, “Law, Legislative Authority and
Theories of Government, 1150-1300,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political
Thought, c. 350-1450, ed. J.H. Burns (Cambridge: University Press, 1988) 424, 438-439;
Antony Black, “The Individual and Society,” in Ibid., 588, 601-603. Many ecclesiastics
could, for instance, point to ancient Greek and Roman texts which supported the efficacy
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In any case, Magna Charta eventually led to solidification of private property
right recognition at all ends of the economic spectrum thereby impacting recognition of
rights of yeomen farmers as well as others in the Anglo-American legal and
constitutional pecking-order. These private rights in land would eventually trickle
down—to borrow a twentieth-century catch-phrase—to the lesser English landowners.
Jean Louis De Lolme, a Swiss historian of the British Constitution, observed Magna
Charta prevented all “arbitrary attempts” by the sovereign (king) form “touching any part
of the property of the [s]ubject[.]” More recently, Bernard Siegan, traced the substance
of America’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses of the United States
Constitution to the Fourth English Magna Charta issued in 1225. That version of the
Great Charter, in Chapter Twenty-Nine, stated no freeman could be “disseised of his
freehold” except by “the law of the land.” Britain’s parliament later expanded that
protection of Magna Charta through different legislative acts over the centuries and
common law courts further expounded on both those enactments as well as the Great
Charter.55 All of this inured, of course, to the land and property owner.
of private property arrangements. See Janet Coleman, “Property and Poverty,” in Ibid
607-648. Aristotle, for instance, had argued property should be private rather than
common as it would cause far less conflict between men than the holding of property in
common. Aristotle, Politics (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2000) 62-66. So too agreed
Saint Thomas Aquinas who, drawing on Aristotle’s Politics, argued that, while God
continue to exercise dominium over all the earth, mankind gained the right to exercise
usufruct over all that was necessary to support his existence on the earth. Coleman, supra
at 616-625. Later natural law philosophers, however, would disagree with Aquinas. See
Heinrich A. Rommen, The Natural Law: A Study in Social History and Philosophy
(Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund, 1998) 207 (“The institution of private property is of
natural law. In the long run man cannot exist, cannot make good his right to marriage or
to a family or to security of life, and cannot maintain his sphere of individual right to a
life of his own, unless he is entitled to ownership through the acquisition of goods”).
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Jean Louis De Lolme, The Constitution of England, ed. David Lieberman
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As important as the Great Charter was, we should not underestimate the
interpretation and application given it by sixteenth century jurist, Edward Coke, Chief
Justice of Common Pleas and, later, the King’s Bench. Bernard Siegan, illustrates that
the many rights extended English property owners through not only Magna Charta but its
subsequent expansion by Coke. These included, in no particular order of importance, the
requirement that (1) nobody could be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law; (2) any laws attempting to do so must be prospective, rather than
retroactive; (3) every person has the freedom to practice the vocation of his choice; (4)
monopolies are violative of Magna Charta: and (5) property rights may be limited only
when necessary to protect the lives or property of others. While none of this may strike
contemporary Americans as particularly noteworthy, it was a tremendous restriction on
princely prerogative that, along with other changes that were to come about in the
seventeenth century, rendered the English (later British) monarchy the laughing-stock of
kings and emperors on continental Europe.56
By the dawn of the Fourteenth Century, English law focused on property in its
most basic sense, meaning land. Real property enjoyed much of the focus of the common
law and possession of land, as opposed to actual ownership, was the sine qua non for
judicial backing of a claim of right thereto. If the protections for real property seemed
lax, protections for chattel (“movable”) property was even worse. Personal property,
From Magna Carta to the Fourteenth Amendment (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 2001) 5-29.
56

Siegan, Property Rights from Magna, Charta, at 28. As many historians have noted, the
notion of divine right, though infrequently asserted by Stuart monarchs, died in England
much sooner than it died on the continent and British kings had no other choice but to
respect property rights of their nobles and gentry.
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during this time period, for all intents and purposes, was “synonymous with cattle”
explained Sir Frederick Pollock and William Maitland. Protections for modern property
rights acquired by contract (e.g., stock, bonds, bank deposits, mortgages) were virtually
non-existent for the centuries following Magna Charta. Indeed, Medieval protection for
real estate—as primitive as it was—covered far more than any legal protections afforded
chattel rights. What benefitted English kings most was the institution of land tenures and
entails through which they could derive military service of knights. The first Magna
Charta, notably, restricted the English king’s abuse of land rights but did little to protect
rights of chattel property, which became increasingly important in later centuries as new
forms of property rights were developed.57 Indeed, as society advanced to the modern
era, protection of contract rights would, eventually, overtake protection of real property
rights.
Certainly Magna Charta was significant in protecting English property rights, but
various wars and political resolutions over the course of the seventeenth century largely
overshadow the importance of the thirteenth century C.E. The English Civil War (16421651) and, even later, the Glorious Revolution (1688), had a greater impact on English
ideas on the importance of property in England, generally, and its’ American colonies in
particular. Cut off from the mother country during the seventeenth century, and being
part of a generation which grew up with little or no instructive contract from the
metropol, Anglo-American colonists found themselves in the unique position of absence
from England and the inability to experience the political context from which many of
57
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these ideas emerged and, because of that, could simply pick and choose which theory
benefitted them at the time. One theory that would play a significant role in later
American thought was espoused in Emerich de Vattel’s, The Law of Nations. De Vattel
wrote of virgin lands, like America, that:
When a nation in a body takes possession of a country, everything that is
not divided among its members remains common to the whole nation, and
is called public property. . . . As soon as the nation commits the reins of
government to the hands of a prince, it is considered as committing to him,
at the same time, the means of governing. Since therefore the income of
the public property, of the domain of the state, is destined for the expense
of government, it is naturally at the prince’s disposal and out always to be
considered in this light.58
The political philosophy of de Vattel may not have had the same effect as Locke
for purposes of acquiring ownership of property interests in the New World. But, at the
same time, it weakened the legal rights of traditional aboriginal owners and helped usher
in a new way of thinking about property and property interests in the new world. What
was taken for granted in European thought (i.e., both the improvement and development
of property) would make its way here, to America and have some disastrous
consequences for aboriginal peoples.

2. Anglo-American Principles of Contract
As mentioned previously, property, as important as it was to the founding
generation, lacked value absent the notion of contract even if contract did not seem
immediately apparent to those who wrote our founding documents. Contract, and
contract alone, granted status to property owners even for those white men who did not
own property. In short, the ability to contract not only guaranteed access to the economic
58
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system, but also defined the role of white men within governmental structure. Slaves,
women, children and even free blacks, however, were not only denied access to contract
in the economic sense of the term but, as discussed later in Part III of this dissertation,
were also excluded altogether from the so-called “social contract” and, therefore, the
polity in which they lived.
In 1861, Sir Henry Sumner Maine observed “[t]here are few general propositions
concerning the age to which we belong which seem at first sight likely to be received
with readier concurrence than the assertion than the society of our day is mainly
distinguished from that of preceeding generations by the largeness of the sphere which
is occupied in it by [c]onract.”59 Maine’s comment, at least for America, had both
economic/sociological implications stretching far beyond anything involved with the
European continent to which he had contact.
As mentioned above, contract (in the context of this dissertation) has two separate
meanings--both of which are important to understanding my argument. Though flawed
in some respects, the best explanation I have seen to explain the distinction between the
two is that given by P.S. Atiyah, a British legal historian, who writes as follows:
The law of contract in the modern world, even the ideas which underlie it
seem to have no relationship to the ideas which underlay the Social
Contract. The relationship between Government and governed appears to
have no relationship at all with the relationship between contracting
parties. The former is largely perceived as an authoritarian and
hierarchical relationship. . . . A contractual relationship, by contrast, is
seen as deriving from agreement; it is felt to be the creation of the parties
who give it life.60
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Though true to a large extent, this explanation neglects to mention (at least for
Americans) that participation in the Social Contract was also a prerequisite to
participating in contract in the economic sense of the term. For instance, white men
could sell their labor through a contractual arrangement, but that option was almost
always off-limits to women, children, slaves and, sometimes, even free blacks. If you
were not a party to the social contract, in short, you oftentimes could not enter into the
economic contracts benefit it provided either.
This is not meant to disparage the importance of social contract theory, however.
As noted by Sir Henry Maine, contract (as opposed to status) allowed white men to
define their place within society. While this notion may have been slow to take root in
England/Great Britain, it found enormous support in an egalitarian American where
(European white) men could escape the caste into which they were born and scale the
heights of society based on their own merit.James Wilson, a Scottish émigré to the United
States, who later became an Associate Justice of the United States wrote “[t]his theory
[meaning social contract] is a material basis of political rights; and as a theoretical point,
is not difficult to be maintained. For what gives any legislature a right to act, where no
express consent can be shown.” Though an important statement of social contract theory,
suffice it to say, Wilson left out all those were not (heterosexual) white male property
owners.61
Economic contract was therefore intended to be the means by which many born
into the lower castes enabled themselves to achieve riches many of them would have
never achieved had they been living in Europe. What is meant to be, however, is
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oftentimes not what turns out to be. Many men, from John Jacob Astor, to John Davison
Rockefeller, proved this was possible. Many others, however, proved the notion of
American success a failure and died in the process.
I will come back to the concept of contract later in this dissertation. Property and
contract are almost inextricably linked with one another but that link is not truly realized
until the nineteenth century of American history. The eighteenth century, however, is
still infused with rhetoric of the Enlightenment which at least in eighteenth century
America, meant the idea of social contract for white, propertied men.

B. Constitution–Making
There occurred in British North America what I describe to my undergraduate
history classes as a creolization of Anglo-American legal and constitutional thought. The
British Constitution, at least in the Eighteenth Century, was unwritten and therefore
undefined by contemporary American standards. Though it included various historical
documents like Magna Charta and the British Bill of Rights of 1688, it was also
influenced by Parliament and parliamentary precedent. Historians such as Bernard
Bailyn chronicled the importance of republican (and what Bailyn also characterized as
“radical whig”) thought in Anglo-American politics that led to the American Revolution
and the American Constitution. The notion of an unwritten constitution—the organic law
of the land—was appealing to everyone on this side of the Atlantic both as a fundamental
statement of law as well as a restriction on the legislative branch of government which
did not exist in Great Britain. Although American colonies (later states) rejected the
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notion of British Constitutionalism, what is amazing is how much of the British common
law was retained—even today in the twenty-first century America.62

1. Confederation Threats to American Property and Contract Rights
Polemics from the latter half of the eighteenth century make clear that the founders,
both Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike, agreed that man possessed certain natural
rights and that those rights required protection. Where they disagreed was over how to
defend those rights and what threatened them in the first place. In 1776, Americans
perceived that the preeminent threat to liberty emanated from unchecked magistrates.
They responded by creating republican state constitutions which vested enormous power
in legislatures and provided for weak executives. It never occurred to orthodox Whigs
drafting those constitutions that representative bodies could be just as tyrannous as
executive ones or that the problem lay not with the body in which power was reposed but
the lack of institutional safeguards to check the exercise of that power.
Between 1776 and 1787, however, there occurred a series of events which
transformed republican thinking and re-focused attention onto the state legislatures as a
source for tyranny. Proliferation of paper money and debtor relief statutes with their
effect on “republican virtue,” not to mention the value of property interests, caused
political elites to reorient their thinking as to the origins of tyranny. It was not just
magistrates that were capable of violating the people’s rights, legislative assemblies could
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be equally tyrannical. This change in thought—the so-called “republican synthesis”—
manifested itself in a movement to strengthen the national government and to check state
governments. Although Madison’s proposed national veto of state legislation never came
to fruition, the founders succeeded in prohibiting states from any further effort to coin
money or impair the obligation of contract. More importantly, though, the founders
crafted a frame of government which significantly cut back the power of the legislative
branch and instituted checks against popular majoritarianism. As a further check on
overreaching legislatures, Federalists like James Madison who had in the past opposed
inclusion of a bill of rights, were willing to adopt them as a check on “excess democracy”
and legislative tyranny.
As noted previously, the groundwork for the “republican synthesis” was first laid by
Bernard Bailyn, who pointed out that Whig Oppositional thought, inherited from the
Glorious Revolution and transplanted into colonial America, advocated free and
independent parliaments as the best guardians of liberty. What made this belief
problematic, however, was the colonial conception of British Constitutionalism and the
place of Parliament in that sphere. Constitutions were perceived by Whigs as simply
arrangements of institutions or frames of government. They were not viewed, as we view
them today, as written documents specifying rights which cannot be infringed by popular
government. The British Constitution did not check Parliament because Parliament was,
in fact, a part of that constitutional system and laws passed by Parliament were ipso facto
constitutional. After independence, Americans carried these views over into their initial
experiments with republicanism in state governments. Representation in the new state
governments was based on direct consent of the governed and the former colonists tried
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to make government, particularly the legislatures, more reflective of the people who gave
their consent. Indeed, these new state governments “had no separate existence apart”
from the people. Only after the turbulent years of the 1780s would Americans begin
what Bailyn described as a process of disengaging popular assemblies from fundamental
law so that, by the time of the Philadelphia convention, the founders would conceive of
government not as a part of such law but subordinate thereto.63
The task fell to Gordon Wood and subsequent scholars to elaborate on that process of
disengagement and explain how legislatures came to be viewed, not as part of the
fundamental organic law of the land, but as constrained by it. This process began,
according to Wood, in the 1780s and was attributable to two factors—the first was the
systemic defects in the Articles of Confederation which made the national government
weak and dependent on the states and the second was what Wood calls “excess
democracy” or legislative tyranny in the state governments. The defects in the Articles of
Confederation are well known and require little elaboration—the national government
had no power to tax, no power to regulate foreign or interstate commerce and no power to
enforce its treaty obligations with Great Britain. The crisis in state government is a little
more complex and was a natural outgrowth of what Bailyn described as a concerted effort
to make legislatures more reflective of the people. The problem was that, in the process,
state legislatures became more populist and passed legislation which reflected popular
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interests thereby running contrary to the concept of disinterested republican virtue which
disdained such parochial interests.64
The Revolutionary War, with its vast government expenditures and its easy money
policies to finance the war effort, precipitated great prosperity which came to an end with
the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783. Consumers who had grown used to being flush with
available cash, middling traders who wanted to unload their inventories, debtors who
needed easy money to repay loans, farmers and planters who wanted to finance future
crops and current consumption all petitioned their state governments to issue its own
paper money and the states were all too eager to oblige. Emissions of paper money
proved inflationary, though, and creditors tried to avoid accepting the devalued currency
as payment for debts. States responded by passing legal tender laws requiring creditors
to accept depreciated currency in satisfaction of their debts. If that was not enough, states
also passed relief legislation allowing debtors to repay their debts in several installments
over time.65 Of all the problems that precipitated the calling of the Philadelphia
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convention, scholars agree that these interferences with property interests were among the
most significant.66
The solution to these democratic excesses lay in a reorientation of political thinking
that has come to be called “the republican synthesis.” There are several aspects to these
changes in republican theory but, for our purposes, we need only concentrate on two.
The first was a realignment of the political system and distribution of power within that
system. The colonial experience had proven to Americans that too much power given to
the executive led to tyranny. Likewise, the Confederation experience proved that too
much power given to elected assemblies also led to violation of rights. The founders
eventually concluded that perhaps the problem was not who held power but that too much
power should never be vested in a single body no matter what the body. The solution
was to divide power, to spread it over several bodies, and then to institute systems of
checks and balances. To that end, the founders devised various “brakes” on democracy.
Those brakes included not only the concept of an extended republic but also more
concrete measures like an executive veto, a supreme court and filtering mechanisms such
as an electoral college and the appointment of senators by state legislatures. The second
important change in the “republican synthesis” was a reconceptualization of the role of
constitutions in the American polity. As Bailyn and Wood have shown, the British model
of constitutionalism perceived the constitution as merely a system of government with
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Parliament as part of that system. Parliament could not violate the constitution because it
was a part of that constitution and all of its actions were therefore constitutional. By the
time of the revolution, however, Americans undertook what Wood calls a “crucial
divergence” from their British counterparts and envisioned the British Constitution as
constraining Parliament. Indeed, it was the perceived violation of their rights under the
British Constitution which justified the revolution in the minds of the colonials. But,
even as Americans reconceived of constitutions as being above positive law passed by
legislatures, they hesitated in taking the next step of putting constitutions entirely beyond
the reach of legislatures. State constitutions were largely drafted by state legislatures and
during the Confederation era were frequently revised and rewritten by the state
legislatures to accommodate their own needs. A significant part of the “republican
remedies” for the crisis of the 1780s was a realization that constitutions must be put
beyond the power of the legislatures so that they could only be changed by the sovereign
people acting in convention.67
This changed view of Constitutionalism would have a profound effect on the
proceedings both in the Philadelphia Convention and in the First Congress. Federalists
and Anti-Federalists alike were suspicious of government. For Federalists, the danger lay
in state governments which proved only too willing during the Confederation period to
pass legislation which trammeled on the natural rights of property owners. For AntiFederalists, the danger lay in a distant national government which could pass laws
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violating the rights of their citizens. The one point on which both sides could agree was
the necessity of inserting “brakes” on democratic government at the national level.

2. The Making and Ratification of the Constitution (1787-1789)
In May, 1787, fifty-five delegates from twelve states began to arrive in Philadelphia
for the express purpose of amending the Articles of Confederation.68 These delegates,
despite absences of such notable intellects as John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, were
among the best and brightest of America’s political elite and they quickly came to the
conclusion what was needed was not an amendment to the articles of governance but a
new set of articles altogether. Thus, in great secrecy, they set about drafting an entirely
new framework of government. Most of their work that summer centered upon both the
structure of government and the relationship between a national government and the
states (Articles IV & VI). Little attention was paid to the “rights” of citizens. In August,
Charles Pinckney suggested several propositions be taken up by the Committee of Detail
including proposals that liberty of the press be “inviolably preserved” and that soldiers
could not be quartered in private homes during peacetime “without consent of the owner”
(which language pre-figured what eventually became the First and Third Amendments)
but the committee took no further action on the proposal.69
The matter came up again, almost by accident, in the final days of the convention.
On September 12, 1787, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina observed that the document
they were debating made no provision for jury trial in civil cases. Elbridge Gerry of
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Massachusetts echoed his concern noting juries were necessary to guard against corrupt
judges. At that point, George Mason of Virginia spoke up and voiced agreement with
Williamson and Gerry and suggested the proposed constitution be prefaced with a bill of
rights. Mason continued that such a bill would “give great quiet to the people” and could
be prepared in just a few hours thereby not delaying adjournment of the convention.70
Roger Sherman of Connecticut questioned the need for a bill of rights. Though all for
“securing the rights of the people where requisite,” Sherman noted the state constitutions
and declarations of rights were not being repealed by the new proposed federal
constitution and that they would suffice to protect the rights of the people. Mason
answered that, while the state constitutions were not repealed, the new federal
Constitution would nevertheless “be paramount to State Bills of Rights.” Gerry then
moved the matter be referred to a committee where a bill could, presumably, be quickly
drafted. Mason seconded his proposal but, in the end, the motion was unanimously
defeated with neither Virginia nor Massachusetts in support of the positions advocated by
their own delegates.71
Gerry and Mason ultimately refused to sign the final draft of the proposed
Constitution. On draft blanks, Mason noted that “[t]here is no Declaration of Rights, and
the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and constitution of the
several States, the Declaration of Rights in the separate States are no security.” So upset
was Mason with these perceived defects, that he declared to his fellow delegates that he
70
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would “sooner chop off his right hand than put it to the Constitution as it stood.” Gerry
was not so much troubled by the absence of a bill of rights as he was by eight other
structural problems with the new government, all of which he said he could “get over” if
the rights of citizens were not rendered insecure by the power of Congress to make
whatever laws they pleased and then to establish tribunals without juries.72 The proposed
constitution was nevertheless approved by the overwhelming majority of delegates who
remained in Philadelphia until September. Only three delegates at the conclusion of the
convention (Mason, Gerry and Edmond Randolph of Virginia) refused to give their
assent to the document. The new frame of government was then sent to the states for
their approval and ratification.
If Federalists expected the same muted reaction to the absence of a bill of rights at
state ratification conventions as they received in Philadelphia, then they sorely
underestimated the salience of that issue. Anti-Federalists, concerned with national
intrusion on both individual and state’s rights, seized on the absence of a bill of rights as
reason to oppose what they saw as an emerging federal leviathan. This is not to suggest
that the absence of a bill of rights was the only reason Anti-Federalists opposed the new
constitution. As Saul Cornell has persuasively shown, few groups in history were as
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heterogeneous, and had such differing ideas on the inviolability of rights and the role of
democracy in America, as Anti-Federalists. There were elite, middling and plebian
strains of Anti-Federalism—each with its own philosophical concerns about the national
government and oftentimes as suspicious of their Anti-Federalist colleagues as they were
of their Federalist opponents. Nevertheless, the lack of a bill of rights was a more
tangible point around which to rally than, say, differing views of democracy and
republicanism.73
The ensuing struggle between these groups played out over class and ideological
battlegrounds. Progressive historians like Charles Beard cast Federalist and AntiFederalist positions in terms of economics, with support for the Constitution coming from
merchants, money lenders and securities holders while opposition originated with
farmers, debtors and advocates of loose money. Subsequent scholarship demonstrated
that the battle for ratification was far more complex and involved differing political
ideologies and concepts of representative government. Federalists viewed good
republican government as administered by the virtuous who arose from the ranks of the
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elites and would govern for everyone. Anti-Federalists were obsessed with what they
saw as a Federalist cabal to govern through “aristocracy.” Elite Anti-Federalists, like
George Mason of Virginia, were not so concerned about a “natural aristocracy,” but
feared the new frame of government concentrated too much power in the hands of too
few people who would eventually form a “governmental aristocracy” to rule everyone
else. Their solution was a bill of rights to protect individual liberty. Middling AntiFederalists, merchants, mechanics and professional men, were wary of the very sort of
natural aristocracy to which men like Mason belonged and resented the Federalist
arguments that filtering mechanisms in the new Constitution were needed to ensure that
these “better sorts” were the ones who rose to power in the new Congress. A bill of
rights was all well and good but did little to relieve their concerns about the structure of
the new government. The solution for these men was to strip power away from the
national government and keep it at the state level where it could be controlled. At the far
end of the Anti-Federalist spectrum were plebian populists, like farmers in the western
back countries, who were the most class conscious and favored representation by
“populist localism” where representatives more closely resembled the constituents they
were supposed to represent. Thus, while the battle lines between Federalists and AntiFederalists coalesced around the issue of a bill of rights, their differences were much
more systemic and theoretical. 74
The Constitution, as ratified in 1789, provided a number of affirmative protections for
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private property even if it did not spell out the right to acquire, use or sell property per se.
Article I of that document ostensibly dealt with power of the legislature, but section ten
of that article prohibited states from either issuing the much maligned paper money or
interfering with the obligation of contract. Moreover, despite arguments by some
historians the Constitution was neutral to slavery, its various provisions woven
throughout the original document clearly indicates protection for slave property.
Ownership of property was not an enumerated right but was certainly implied by the
provisions protecting it. Recognition of this unenumerated right, and perhaps others,
would become even more clear with passage and ratification of a bill of rights.

3. The Bill of Rights: Unenumerated Rights in General and Property in Particular
It is clear the founders, both Federalists and Anti-Federalists, were concerned
about protecting the rights of citizens—or at least those of white male property owners—
but what is less clear is what they meant by the term “rights” and what specific
protections for those rights they thought necessary to included in the now polity. From
the writings of Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike, it would appear that the “rights’
with which they were primarily concerned were, in fact, “natural rights.” Thomas Paine
wrote that he considered the war against Great Britain to be the war of the people “for the
security of their natural rights, and the protection of their own property.” Later, when
arguing for adoption of the Constitution, John Jay admitted that it was “undeniable” that
people must cede to the new government “some of their natural rights” but that this was
necessary to vest government with requisite power to function and that the institution of
government was “an indispensable necessity.” Indeed, to create a proper civil
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government, it was necessary “that a certain portion of natural liberty” belonging to man
in a state of nature be surrendered. That said, Anti-Federalists like Richard Henry Lee
thought it absolutely essential to expressly declare a “residuum” of “natural rights, which
is not intended to be given up to society” upon entering the new polity.75
Due to their amorphous and undefined nature, though, devising a means to protect the
people’s natural rights was a primary point of contention between proponents and
opponents of the Constitution. Anti-Federalists insisted that the only way to protect their
rights was with a bill specifically setting out rights that could not be infringed by
government. Federalists responded that it was impossible to enumerate all the natural
rights of man and an incomplete enumeration was even more dangerous than no
enumeration at all. In proposing what ultimately became the Ninth Amendment,
Madison devised an ingenious compromise that addressed the arguments of both groups.
The most convincing concern cited by Federalists for not including a bill of rights
in the Constitution centered on the fact that natural rights were amorphous and incapable
of any precise delineation. Many founders were well-schooled in law and were wellaware of the ancient legal maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression
of one thing means exclusion of another). They were concerned that an enumeration of
some rights could later be construed by tyrants as having been meant to exclude any other
rights which were not so enumerated. James Wilson summed up the danger for his
fellow Pennsylvanians:
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In a government possessed of enumerated powers, such a measure would
be not only unnecessary, but preposterous and dangerous. . . .[In] a
government consisting of enumerated powers, such as is proposed for the
United States, a bill of rights would not be unnecessary, but, in my humble
judgment, highly imprudent. In all societies, there are many powers and
rights which cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed
to a constitution is an enumeration of the powers reserved. If we attempt
an enumeration, every thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be
given. The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all
implied power into the scale of the government, and the rights of the
people would be rendered incomplete. On the other hand, an imperfect
enumeration of the powers of government reserves all implied power to
the people; and by that means the constitution becomes incomplete. But
of the two, it is much safer to run the risk on the side of the constitution;
for an omission in the enumeration of the powers of government is neither
so dangerous nor important as an omission in the enumeration of the rights
of the people.76
On December 4, 1787, just days before Pennsylvania would ratify, Wilson again
rose to emphasize what he saw as the futility of including a bill of rights: “[e]numerate all
the rights of men! I am sure . . . no gentleman in the late convention would have
attempted such a thing.”77 Hamilton sounded the same clarion in Federalist 84:
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent to
which are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed
Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various
exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford
a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that
things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance,
should it be said that the liberty of the press hall not be restrained, when
no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not
contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is
evident that it would furnish to men disposed to usurp, a plausible
pretence [sic] for claiming that power.78
Future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell of North Carolina agreed and called

76

Elliot, Debates, 2:436.

77

Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, 3:162.

78

Hamilton, “Federalist 84,” in The Federalist, 550.
56

the demand for a bill of rights nothing short of “absurd.” Iredell argued that no man, in
all of his ingenuity, could enumerate a list of rights that were not relinquished in the
Constitution. Should a legislature violate an unenumerated right in the future, Iredell
pointed out, the legislature could merely point to the fact that such a right was never
included in the bill of rights and, thus, was not protected. A bill of rights in a government
based on delegated powers was thus a “snare” for the unwary rather than a “protection.”79
In proposing his amendments, Madison did not wholly abandon the Federalist concern
over the expressio unius argument of an imperfect enumeration of rights later being
construed to deny other rights that were not enumerated. To guard against it, the final
paragraph of his fourth proposed amendment provided that “[t]he exceptions here or
elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed
as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people.”80 Madison
explained the purpose of this paragraph as follows:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating
particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights
which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by
implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to
be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were
consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have
ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system;
but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as
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gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution.81
Thus, to prevent a partial enumeration of rights from being construed to deny
protection to other rights not expressly set out in the Constitution, Madison proposed that
which ultimately became the Ninth Amendment. There is little legislative history on
what happened to the “last clause” of Madison’s “fourth resolution” as it wound its way
through Congress. But, somewhere during its time in committee the language was reshaped to read the way it does today. A House Committee Report on July 28, 1789,
shows the language of the amendment as reading that “[t]he enumeration in this
Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.”82 Elbridge Gerry moved to delete the word “disparage,” which he
claimed was unclear, and to insert the phrase “deny or impair” but his motion was not
seconded. There is no record of any further debate on that particular provision and it was
sent to the states where it was ultimately ratified.
The proposal, debate and ratification of the Bill of Rights is important for two
reasons. First, the Fifth Amendment of that Bill provided, in pertinent part, that no
person shall be deprived of “property, without due process of law.” The very promise that

81

Gales, The Annals of Congress, 1:439. Several weeks after introducing his proposals,
Madison forwarded them to Jefferson in Paris stating that, while other amendments might
have been made as well, everything of a “controvertible nature” that could have
endangered passage in Congress and ratification in the states was avoided. Madison to
Thomas Jefferson, 30 June 1789, The Republic of Letters, 1:618-624. Jefferson
responded several months later and assured his protege that, while there were other
amendments he would have liked to have seen included in Madison’s proposals, he had
enough confidence in his countrymen that “we shall have them as soon as the degeneracy
of our government shall render them necessary.” Jefferson to James Madison, 28 August
1789, Ibid., 1:627-631.
82

House Committee Report, in Creating the Bill of Rights, 31.
58

property should not be taken without due process of law assumes, at the very least, that
there is a right to acquire or retain property without interference from the government.
More importantly, however, if the right to own property is not enumerated in the text of
the Constitution, and if the Ninth Amendment is taken to mean precisely what its drafter
(James Madison) said it meant, then it is logical to assume that there are other
enumerated rights that exist, or at least permutations on the right to own property.
My thesis—that the notion of bodily property was encompassed within the
Enlightenment notion of property in general—is put to the test in the next chapter of my
dissertation. Enlightenment principles continue to hold sway (more or less) over the
political and legal thought of this country. I maintain that well into the early parts of the
nineteenth centuries, those principles found a sympathetic ear with judicial branches of
government. Chapter Three, explores how in the early days of the republic the United
States Supreme Court both—indeed, even state supreme courts—rigorously enforced
both property and contract rights. Moreover, John Locke’s theory of land improvement
found its way into jurisprudence of American Courts insofar as disposition of native
lands.

C. Property and Contract in the Early Republic
Property and contract, as aforesaid, are inextricably intertwined with one another.
Private property rights cannot exist without contract and contract (in and of itself) has
little meaning beyond the realm of transfer of property rights. This chapter of my
dissertation examines the link between these concepts insofar as constitutional principles
are concerned. Associate Justice Potter Stewart once opined the “dichotomy between
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personal liberties and property rights is a false one” and the right to enjoy property,
without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel is, in
truth, a personal right.” 83

1. The Marshal Court, Property and the Contracts Clause
In 1801, during the waning days of the Adams presidency, one of the final acts of
the Federalist congressional majority was to confirm John Marshall to the office of Chief
Justice of the United States. Though Marshall was related to the incoming President,
Thomas Jefferson, the two men were soon to become bitter enemies as a result of rulings
handed down by the Supreme Court. John Marshall is widely credited (or excoriated) for
strengthening the power of the national government, usually at the expense of state
governments, and ushering in the concept of judicial review. But for our purposes, it is
the Marshall Court’s economic jurisprudence that is most important.
In 1790, ten years before appointment to the high court, a thirty-five year old
Marshall went before the Commonwealth Court of Appeals to argue that a 1779 Virginia
statute—enacted to protect citizens from debts owed to British merchants—did not
forestall his client from collecting a debt owed by another man. His arguments were
procedurally technical, and based on the ancient English write of indebitatusassumpsit,
but what is important was his contention that there existed no “stronger moral obligation”
than “to pay for property purchased[.]” Marshall also maintained that the
Commonwealth’s legislature did not—indeed, could not,—destroy “this moral
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obligation.” There was a substantive right vested in contract that could not be disturbed
by a state legislature. The court agreed and Marshall won the case.84
It is oftentimes difficult to separate an advocate’s personal views from the
arguments advanced on behalf of a client. In Marshall’s case, though, it is safe to say two
coincided. In a series of seven cases dealing with the Article I, section 10, prohibition
against states interfering with “obligation of contract,” the Marshall Court laid out a
foundation of economic jurisprudence that both protected vested property rights and
limited the power of state legislatures to interfere with those rights. The first—and
arguably most important—decision on property rights was the aforementioned 1810 case
of Fletcher v. Peck. This case involved Georgia’s attempt to rescind the infamous, and
fraudulent, Yazoo land grants made by a previous legislature. Before the new legislature
could rescind those grants, however, some of the land was sold to buyers who played no
part in the original fraud. When the new legislature tried to rescind those grants, John
Peck, one of the subsequent owners, brought suit against the state. Chief Justice Marshall
quickly struck down the act of rescission as an unconstitutional impairment of contract.
Peck had vested contract rights, Marshall explained, and it would it be “indecent, in the
extreme,” to go back and retrospectively question the sale of the property.85
Marshall could have ended the decision solely on the basis of the contract
impairment. But, he went further to connect the contract impairment to disturbance of
real property rights in general. “If the legislature felt itself absolved from those rules of
property which are common to all the citizens of the United States,” Marshall warned,
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then the state “may devest [sic] any other individual of his lands, if it shall be the will of
the legislature so to exert it.” What limit could there be “to the legislative power” if the
State could simply seize private property without compensation. There was, in other
words, a higher principle here—a principle that allowed states to go only so far with their
regulations, but no further. In addition, by slipping back and forth between the rhetoric
of contract rights on one hand, and real property rights on the other hand, Marshall
signaled the Constitution would be read expansively to protect many more rights than
those expressly enumerated in the document itself. Indeed, Marshall concluded the State
of Georgia was prohibited from interfering in Peck’s property interests either because of
the “particular provisions” of the Constitution noted in the opinion, or “by general
principles which are common to our free institutions.”86
Two years later, in New Jersey v. Wilson, the Court struck down another state
statute interfering with vested property rights. In that case, the state of New Jersey set
aside land for the Delaware nation in 1758 and agreed the land would remain exempt
from state taxation. In 1803, however, the Delaware sold the land to someone else.
When the legislature passed a law in 1804 to revoke the tax exemption for the new
owner, that owner filed a lawsuit. In one of the shortest opinions ever issued by the Chief
Justice, Marshall found the New Jersey legislation unconstitutional. Writing for a
unanimous Court, Marshall observed that the tax exemption “annexed” to the land not to
the “persons” of the “Indians” to whom it was originally granted. Any subsequent
purchaser stood in the same position as the “Indians” and, just as the state legislature
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could not divest the “Indians” of their rights, so too could they not divest the rights of
subsequent purchasers to whom the “Indians” sold their property.87
Although Marshall did not author the majority opinion in Green v. Biddle, his
influence is clear. The issue in that case was a compact between Kentucky and Virginia
whereby the latter agreed to grant some of its western lands for creation of the former.
As part of that compact, and in exchange for the land, Kentucky agreed the rights of
occupants in those lands would be determined under Virginia law. When Kentucky
passed statutes in 1797 and 1812, attempting to curtail those rights, successors of the
original occupant brought suit. It made no difference that this contract was between two
states rather than between a state and an individual or two private individuals. A
“contract” is an “agreement of two or more parties, to do or not to do certain acts.” States
are just as much parties as individuals and Kentucky and Virginia both undertook certain
obligations in exchange for obligations from the other. Thus, their compact was a legally
enforceable contract. That, said, Justice Bushrod Washington went on to declare “that
the duty, not less than the power of this court, as well as of every other court in the Union
to declare a law unconstitutional, which impairs the obligation of contracts, whoever may
be the parties to them, is too clearly enjoined by the constitution itself, and too firmly
established by the decisions of this and other courts to be now shaken[.]”88
The question in Dartmouth College v. Woodward was whether the state of New
Hampshire could alter a corporate charter granted in 1769 and convert a private college
into a public institution. Marshall answered in the negative. Dartmouth’s charter created
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an artificial, but immortal, being as capable of entering contracts as a natural being.
More importantly, however, the college had solicited, and accepted, donations of money
and other property held and used to further its educational purposes. Reordering the
corporate charter would, essentially, reorder the college’s property holdings. Not only
did private trustees hold legal title to property but the donors had vested rights in seeing
their donations were used for the stated purpose of the college. By altering those rights,
Marshall ruled, the New Hampshire legislature enacted a law prohibited by the United
States Constitution.89
What is interesting about Dartmouth College is not just the holding but also some
of its ancillary lines of thought linking property rights to other personal rights. An
argument raised by New Hampshire’s attorneys against application of the contracts
clause was that such provision was never meant to apply to “civil contracts” such as a
college charter. What would be next? Would the Court apply the “contracts clause” to
state regulations affecting marriage contracts? Marshall largely sidestepped that issue,
noting the clause was inserted into the Constitution to “to restrain the legislatures in
future from violating the right to property.” It should be confined to cases, like
Dartmouth College, “within the mischief it was intended to remedy.” The clause was
always understood to extend only so far as “property or some object of value” though
Marshall left the door open to reviewing marriage legislation in the future if a legislature
passed some hypothetical law “annulling all marriage contracts.” In his concurring
opinion, however, Justice Story was more direct noting “[a] man has just as good a right
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to his wife” as to his property and to deprive him of her society (or fortune) “would be as
flagrant a violation of the principles of justice, as the confiscating of his own estate.”90
A particularly problematic issue in the Court’s contracts clause jurisprudence was
state insolvent and bankruptcy laws. Although Article I, section 8, of the Constitution
grants Congress the authority to enact “uniform” bankruptcy laws, the Court found there
was nothing to prohibit states from passing their own laws if Congress was silent – so
long as the state legislation did not impair the obligation of contract. The first time the
Court was called to pass on this issue was the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield wherein
the Court ruled a New York bankruptcy statute was unconstitutional insofar as it applied
retrospectively and allowed for discharge of debts contracted prior to its passage. It was
the retrospective application of the New York statute which made Sturges a relatively
simple, straightforward, decision. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall spent more time
justifying the reach of the contract clause to bankruptcy law than to explaining the
unconstitutionality of that law.91
Eight years later, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the
constitutionality of another bankruptcy law. This time, however, the statute at issue
predated the formation of the contract and there was no issue of retrospective application.
The question, instead, was whether legislation could be enacted regulating future
contracts. Though the Court ruled in Ogden v. Saunders that Louisiana could enact
prospective bankruptcy legislation, there was no clear rule to emerge from the decision
and Chief Justice Marshall dissented—the first, and only, time he was on the losing end
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of a contract clause case. Justice Bushrod Washington, who typically sided with
Marshall, parted company with his colleague this time. Conceding “universal law”
requires “that all men are bound to perform their contracts” once made, Washington held
states could pass legislation regulating what types of contracts could be formed in the
future.92
The most theoretical opinion in the case, insofar as property rights were
concerned, came from Justice Trimble. “[M]en have, by the laws of nature, the right of
acquiring and possessing property, and the right of contracting engagements.” Trimble
continued “that, in a state of nature, when men have not submitted themselves to the
controlling authority of civil government, the natural obligation of contracts is coextensive with the duty of performance. This natural obligation is founded solely in the
principles of natural or universal law.” But, this did not mean that the civil polity had no
right to regulate the contract.
[W]hen “men form a social compact and organize a civil government, they
necessarily surrender the regulation and control of these natural rights and
obligations into the hands of the government. Admitting it, then, to be
true, that, in general, men derive the right of private property and of
contracting engagements from the principles of natural, universal law;
admitting that these rights are, in the general, not derived from or created
by society, but are brought into it. . . it is equally true that these rights and
obligations resulting from them are subject to be regulated modified and
sometimes absolutely retrained, by the positive enactions [sic] of
municipal law.93
The Constitution did not prohibit impairment of contract. What the Constitution
prohibited, Trimble reasoned, was the impairment of the “civil” obligation of contract.
This “civil” obligation of contract is determined under state law. Indeed, contractual
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obligations so incurred absorb the laws regulating it and the law becomes part of the
contract. If it were otherwise, and the Constitution banned impairment of the “universal
law” of contract, then states would be incapable of passing even the most innocuous laws
such as those barring usurious interest rates.94
Marshall dismissed the prospective/retrospective analysis of his colleagues as
irrelevant. The real issue for him was the substantive right of contract and whether state
legislatures could pass laws limiting that right or whether they were restrained to enacting
only legislation for enforcement of the obligation itself. The Chief Justice ultimately
came to the latter conclusion. Every man, Marshall wrote, “retains [the right] to acquire
property [and] to dispose of that property” as he sees fit. Property rights can neither be
acquired, nor disposed of, without contract. The right to enter contracts is not something
government grants to individuals but, rather, they “bring that right with them into
society[.]” Man only surrenders to government the right to coerce performance of the
contract when he enters civil society and this is the sole area, Marshall reasoned, where
states were permitted to legislate.95
The opinion of the Chief Justice was in the minority, of course, and the operative
effect of Ogden was to allow states to prospectively regulate the terms of a contract so
long as they did not disturb rights that were already vested when the contract was made.
The final “contracts clause” decision came in the case of Providence Bank v. Billings
wherein Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, ruled in favor of the State
of Rhode Island rejecting an argument that a State decision to tax the bank impaired its
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corporate charter. Marshall opined that the charter never expressly exempted the bank
from taxation and the forfeiture of a power of such “vital importance” can never be
assumed. As shown by his dissent in Ogden, Marshall championed contract and property
rights farther than most but even he had limits and, true to his federalist roots, one of
those limits was taxation:
The power of legislation, and consequently of taxation, operates on all the
persons and property belonging to the body politic. This is an original
principle, which has its foundation in society itself. It is granted by all, for
the benefit of all. It resides in government as a part of itself, and need not
be reserved when property of any description, or the right to use it in any
manner, is granted to individuals or corporate bodies. However absolute
the right of an individual may be, it is still in the nature of that right that it
must bear a portion of the public burdens, and that portion must be
determined by the legislature.96
The Supreme Court’s “contracts clause” cases are among the first examples of an
American ethos that favored economic liberty. But, they are not the only examples. In
1833, three years before his death, Justice Joseph Story published his Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States. This was the first treatise published on American
constitutional law and it was favorably compared to Blackstone’s commentaries on
English law published a generation earlier. “A government can scarcely be deemed to be
free,” Story warned, that if “the rights of property are left solely dependent upon a
legislative body, without any restraint” then liberty cannot be safeguarded. Indeed, “[t]he
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, that the rights of personal
liberty, and private property should be held sacred.” Story’s jurisprudence required
neither an express prohibition against the states, nor an express power on the part of the
federal judiciary to strike down laws that infringed on property rights. Citing his opinion
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in Wilkinson v. Leland, Story wrote “no court of justice, in this country” would be
warranted in believing [that] states possessed some “implied” power so repugnant to the
common principles of justice and civil liberty” that it allowed them to interfere with
vested property rights.97 It was property rights, after all, which both granted citizenship
in the American republic and represented each individual member of the polity a stake in
that republic.
Though Story was a Democratic-Republican, appointed to office by President
James Madison, he nevertheless frequently found himself siding with the Federalist Chief
Justice. He parted company with Marshall, however, as to the reach of the Article I,
section 10 contracts clause. Citing principles stated by Justices Washington and Trimble
in Ogden v. Saunders, Story differentiated between “contract” and “the obligation of
contract,” Story explained positive law (statute) gives form to the “civil” obligation of
contract and—as long as it does not eliminate entirely the remedies for enforcing it —the
states may control various aspects of their formation. Accordingly, Story found no
theoretical problem in allowing states to regulate contracts for such things as usury.98
Though a ban against usurious loan instruments may arguably be beneficial in a free
market society, Story’s jurisprudence, unfortunately, also laid the groundwork for
institutions such as chattel slavery, coverture and legal recognition of children as little
more than economic inputs to a familial household.
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2. Locke, Marshall and Deprivation of Aboriginal Lands
A “labor theory of property,” as enunciated by Locke and his Enlightenment era
contemporaries, was more than rhetorical flourish—at least in the so-called “new world.”
It was also a means by which to explain (or justify) exercise of sovereignty over new
lands “discovered” in the western hemisphere. A failure to subdue virgin land, and
improve it, meant one could not establish title to it. Those who settled on land, but never
farmed it, mined it or otherwise made any productive use of may acquire a right of
usufruct (use) bout could not maintain a claim to title. Nowhere was this principle more
evident than state and Supreme Court decisions justifying removal of aboriginal
Americans from their native lands.
A dispute over conflicting land titles, one granted by the Illinois and Piankeshaw
tribes, another by U.S. government patent, placed the issue of native property rights
squarely in front of the United States Supreme Court in the first quarter of the nineteenth
century. Forced to give legal imprimatur to what was already a fait accompli, Chief
Justice John Marshall reasoned in Johnson v. M’Intosh aboriginal peoples had no
“ultimate” title to the land they simply “occupied” and, thus, could not convey absolute
title to anyone else. Europe provided a convenient scapegoat and Marshall detailed all of
the extensive exploration, and subsequent carving-up of North America from the
Sixteenth Century up through to the Louisiana Purchase. “Discovery” of these lands,
Marshall wrote, gave an exclusive right to European nations to extinguish native
occupancy either through purchase or by conquest. “Conquest,” in turn, gave a title
which courts of the conqueror could not deny. The United States was then successor to
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those titles either by treaty, as was the case with Great Britain and Spain, or sale, as was
the case with France. 99
Though ostensibly basing the Court’s decision on title by conquest, there is also a
distinct strain of Enlightenment thought running through Johnson. First, throughout the
opinion, aboriginals are only referred to only as occupants. This suggests their only
relationship to the land was to occupy it. Indeed, no mention was ever made of their
improving the land either by tilling it, or building homes on it, and thus there was no
mixing of their own labor in such a way as to convert common property to private
property. The only fleeting reference to any exercise of dominion over land was the
hunting of game and, as Marshall would have known, such ferae naturae is a species of
property separate and distinct from land. As if to drive the home the absence of
dominion, Marshall opined “the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages . . . whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in
possession of their country was to leave the country a wilderness.” For Marshall, without
any permanent settlement, or tilling of soil, the North American continent essentially
existed in a state of nature. Marshall drew even further attention to that state in observing
that “vacant” land vested in the British crown and the initial object of the crown was to
“settle” the sea coast. There can be no theft, after all, of that which has never been
claimed. What Marshall downplayed, of course, was the idea that title to all but use was
gained through military conquest which, as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon would later say is
little more than “theft.”100
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Still this reasoning continued. Chief Justice Taylor of North Carolina’s Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Cherokee land titles, by virtue of several pre-Revolutionary War
treaties, but nevertheless explained the European philosophy on land use thusly:
Writers on the law of nature have maintained the justice of this principle
in furthering the designs of Providence, and tending to the increase and
civilization of the human race. . . . They argue, that every nation is under a
natural obligation to cultivate the land that has fallen to its share, since
otherwise, the whole earth, which is destined to feed its inhabitants, would
not yield an adequate supply, if large tracts of fertile land were peopled
only by hunters and shepherds: that however right this might have been in
the first ages of the world, when the spontaneous productions of the earth
were more than sufficient for its few inhahitants, [sic] it cannot now be
justifiable, when the great multiplication of the human race, in some
countries, has rendered it essential to their subsistence, that the forests
should be cleared and cultivated. The unsettled habitation of savages in
those extensive tracts of country over which they wander, but cannot
cultivate, must be inconsistent with the views of Nature, while other
nations are confined within a small compass, which no degree of skill or
labour [sic] will render sufficiently productive. The only obligation which
justice imposes on other nations, is, that they leave the natives a
sufficiency of land.101
Though Marshall relied on no authority but his own view of the law, Taylor cited
Montesquieu and Vattel. The Supreme Court was once again called to comment on the
unique legal status of aboriginal peoples when the State of Georgia passed a series of
laws stripping Cherokees of their rights. That nation filed an original action in the
Supreme Court asking for an injunction to prevent those laws from taking place. Noting
the Constitution allowed for an original action against a state, thus making Georgia a
permissible defendant, the bigger question was whether the Cherokee were a foreign

because the country has already been settled in this way, “it may, perhaps, be supported
by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice.” Ibid. at 515. In short,
the Court was never going to rule in favor of the “Indian” title in this case as it would
have thrown title to all other land throughout the country into question.
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nation such that they could bring the suit. The Supreme answered in the negative.
Though acknowledging the Cherokee had “an unquestionable right to the lands they
occupy, until that shall be extinguished” the fact remained that they occupied “a territory
to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of
possession when their right of possession ceases.” Without title to the land that they had
occupied for generation, but apparently not sufficiently developed, the Cherokee (and by
inference all tribes) were said to exist in a state of “pupilage” with the United States—a
relationship more closing resembling that of ward and guardian than one foreign nation to
another.102
The descriptor of “occupier” rather than settler or owner was used again nine
years later in Worcester v. Georgia where Marshall described Europeans as having found
a new world “in possession of a people who had made small progress in agriculture or
manufactures,” activities which would have converted common property to private
property, “and whose general employment was war, hunting and fishing.” This time,
however, the question before the Court did not involve the aboriginal title but, rather, the
extent to which the state of Georgia could exercise jurisdiction over their lands. In
determining the laws of Georgia could have no affect within the Cherokee nation,
Marshall observed that all “Indian” nations “retain[ed] their original natural rights” but
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that right was not to the property itself but to the “undisputed possess[ion] of the soil
from time immemorial.”103
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CHAPTER III
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS IN THE BODIES OF OTHERS

We know Anglo-American products of the Enlightenment conceptualized
property rights in a much different way than we do now. John Locke and Adam Smith,
among others, particularly located a property right in the ownership of one’s own body.
No lesser a figure in American history than James Madison opined that men not only had
rights in property but they also had property interests in their rights which included not
only freedom of conscious but other, inchoate, rights that existed in a state of nature but
were perhaps too nebulous to be codified into a Bill of Rights. How did this philosophy
play itself in the practical sphere (both public and private) however? Were ownership
rights in the body really recognized either formally by the law or informally by the
dictates and constraints imposed by American society? The answer to that question is an
emphatic “yes.”

A. Chattel Slavery
The most difficult—and most distasteful—issue in American property ethos is the
concept of owning “property” in other human beings. Chattel slavery simply cannot be
reconciled with a Lockian view of any notion of “liberty” and proclamations that “all
men are created equal” as espoused in the Declaration of Independence nor is it
compatible with guarantees of liberty appearing in the Constitution. Robert Cover
explains the founders circumvented this theoretical problem in their own minds by a
thoroughgoing belief in “legal positivism.” That is to say, even if slavery was contrary to
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natural law and natural liberty, it was nevertheless permissible if sanctioned by the
Constitution. While this may have resolved the issue from a jurisprudential standpoint, it
does not explain how the founders resolved this paradox in their own minds. As Henry
David Thoreau would later ask, how could a nation that undertook to be a “refuge of
liberty,” keep a sixth of its population in slavery? William Lloyd Garrison provided one
answer: the Constitution was an “unholy alliance” and “dripping with blood.”104
A more thoughtful answer was given by John C. Calhoun who argued the revered
Jefferson—a fellow southerner and fellow slaveholder—was, in fact, wrong. “All men
are not created [equal].” The genesis of this flawed reasoning, Calhoun maintained, was
over-reliance on principles espoused by Locke and Algernon Sydney that men were equal
in a state of nature. This state of nature, Calhoun maintained, was a “hypothetical
truism” that never existed. Man is a social creature and his natural state is actually living
in a “society” But, by the same token, no society can exist without government and, thus,
man’s natural state is, in reality, a “political” state. The quantum of power necessary to
run the government, and the liberty necessary to enjoy it, must be “unequal among
different people, according to their different conditions. For just in proportion as a people
are ignorant, stupid, debased, corrupt, exposed to violence within and danger from
without, the power necessary to preserve society against the danger those people pose
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must grow and the liberty of those people decrease to a point “when absolute and
despotic power becomes necessary on the part of the government, and individual liberty
extinct.” In a state devoid of liberty, of course, man is essentially a slave.105
Much as it had done to protect vested property rights in contract, the Supreme
Court also lent its imprimatur to protection of slave property. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
the United States Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania law criminalizing recapture
of runaway slaves. Justice Story, writing for the majority, held that the Constitution
“manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive unqualified right on the part of the
owner of the slave” to reclaim property. Indeed, citing Blackstone, he noted the rights of
a slave owner in this regard were no different than the right of an owner to reclaim any
other property. While the states could not be compelled to enforce fugitive slave returns,
they also could not pass laws to impede the return of such property to the “rightful”
owner. Chief Justice Roger Taney, appointed to the Court by President Andrew Jackson
in 1836 after the death of John Marshall, agreed with the first part of the opinion but not
the latter. “The individual right now in question, stands on the same grounds” as any
other property right and the obligation to protect it, Taney concluded, was imposed as a
duty upon the several states.106
Of course, Taney’s most famous (infamous) pronouncement on slave property
rights came in the case of Scott v. Sandford. Dred Scott was a slave belonging to an army
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surgeon who took Scott with him to an assignment at an Illinois fort in 1834. Scott
accompanied his master to another assignment in 1836 in Louisiana and, in 1838, they
went to Missouri where the surgeon sold Scott (as well as his wife and two daughters) to
John Sandford. Scott filed a civil action for his freedom, arguing that his stay in Illinois
and federal territories (where slavery was not allowed) made him free. The Court
rejected that argument and, in the process, gave one of the most explicit statements on the
legal status of “slave property” in America.107
First, Taney noted that slaves were not “citizens” for purposes of the Constitution
and the state of Illinois could not make them so in violation of federal law. Taney then
took aim at the Declaration of Independence and Jefferson’s remark that “all men are
created equal.” Whereas Calhoun had argued that Jefferson was just plain wrong, Taney
was more circumspect positing “it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race
were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people.” If Jefferson’s
Declaration of Independence was understood to include slaves, Taney concluded, it
would have opened its framers to “universal rebuke and reprobation.” Finally, Taney got
to the crux of the matter noting “the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the Constitution.” The government “in express terms is pledged to protect”
those property interests and nothing in the Constitution afforded less protection for slave
property, “than property of any other description.” In short, government had a “duty of
guarding and protecting the [slave] owner in his rights.”108
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A “property rights” analysis was not confined to the majority opinion. Justice
Wayne concurred with Taney observing the “case involve[d] private rights of value.”
Justice Campbell observed that it was the province “of the States, to ascertain and
determine what is property, and the rights of the owner.” Missouri gave masters a
property right in slaves and neither the federal government, nor other states, could
interfere with those property rights.109
To say the “Dred Scott” case was highly controversial is an understatement. The
case was both applauded, and attacked, in Congress and state legislatures across the
country while newspaper editorials debated its merits. Not surprisingly, Scott featured
prominently in the 1858 Illinois Senate campaign and the 1860 Presidential election, both
of which pitted Abraham Lincoln against Stephen Douglas. Lincoln resigned himself to
the decision in Scott—admitting that “to take Dred Scott from his master” would be
“interfering with property.” “[N]othing in the Constitution or laws of any State can
destroy the right of property in a slave.” But, he also chided Douglas for the
“sacredness” he afforded that decision. While the ruling must be respected, it was also
true lawyers routinely questioned the soundness of one or another Supreme Court cases
and this one should be no different, Lincoln observed.110
Indeed, as the senatorial campaign wore on, Lincoln became more aggressive in
challenging the Scott decision. Citing Taney’s claim that the “right of property in a slave
is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution,” Lincoln noted there was nothing
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in the Constitution expressly granting the right to property in slaves and challenged
Douglas to prove him wrong. “[N]either the word ‘slave’ nor ‘slavery,’ is to be found in
the Constitution, nor the word ‘property’. . . in any connection with language alluding to
the things slave or slavery.” Had the founders been cryptically referring to slaves when
using the word “person,” Lincoln suggested, there would be some evidence of that fact
either in the Constitution or some other contemporaneous document. He later warned
Ohioans that the Scott case took “the right of property in a slave” and so wove it into the
fabric of the Constitution that “it cannot be detached without breaking the constitution
itself” and would require that slave property brought into free states (like Ohio) be
allowed by that state’s law even if forbidden in its charter.111
Like Thoreau, Transcendentalist Orestes Brownson was personally opposed to the
institution of slavery. But, his views on what to do with slave “property” were much
more nuanced. After calling for a “substantial equalization of property” in 1842,
Brownson “found religion,” converted to Catholicism and became more conservative in
his various world views. Conceding ownership of property was a “natural right” and
protection of that right was “the duty of the temporal power,” Brownson declared any
attempt by the state to deprive a man of that right struck “a blow at the sacredness of all
rights” and aimed “a death blow at the spiritual.” The same was true of the proverbial
“slave power.” In those states which allowed slavery, the master held title to that slave
and such title was “good against the state.” Although the state was certainly “bound” to
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undo its wrong, Brownson argued that the state could only do so upon payment of just
compensation to the master. In arguing slavery could simply be abolished—as Senator
Sumner did—congressmen advocated violation of the very Constitution they swore to
uphold.112
Where slavery did not exist, however, man could claim no property right in
another man. “By the law of nature,” Brownson reasoned, “all men are born free and
equal and man has no jus dominii in man.” A “natural right” to slave property simply did
not exist as it did for other species of property. Given that there never developed a
national common law of slavery, the “peculiar institution” was purely local in nature and
slavery could not exist outside of its locale. Thus, in a case currently working its way
through the Kansas legal system, courts would be forced to declare “the alleged slave a
free man.” Slave property must be respected in those states where slavery existed,
Brownson concluded, but not in those states (or territories) where it did not exist .113
Not everyone was as quick as Brownson to accept the argument that slave
property stood on an equal basis with all other property and that federal abolition would
invoke the Fifth Amendment mandate that “just compensation” be paid. Senator Sumner
of Massachusetts characterized it as an “[i]mpossible pretension for man to claim
property in man.” (emphasis in original). Harkening back to Madison’s essay on
property almost a century earlier, Sumner argued every human being has title to himself
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and, while a “man may be poor in his world’s goods[,] he owns himself.” Another socalled radical republican agreed. In a speech before Congress in the early years of the
Civil War, Thaddeus Stevens announced “I do not admit the rightful ownership of any
human being in any human soul.” But, “in deference to chronic error and prejudice,” he
was willing to treat it “as if such a thing were possible” and even pay compensation to
slave holders in the slave states that stayed in the Union. With regard to states that had
seceded, though, Stevens noted Congress and the President were empowered to suppress
insurrections and that immediate emancipation of slaves in rebellious states was justified
as a measure taken for the safety of the people.114
Although Lincoln acknowledged that the government had no power to end slave
“property rights” where it existed, his acceptance of the “peculiar institution” was
premised on a normal state of affairs in the nation. After secession, and the onset of civil
war, that all changed. On January 1, 1863, he issued the Emancipation Proclamation
freeing slaves in that part of the Confederacy which was not yet under Union control.
The proclamation did not end slavery in loyal border states, nor did it end slavery in those
part of the Confederacy under Union control, but this was more indicative of Lincoln’s
awareness of his constitutional limitations rather than unwillingness to take on the issue.
Lincoln firmly grounded his actions in his Article II, section 2, war powers as
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commander in chief noting the proclamation was a “necessary war measure for
suppressing [the] rebellion.”115
Exigency of battle may well have justified emancipation as a wartime measure but
Lincoln knew as a lawyer that slaves were legal property and that, constitutionally, he
could not free them in the border states, or in the south after war ended, without invoking
the Fifth Amendment guarantee of compensation. In a letter to one of his cabinet
officers, Lincoln noted “[t]he original proclamation has no constitutional or legal
justification, except as a military measure” and the areas exempted were excluded from
its reach “because the military necessity did not apply.” If he continued emancipation
“without the argument of military necessity,” would he “not thus give up all footing upon
constitution or law?” Would he not, Lincoln asked rhetorically, “be in the boundless
field of absolutism?”116
If slave property was part of the Constitution, then only a constitutional
amendment could end rights in that property. In his Annual Message to Congress, just a
month before issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln called for an amendment
to the Constitution to provide for gradual emancipation of slaves by 1900 and, at the
same time, provide compensation for slave owners. Even as late as the winter of 1865,
Lincoln requested the Senate and House allocate him $400 million to compensate slave
holding states for emancipation. He ultimately abandoned that position and approved the
Resolution which sent the Thirteenth Amendment to the states for ratification.
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Involuntary Servitude was thereafter abolished with no provision made for compensating
slave holders.117
If the Civil War ended one type of property, Reconstruction revived another.
Contracts—particularly labor contracts—were thought to be the mechanism by which to
make the transition from a slave-based to free market economy. As Eric Foner points
out, however, the belief that labor contracts would allow for freedmen to convert labor
into wages, and show ex-Confederates that free market labor rests on consent rather than
coercion, was “hopelessly unrealistic.” Transition from slave owner to employer was not
an easy one for planters who feared losing both social hegemony and a captive labor
force. Consequently, southern states passed laws circumventing any notion that these
contracts would be voluntary by using civil law to enforce performance and criminal law
to punish breach. Freedmen who tried leaving before the term of their employment was
up, or who had not yet found labor, or tried to find higher wages than their former
masters offered, all too often found themselves in a criminal proceeding and bonded out
to their former owners for peonage labor.118
Not surprisingly, court systems that were all too willing to allow reintroduction of
slavery in the guise of peonage labor, provided little help to freedmen seeking civil relief
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when their employers would not pay them what was due. Georgia, for instance, barred
freedmen from bringing actions, or testifying against whites unless through a white
patron acting as a “next friend.” The freedmen’s bureaus provided some relief for these
cases but were too few and far between in the former Confederacy. Federal troops
provided even less help oftentimes finding more in common with former Confederate
enemies than those of a different race. Federal troops even coerced freed blacks into
signing one-sided labor contracts and, as Jonathan Bryant notes in his study of
Reconstruction Georgia, some military commanders severely punished free blacks who
used “disrespectful language to their former masters.” After “redemption” of Georgia by
Democrats, a new county court system was created where labor contracts could be
recorded and, if breached, resulted in arrest and imprisonment of the non-performing
party. The only persons ever prosecuted for breach, of course, were freedmen.119
It is naïve to think the lack of will on the part of Radical Republicans to fully
reconstruct labor relations in the south was not partly due to white antipathy (racism)
towards freedmen as well as sheer exhaustion over a war that lasted four years and an
occupation that lasted twelve more. But, at the same time, their reliance on “contract
labor” ideology to introduce freedmen into the American economy was perfectly
consistent with the primacy that had been afforded property and contract rights in the
past. As far back as John Locke and Adam Smith, a man’s body and the labor that it
produced were perceived as “property.” Contract—even unwritten employment
agreement—was the accepted means by which to sell that property. Where the
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reconstruction congress, and so-called radical republicans, arguably went wrong was in
their failure to provide the political and legal mechanisms necessary to scrutinize both
private and public overreaching in those contracts and to enforce them for the benefits of
freedman. This failure of contract labor ideology in the reconstruction south undoubtedly
diminished its luster in the eyes of jurists and political theoreticians who for so long had
been schooled on its efficacy. Subsequent developments in the remainder of the
nineteenth century would show that it was just as much a failure for working class whites
as it was for freedmen.

B. Substantive Due Process Versus State Police Powers
Civil War and Reconstruction also set in motion two forces that were on a
collision course with each other by the end of the century. The first was ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Among other things, this amendment prohibited
states from depriving the people of “due process of law.” Few phrases in the Constitution
are as vague as the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and none are as
controversial. Many scholars insist “due process” means only procedural due process
requiring the implementation of procedural safeguards—like notice and an opportunity to
be heard—before someone can be deprived of life, liberty or property. Others,
particularly in the Lochner era, found a “substantive” component to due process which
measured pieces of legislation against certain, inchoate, standards of natural justice such
as whether the law violated an unwritten, unenumerated, “liberty of contract.”120
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The second force set in motion by Civil War and Reconstruction was a period of
industrialization, which reached dizzying heights by the close of the nineteenth century.
Economies of scale, streamlined manufacturing and technological advances turned small
factories into industrial behemoths which, by the use of trust agreements, allowed
companies to circumvent prohibitions against interstate corporations and create
national—even international—conglomerates in steel, oil refining and meat-packing to
name a few. As industry grew, and as available land on the frontier slowly diminished
and then disappeared altogether, America’s growing population was absorbed into
industry as wage laborers. But, industrialization came at a huge social cost thus
prompting states and municipalities to pass legislation attempting to ameliorate its harsh
effects. This, in turn, prompted business to fight back with their new weapon—the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. In retrospect, we see it was during this
clash between substantive due process and state police powers that society’s attitudes
(ethos) toward property began to change and rights in property became disassociated
from other fundamental liberties.
What critics derisively refer to as “substantive economic due process” did not
simply spring forth, fully grown, from the Lochner decision. To the contrary, like most
jurisprudence on economic right and liberty, it enjoyed a long and storied pedigree. In
1798, the Supreme Court passed on the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that
overturned a probate court ruling. Justice Chase opined as follows:
The purpose for which men enter into society will determine the nature
and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the
legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it. . . .
There are acts which the Federal, or state, legislature cannot do, without
exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free
Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent
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and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice
by positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or
private property, for the protection whereof of the government was
established. An ACT [sic] of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law)
contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.121
There were limits, in other words, to the reach of a state legislature. Three
decades after Calder, Justice Story reiterated the point in Wilkinson v. Leland. Personal
liberty and private property are sacred, Story wrote, and “no court of justice in this
country would be warranted in assuming, that the power to violate and disregard them[,]
a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty[,] lurked under
any general grant of legislative authority[.]” He continued that the “people ought not to
be presumed to part with such rights so vital to their security and wellbeing, without very
strong and direct expressions of such an intent.” Statutory enactments which deprive the
people of personal liberty, or private property, must fail because they go against the very
reason for the American “social compact” in the first place.122
The same year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, Michigan Supreme Court
Justice Thomas Cooley published his treatise on the Constitutional Limitations imposed
on the state legislatures. Cooley interpreted the “due process” clause as analogous to the
“law of the land” clause in Magna Charta and noted analogous phrases appeared in
almost every state constitution. What was meant by due process of law? Cooley rejected
any argument the phrase meant only “procedural” due process:
It is entirely correct, also, in assuming that a legislative enactment is not
necessarily the law of the land. The words ‘by the law of the land,’ as
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used in the Constitution, do not mean a statute passed for the purpose of
working the wrong. That construction would render the restriction
absolutely nugatory, and turn this part of the Constitution into mere
nonsense. The people would be made to say to the two houses: ‘You shall
be vested with the legislative power of the State, but no one shall be
disenfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges of a citizen,
unless you pass a statute for that purpose. In other words, you shall not do
the wrong, unless you choose to do it.123
Citing various federal and state precedents, Cooley concluded that such phrases in
constitutions were meant to shield people from “the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
the government” unrestrained by established principles of private right:
The principles, then, upon which the process is based are to determine
whether it is ‘due process’ or not, and not any consideration of form.
Administrative and remedial process may change from time to time, but
only with due regard to the old landmarks established for the protection of
the citizen. When the government, through its established agencies,
interferes with the title to one’s property, or with his independent
enjoyment of it, and its act is called in question as not in accordance with
the law of the land, we are to test its validity by those principles of civil
liberty and constitutional defence [sic] which have become established in
our system of law, and not by any rules that pertain to forms of procedure
merely. . . . Due process of law in each particular case means, such an
exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of law
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights
as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in
question belongs.124
Furthermore, even before the United States Supreme Court decided Lochner, state
supreme courts applied substantive due process principles to strike down laws passed by
their own legislatures. As early as 1895, the Missouri Supreme Court struck down a law
criminalizing employers who forced employees to quit labor unions or face termination
from employment. The Court held that the right to “terminate” a contract was one of the
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“essential attributes of property.” That same year, the Illinois Supreme Court struck
down a state statue limiting the number of hours women could work to eight a day and
forty-eight a week. Such statute interfered with the right of “contracting” which the
Court found was both a liberty and a property right and, thus, could not be taken without
due process of law.125
The Supreme Court of Colorado granted habeas corpus to a jailed employer in
1899 after he was convicted of working someone at a “smelter” longer than the eight
hour day required by statute. In so doing, the Court essentially found the state law
unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled a law unconstitutional for
criminalizing the termination of a union employee noting that, just as there is liberty to
enter a contract, there is also liberty to refuse a contract and the statute violated that right.
A prevailing wage statute was struck down by New York’s highest court because it
“invades right[s] of liberty and property” requiring employers to pay their workers an
arbitrary, uniform, compensation. In 1902, the California Supreme Court ruled a state
statute requiring terms of payment in construction contracts to be in money only violated
the due process clause of the state constitution. That same year, Ohio’s Supreme Court
struck down a state statute limiting the number of hours a worker could labor at any
public works project to eight hours a day. Work hours are an integral part of a service
contract, the court found, and to limit those hours impaired obligation of contract. “The
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legislature is not supreme” under our system of government, the court ruled, and cannot
pass laws that go against the very foundation of the social compact.126
The statutes against which these substantive due process doctrines had been
applied were passed by legislatures for the salus populi (benefit of the people) pursuant to
the state’s inherent “police powers.” One of the earliest delineations of the concept of
“police powers” was given by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts. In upholding the power of the City of Boston to regulate the extent to
which a wharf could stick out into Boston Harbor, Shaw reasoned that “it is a settled
principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied
liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others.” He continued that “[r]ights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment, as shall
prevent them from being injurious” as the legislature may determine to be necessary and
expedient. This was also reflected in an 1864 treatise on real property law which
immediately starts by recognizing the importance of rights in property, but with the
caveat that the “right of property . . . is so far limited, that its use may be regulated from
time to time by law, so as to prevent its being injurious to the equal enjoyment by others
of their property, or inconsistent with the rights of the community.” 127
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The “myth” of an unregulated laissez-faire society during the nineteenth century
was put to rest by William J. Novack who persuasively argues that state and local
authorities around the country made frequent use of police powers in the nineteenth
century to regulate everything from businesses to the market place. Still, the extent of
those regulations in the first half of the century came nowhere near the extent to which
they would be used (oftentimes unsuccessfully) by the century’s end. Justice Cooley
conceded that states could exercise police powers for the benefit of the health, safety and
welfare of its citizenry but noted such powers had to be exercised “within certain limits.”
He never clearly expressed what he thought those limits were except to say that state
legislatures could not deprive property owners of vested rights.128
Just as there are numerous examples of state courts applying substantive due
process doctrines during this time, there is also no shortage of cases demonstrating
successful use of police powers. The Mississippi Supreme Court in 1854 ruled that taxes
imposed on a landowner were not an unconstitutional taking of property. In so ruling, the
court observed that every revenue bill had some detrimental effect on property rights but
that was a necessary evil if the advantages of the “social compact” were to be enjoyed.
“This principle rests in the very foundation of society and is illustrated in every day’s
experience of the citizen yielding his natural rights, even of life, liberty or property, to the
public good.” One of the earliest cases to see a retreat from property law in the face of
government police powers is Milne v. Davidson where the Louisiana Supreme Court
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upheld a municipal ordinance barring operation of a hospital in city limits. When the
ordinance was challenged as an infringement on the natural right to use property, the
court disagreed. “The natural right to the enjoyment of property, in opposition to the
positive regulations of society, is a subject of little utility in a court of justice.” The right
to acquire property may be inherent in man but it “received its perfection, and had a
permanency given to it, by municipal or civil law” and the natural right of property must
be considered in this context. A property owner could still do whatever he wanted with
the property so long as it did not violate municipal or state law.129
Ironically, one of the first Supreme Court cases to discuss state police powers was
also one of the few to uphold those powers despite a challenge on economic grounds. In
upholding legislation allowing the City of New Orleans to grant a monopoly on
slaughter-houses within the city, the Court noted “[t]his power is, and must be from its
very nature, incapable of any very exact definition. Upon it depends the security of
social order, the life and health of the citizen . . . the enjoyment of private and social life
and the beneficial use of property.” Police powers extend to “protection of the lives,
limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within
the street.” Persons are subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort health and prosperity of the state. The Court further noted a few years
later that police powers “belonged to the States when the Federal Constitution was
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adopted” and “rests upon the fundamental principle that every one shall so use his own as
not to wring and injure another.”130
The majority ruling in the Slaughter-House Cases was an anomaly. Courts
typically sided with property interests when those interests were infringed by state
legislation and the majority’s decision to uphold the exercise of police power was largely
unprecedented—and controversial. Justice Field filed a dissent noting that “the right to
pursue lawful employment in a lawful manner” was one of the “privileges and
immunities” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Bradley also dissented
noting that life, liberty and property were fundamental rights and the ability to choose
one’s own profession or calling was necessary “[f]or the preservation, enjoyment and
protection of these rights.”131
The Court reverted back to a more consistent property jurisprudence when it
revisited the New Orleans monopoly in 1884 when one of the original slaughter-houses
filed suit after a new constitution abolished the monopolies and the city of New Orleans
allowed another such company to open business. Rejecting a claim that this was an
impermissible impairment of contract, the majority held that a state legislature cannot
contract away the police power of the state so that a future legislature can no longer act to
protect the lives, health and property of its citizens. This would violate the maxim of
salus populi suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). What makes the
case interesting, though, is not so much the majority opinion as the opinions of the
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concurring justices. Justice Field opined the monopoly itself was against “common
right” and thus void. Among the “inalienable rights” set out in the Declaration of
Independence was the right of men to pursue “any lawful business.” Citing Adam Smith
and the Wealth of Nations, Field noted the property man has in his own labor is the
original foundation of all property and is the most “sacred and inviolable.” The
Louisiana monopoly forced thousands of workers to abandon their regular livelihood and,
thus, forfeit that property. Justices Bradley, Harlan and Woods also concurred noting that
“if a man’s right to his calling is property” then the monopoly deprived men of their
“property, as well as their liberty, without due process of law.”132
The actual use of “liberty of contract” as a federal constitutional doctrine began
with the case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana where the Court was called upon to decide the
constitutionality of a statute which made it a criminal offense for a property owner to
seek insurance from a company not licensed in that state. Justice Peckham—writing for a
unanimous court—quickly dismissed any state police power claim on grounds that, while
Louisiana could regulate contracts made in its own territory, it had no power to regulate
contracts made in another state. Peckham then turned to the real question which was
whether Louisiana could bar one of its own citizens from entering such a contract and
answered that question in the negative:
The statute which forbids such act does not become due process of law,
because it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution of the
Union. The liberty mentioned in that [Fourteenth] amendment means not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be
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free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation,
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the
purposes mentioned above.”133
It was in this environment that Lochner came to the Supreme Court. To be sure,
“substantive due process” and “liberty of contract” were doctrines that fit nicely (perhaps,
too nicely) with the entrenched property and industrial interests with which the
conservative courts were thought to be aligned. Literal application of these doctrines
frequently maintained economic status quo hindering progressive efforts to ameliorate the
harsh labor conditions in industry. On the other hand, consistent application of “liberty
of contract” also aided in progressive causes on occasion. In the little-remembered case
of Buchanan v. Warley, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Kentucky
ordinance forbidding sale of homes to “colored people” if the home was on a block
primarily occupied by white people. A white seller brought suit claiming the law
interfered with his right to dispose of property as he saw fit—even if it meant selling that
property to a black family. The Court agreed. In so ruling, the Court acknowledged a
number of its past decisions upholding Jim Crow laws. But, de jure segregation of the
races was altogether different than denying the private right of someone (a white
someone) to dispose of his property as he saw fit.134
In the end, it made little difference whether “liberty of contract” or state “police
power” carried the day in Lochner. The American ethos of property had already started
to change; the Supreme Court had simply not taken notice yet. Whereas the outset of the
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“Gilded Age” was characterized by Horatio Alger whose formulaic stories like Ragged
Dick showed that hard work and honesty could transform a rough “boot black” into
“Richard Hunter, Esq.,” a “young gentleman on the way to fame and fortune,” that
optimism was largely gone by the dawn of the twentieth century. In its place, we see
characters like Jurgis Rudkus of The Jungle whom, after years of exploitation in the
meat-packing industry, and abuse in tenements of Chicago, stumbles by mistake into a
meeting of a local Socialist Party. Only when Jurgis hears the orator give voice to the
plight of the wage laborer, “despised and outraged,” blinded, bounded and ignorant of his
own strength,” does he experience a “mighty upheaval” in soul and “rebirth” as a new
man.135
Indeed, change was palpable. No longer were progressives arguing for reform
using the rhetoric of property rights. Now, they attacked the system of property rights
head-on. Jacob Riis observed that “[h]aving solemnly resolved that all men are created
equal and have certain inalienable rights, among them life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, we shut our eyes and waited for the formula to work.” It did not. “Liberty”
amounted to nothing more than sixty cents a day living wage and this kind of crushing
poverty was “the scandal and the peril of our political system.” Upton Sinclair
speculated that, in a few years, the American worker would rise up and reject the
American capitalist system in favor of what he called the “industrial republic” –
essentially, an industrial government of the people, by the people and for the people
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where everyone shares “equally” in all its advantages. Indeed, “equal benefits” of
industrial government “will be the elemental right of every citizen.”136
No longer was property the great equalizer and benefactor that it was in the early
republic. To the contrary, property and contract rights were now perceived as being an
impediment to equal enjoyment of American society. The opportunity costs of
maintaining property rights and economic liberties were now too much to bear.
American industry and society had changed and if state and federal governments were
going to regulate those changes—as it was becoming increasingly obvious that they
must—then the law was going to have to change as well. To the extent society in
general, and wage laborers in particular, ever valued property rights and “liberty of
contract” as much as the courts claimed they did, they now valued a living wage and
humane working conditions even more.
The decision in Lochner was not the beginning of the era of substantive due
process, but it was the beginning of the end of an era where property rights were
considered fundamental. Constitutional text, context and structure all support the
existence of unenumerated economic rights. Legal and social discourses prior to the
Civil War also support the primacy afforded property in the American ethos. But, that
began to change, first, when contract labor failed to reconstruct labor relations in the
south and, later, when adherence to contractualism and property rights impeded
progressive era labor legislation passed to ameliorate the harsh conditions of
industrialization.
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The person who came closest to pinpointing “the problem” with Lochner was
Roscoe Pound who wrote an article in the Yale Law Journal just a few years after the
case was decided. Liberty of contract, he maintained, was essentially a fraud. Why,
Pound asked rhetorically, did a “great and learned court” insist on treating the industrial
employer and an industrial employee “as if they were [individual] farmers haggling over
the sale of a horse?” He concluded that one of the reasons was because the schooling of
lawyers and judges in the nineteenth century was still steeped in “eighteenth century
theories of natural law.” Conceding natural law was the operative theory in the Bill of
Rights, Pound nevertheless chastised judges for clinging to that “orthodoxy” when, in
fact, there was no evidence to suggest the framers ever intended “to impose the theory
upon us for all time.” Some of Pound’s arguments—such as his claim that early courts
overemphasized property/contract rights—are a little harder to maintain, but this portion
of the article gets to the crux of the transformation in property jurisprudence. Changing
social and economic conditions made strict enforcement of property and contract rights
increasingly problematic as America moved toward a more regulated society to reign in
the excesses of industry. Americans thus relinquished (or disassociated) property rights
from other rights of life and liberty in the national ethos. It simply took the courts a little
while longer to catch up.137
Some may legitimately ask if a similar sort of problem has not arisen on the
opposite side of the spectrum. In 2005, ironically, a century after Lochner, a sharply
divided United States Supreme Court decided Kelo v. New London and upheld the taking
of private property and transfer of that property to a private entity for development. The
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majority ruled that this complied with the “public use” requirement of the Fifth
Amendment because redevelopment might spawn greater tax revenue for the city.
Dissenting, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor reached back to Justice Chase’s decision in
Calder v. Bull more than two centuries earlier for the proposition that laws passed in
violation of “the great first principles of the social contract” cannot stand. By upholding
the taking, O’Connor declared, the “Court abandons this long-held, basic limitation on
government power” and injured the centrality of property in the American pantheon of
constitutional thought. O’Connor may be right from a philosophical perspective, but she
was wrong from a legal perspective. The Court did not abandon property rights in 2005.
To the contrary, that process began more than a century ago and was complete by the
1930s.138 We can only speculate as to whether the pendulum is ready to swing back
again.

C. The Origins of Privacy and the Birth of Eugenics

Three generations of imbeciles are
enough.139

Raymond Hudlow was born in 1925 and like many other children who grew up in
the rural south during the Great Depression, knew little more than poverty and privation.
What made Raymond’s case a little different, though, was that he also had the misfortune
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to be born to an abusive father who beat him with a buggy whip. Some beatings were so
severe, Raymond later recalled, that the blood literally ran down his body onto his legs.
The boy tried to escape several times by running away but he always wound up back at
home with his father. Eventually, the older Hudlow surrendered his son to the county
welfare workers explaining he could no longer control him. The teenager was eventually
placed into the Lynchburg State Colony for the Epileptic and Feeble Minded where he
was diagnosed a “moron.” A year after his arrival, he was ordered sterilized under
Virginia’s sterilization law. Raymond was not told what was about to be done to him; he
was simply strapped down on a gurney while his feet were forced into stirrups. Then,
without bothering to administer any anesthetic, or later give him any pain medication, the
doctor proceeded to slice the boy’s genitals and render him incapable of ever having
children. “It was the most pain I ever had in my life,” he later recalled.140
Hudlow certainly knew pain. He was discharged shortly after his vasectomy and
was drafted into the military where he participated in the D-Day Landing. Hudlow later
took shrapnel to the knee while helping liberate the Netherlands and, when taken as a
prisoner of war, he was beaten and nearly starved to death by the Germans. An elderly
Hudlow later recalled to a news reporter, however, that none of those experiences during
World War II were as painful as his sterilization. The young soldier was later awarded a
Bronze Star, Purple Heart and Prisoner of War Medal and served his country in the
United States military for a total of twenty-one years. The Virginia legislature adopted a
resolution in 2002 thanking Hudlow for his service to the nation. While the resolution
acknowledged his involuntary sterilization at the Lynchburg Colony when he was
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seventeen, it offered him no apology. When a Florida news reporter tracked Hudlow
down to get his reaction shortly before the ceremony, the toothless and understandably
bitter old man could only sputter “I ain’t no moron. A man’s got to have a level head to
fight.”141
Even if anyone knew (or cared) about Raymond Hudlow’s plight, and even if the
seventeen year old could have found access to the legal system, appealing to the courts
for protection would have been futile. The very same law that forced him to undergo a
vasectomy was upheld fifteen years earlier by the United States Supreme Court in the
notorious Buck v. Bell. Carrie Buck, the plaintiff who lent her name to that case, was
slightly older than Hudlow when sterilized but, as discussed later in this chapter, her
circumstances were every bit as tragic. In one important way, however, Carrie Buck was
far more representative of forced sterilization victims than Raymond Hudlow. State laws,
like Virginia’s, appeared gender neutral but there was far less outrage over its application
to women than men. Women could also be sterilized for sexual promiscuity and/or
having children out of wedlock whereas this fate rarely, if ever, befell the promiscuous
men. Around the time of Hudlow’s vasectomy, the United States Supreme Court
revisited the issue of involuntary sterilization in the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma which
involved a state law calling for involuntary sterilization of “habitual criminals.” While
no attention at all was paid to Carrie Buck’s right to have children, in the case of Jack
Skinner, Justice William Douglas was outraged that the Oklahoma legislature targeted
“one of the basic civil rights of man.” Douglas clearly meant “man” in the literal sense of
the term as he also referenced the Buck case several times in the opinion without ever
141
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voicing any disapproval. The Supreme Court did not hesitate to strike down the
Oklahoma law—albeit on Equal Protection grounds, rather than its violation of the
fundamental right to bear children—but left Buck v. Bell intact.142
Some might dismiss involuntary sterilization laws as simply a byproduct of
America’s flirtation with the pernicious “science” of Eugenics. But, the truth is that these
laws are yet another chapter in a very long history of American government (state and
federal) trying to assert control over the bodies of its people. Slave codes and common
law coverture were among the first example of this but certainly not the last. With
advances in medicine and technology, governments at the outset of the twentieth century
found greater—and certainly more invasive—ways to control its citizenry under the guise
of improving society as a whole. This process began with local vaccination laws in the
early 1900s and gradually progressed to Eugenics. Even as sterilization laws lost favor
with the American public after World War II—the Holocaust demonstrating its natural
end point—both federal and state governments continued to control and regulate uses of
the human body (particularly for women) and restrict intimate decision-making found
objectionable with either sex.
But, people began to fight back against these intrusions into their bodily
autonomy starting at the outset of the twentieth century. The fight began with assertion
of an undefined, inchoate, liberty interest in the integrity of one’s own body. By 1965,
that assertion had coalesced into the principle that people have a constitutional right to
privacy. This right first gained federal recognition in the landmark case of Griswold v.
142
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Connecticut143 though the full extent of it would not be developed until years later.
Critics of this right are quick to point out that the word “privacy” appears nowhere in the
Constitution and argue actions taken by democratic majorities should not be struck down
as being in violation of an “unenumerated” right. Even those who defend privacy
sometimes wince at the language employed by the majority in Griswold, which relied on
“penumbras formed by emanations.”
These are the issues I will address in this and the following chapters. Though I do
not necessarily disagree with the Supreme Court’s reasoning on the origins of privacy
rights—particularly the concurring justices that locate it within the Ninth Amendment—I
will also offer an alternative locus for privacy not just in constitutional law but also
American intellectual and political history. Just as I previously argued that
Enlightenment principles held that people owned property interests in their bodies, my
argument in this and the following chapter is that privacy can also be conceptualized as a
proxy for bodily property. We stopped talking of property in any context other than
chattel or real estate a long time ago. But, this idea was very much part of founding
thought in the latter half of the eighteenth century. We see a few remnants of that
rhetoric in the early days of privacy jurisprudence though, by the time that abortion and
sexual liberty took center stage in the so-called kulturkampf of the 1980s and 1990s, such
discourse had all but vanished. Still, any serious historical, ideological, study of privacy
cannot ignore the salience of property rights in the body, particularly insofar as it is
relevant to current debates over originalism as a mode of constitutional interpretation.
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The notion of the “body as property” also comports nicely with the other theories
advanced in Griswold and its progeny for two reasons. First, property rights and privacy
rights are unenumerated. The Constitution provides safeguards for property owners, but
there is no mention anywhere of a right to acquire, hold or sell property. Of course, as
discussed earlier, that right was no doubt omitted from the Constitution because it never
occurred to the founders it was in question. It is also highly-doubtful the founders would
have thought a federal or any state government would come to micromanage the bodies
of its people – at least in the context of propertied white males. Second, as discussed
earlier, when the Constitution and Bill of Rights were drafted, the founders in
Philadelphia, representatives in the First Federal Congress and members of the state
ratification conventions all had a very different conception of property than we have
today. Contract and property metaphors were lingua franca of the day and, as children of
the Enlightenment, American politicos were well versed in social contract theory which
not only stressed property but explained how private property was first acquired from
common property by the exertion of the body (physical labor) to improve it and physical
occupation with the body to claim it. The body, therefore, was integral to the notion of
property.
Finally, re-conceptualization of privacy as property rights in the body adds to the
meta-narrative of transformational change which occurred as a result of the creation and
strengthening of the modern welfare state from the New Deal through the Great Society
and beyond. The general consensus among constitutional scholars is that, after 1937, the
Supreme Court’s use of “substantive due process”—that is, recognition of unenumerated
rights in the Constitution—shifted from the economic sphere to the individual sphere. I
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agree, but there is another change that went on during that time period as well. Once the
Supreme Court retreated from its Lochner decision, federal and state governments
quickly imposed greater restrictions on private property rights. Given this diminished
importance of economic property, it should come as no surprise that property rights in the
body received little protection either. With only a few exceptions in the 1960s and
1970s, and one exception in 2003, the Supreme Court has largely stood on the sidelines
as governments (state and federal) invaded the private sphere passing laws controlling
bodily autonomy, reproductive rights and intimate decision. The same has also been true,
for the most part, of state supreme courts as well. In short, government assault on
individual liberty occurred in near synchronous lockstep with its assault on economic
liberty.

1. The Origins of Privacy
It is important to understand that there are two different types of privacy rights.
The first is a private law right of privacy. Private law privacy is a right possessed by one
private individual to keep another private individual out of one’s personal affairs. No
government action is involved here. Thus, the private law right of privacy is, essentially,
a tort—the same as trespass, battery or libel.144 The second type of privacy right, and the
one with which I am concerned here, is a public law right of privacy. By public, I mean
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collective action of private individuals acting through machinery of the res publica—in
short, democratic government. Though the public law right grew out of the private law
right, the two rights are fundamentally different in scope and affect. The private law
right applies to individuals and imposes a duty on one private individual to refrain from
violating the privacy of another individual. By contrast, the public law right applies to
people and their relationship to government. This right draws a line in the sand and,
essentially, tells government, you may go this far into our private affairs, but may go no
farther.
Supreme Court critics oftentimes accuse the justices of simply creating privacy
rights out of thin air in the 1960s. But, this critique is more political than factual.
Implicit, if not explicit, resort to privacy rights abound in American history prior to 1965
for anyone who cares to look. Ruth Bloch, for instance, makes a very persuasive case for
the proposition that privacy’s theoretical, if not rhetorical, antecedents can be found much
in the early days of the republic. As a point of departure, Bloch focuses on the issue of
spousal abuse and how that abuse was handled by the legal system in colonial America as
compared to how state and local governments dealt with the subject after independence.
Although Blackstone’s Commentaries on the relationship of husband/wife held sway on
both sides of the Atlantic for a number of years, Bloch identified the trend in British
colonial law to treat domestic violence as breach of king’s peace which permitted an
abused wife to seek out a local magistrate who, if the situation warranted, could force the
husband to swear out a “peace bond” to guarantee good behavior. Though not much, this
provided some minimal relief to the abused spouse. After independence, though,
Americans became increasingly suspicious of over-reaching government and, as Bloch
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argues, came to see “the family” as a private institution beyond the reach of state and
local government. This philosophical shift, as well as centralization of the legal process
away from local authorities to the state, made it more difficult to seek redress for abuse in
the early republic than it had been in the colonial era. The notion of privacy during that
time was familial rather than personal and, as Bloch is quick to point out, the actual
phrase “right to privacy” never made it into American discourse. But, the legal history of
colonial and early republican America makes manifest a growing consensus that there
was a private zone, into which the government could not tread. This was only the
germination of a right that would take at least another century to be flushed out and
developed.145
In more contemporary jurisprudence, Justice William Douglas, who wrote the
plurality opinion in Griswold, is usually credited with recognizing our modern public law
right of privacy. But, in truth, he shares that honor with an earlier Supreme Court
justice—Louis D. Brandeis—who sat on the Supreme Court from 1916 to 1939.
Brandeis, the son of immigrant Czech Jews, was admitted into Harvard Law School at
nineteen and was, by all accounts, a legal prodigy. He and a classmate, Samuel Warren,
set up a private practice shortly after they graduated and the two of them proceeded to
write what may well be the most famous law review article in American history. People
enjoy protection in their persons and property, wrote Warren and Brandeis, and this was a
rule “as old as the common law.” But as the times changed, it became necessary to
“define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection.” The late nineteenth century
was one of those times. Brandeis and Warren were outraged by a news media they
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perceived as exceeding all bounds of propriety—running pictures in the papers without
permission, repeating scandalous gossip, etc.—solely to cater to what the young lawyers
believed was a salacious and indolent readership. Courts were struggling to fit into
existing legal actions new lawsuits filed by plaintiffs who wanted to protect the intimate
details of their lives from being revealed to others. The legal principle which Warren and
Brandeis provided for the courts was a private law right of privacy which they also called
the “right to be let alone.”146
This emergent private law right was analogous to “the right not to be assaulted or
beaten,” or the “right not be imprisoned” they explained. Though similar to private
property rights, the authors rejected the notion of grounding privacy in private property.
To do so, they argued, would be to use that phrase in an extended an unusual sense.”
Instead, they opted to locate privacy within the confines of an undefined right to
“inviolate personality.”147 While Warren and Brandeis rejected property as the locus for
privacy, that rejection is not fatal to my argument that property rights justify recognition
of privacy rights. Warren and Brandeis were lawyers writing for an audience of other
lawyers and judges rather than for historians. Their article was published in a law review
rather than a history journal. Why is that so important? The authors meant to address an
existing legal problem and propose a practical solution to that problem rather than write
history. Early in the article Warren and Brandeis argue that the notion of property had
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expanded over centuries from the strictly corporeal (real estate and chattel) to incorporeal
as well (stocks, copyrights, patents, etc.).148 Though true, at the same time, the definition
of property contracted as well. Lawyers like Warren and Brandeis would not necessarily
have had the same familiarity with property interests in rights, or the body, that
eighteenth century lawyers like James Otis or Alexander Hamilton would have had. Late
nineteenth century Americans may still have been living the “Enlightenment experiment”
but many of the particulars of that experiment had faded from memory over time.
Still, the framework Warren and Brandeis provided the bench and bar quickly
gained currency in the law. Many cases in the late nineteenth, and early twentieth,
centuries either cited to their article directly or were clearly influenced by it, sometimes
even borrowing the phrases “privacy” or “right to be let alone” without attributing them
to Warren and Brandeis.149 More importantly, as state courts came to increasingly cite
the private right of privacy, they also began linking it to property. May Schuyler was a
New York philanthropist who tried hard to stay out of the public eye. Fourteen years
after her death, the New York Women’s Memorial Fund Association began raising funds
to commission a statute of her to be shown at the 1893 Columbia Exposition. Her nearest
living relative, a nephew, filed suit to stop them and asked for a preliminary injunction.
The trial court granted the injunction, citing Warren and Brandeis in ruling the creation of
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the statue violated the decedent’s right of privacy or “right to be let alone.” That decision
was reversed on appeal, in part, the majority said, because a decedent’s privacy rights
died with her. Not so, said one judge, who stated “I cannot see why the right of privacy
is not a form of property[.]” This property would have survived the decedent and her
representatives could pursue that action.150
A private law right of privacy, though, offered no protection from overreaching
governments. Warren and Brandeis only wrote about private actors and none of the cases
that followed their article addressed the right of private individuals to restrict government
entry into the same zone of privacy from which they could exclude private individuals.
Still, critics who accuse Justice Douglas of simply creating a constitutional right to
privacy out of thin air in 1965 are simply wrong. As noted above, American law tried to
distinguish itself from British law by privatizing each man’s “little commonwealth” and
protecting him from government intrusion. It is also worth noting the Third Amendment
prohibits government from quartering soldiers in private homes and the Fourth
Amendment protects persons and homes from unreasonable searches and seizures. While
the “emanations from penumbras” rhetoric of Justice Douglas’s opinion in Griswold may
cause reflexive wincing, it is clear that these amendments—if nothing else—indicate a
clear concern on the part of the founders that there is a zone of privacy around certain
spheres of interest that the government could not tread. The Ninth Amendment, as
discussed earlier, also sets forth a rule of constitutional interpretation for the first eight
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amendments to the Bill of Rights and instructs future generations that there are rights
outside the first eight amendments.
Proto-privacy arguments are also detectable from Supreme Court decisions as
early as 1885—several generations in advance of the Griswold decision. The Court in
Boyd v. United States struck down part of a customs revenue act that compelled
production of private papers of importers whose goods were seized for failure to pay
customs.151 In so doing, the Court cited an English precedent condemning warrants used
by officials to find private papers that would help obtain convictions for those violating
English customs laws. “The principles laid down in [that] opinion,” the Court held,
“affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. . . . [T]hey apply to all
invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s
home and the privacies of life.”152 Intrusion into the home was one thing, but what really
bothered the Court in Boyd was the authority that the customs statute gave the
government to rifle through the personal, and private, papers of the person against whom
the warrant was executed.
Credit for recognizing a public law right of privacy, to some extent, must also be
given to the man who created the private law right. Louis Brandeis was appointed to the
Supreme Court in 1916 by President Woodrow Wilson. Twelve years later, Justice
Brandeis reached back to his law review article of 1890 to craft an argument that there
existed certain private boundaries in life over which the federal government could not
transgress. The issue before the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States was
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whether private telephone conversations, obtained by the government through wiretaps,
could be used in evidence in a criminal prosecution. Former President, and now Chief
Justice, William Howard Taft answered in the affirmative. There were a number of
dissenters, though, including Justice Brandeis who wrote our founders “sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. [The
founders] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”153 These two cases
(Boyd and Olmstead) dealt with property—the invasion of a home/business and the
seizure of personal property—in the conventional sense of the term. In neither case was
proto-privacy argument made in reference to a government invasion of the body. The
first person to actually make that argument, though, was not a lawyer or justice involved
in the Griswold case but an immigrant Swede.
Henning Jacobson was born in Sweden in 1851 and was thirteen years old when
he immigrated to America with his family. As an adult, Jacobson entered seminary and
ultimately moved to Cambridge Massachusetts where he helped found the Faith Lutheran
Church. A smallpox epidemic swept through neighboring Boston in 1901, causing
several hundred deaths, and ultimately prompting the Cambridge Board of Health to
enact an ordinance requiring mandatory vaccination. Those who refused vaccination
were fined $5. Claiming to have had a bad reaction to a vaccination as a child in Sweden,
Rev. Jacobson refused. He was subsequently indicted and fought his conviction through
the commonwealth courts.
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When that proved fruitless, he appealed to the Supreme Court. Jacobson
advanced a number of arguments but the most important, for our purposes, was that the
Cambridge Board of Health exceeded its police powers in ordering its citizens to be
inoculated. Many people—including some physicians—still disputed the science behind
vaccinations and many feared for their lives if forced to introduce an active part of the
oftentimes fatal disease into their body. Jacobson’s lawyers argued that a compulsory
vaccination law of this sort was “hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care of
his own body.” In rejecting Jacobson’s argument that Massachusetts crossed the line,
Justice Harlan never disputed the existence of this “inherent right” but, instead, reasoned
that the health and safety of the community must sometimes supersede that right:
The defendant insists that his liberty is invaded when the state subjects
him to fine or imprisonment for neglecting or refusing to submit to
vaccination; that a compulsory vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary,
and oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the inherent right of every
freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as to him seems
best; and that the execution of such a law against one who objects to
vaccination, no matter for what reason, is nothing short of an assault upon
his person. But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States
to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in
each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized
society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the
rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with
disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the
operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual
person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property,
regardless of the injury that may be done to others. This court has more
than once recognized it as a fundamental principle that ‘persons and
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state; of the
perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon
acknowledged general principles ever can be, made, so far as natural
persons are concerned.’ . . . [We have previously said] The possession and
enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be
deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety,
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health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Even liberty
itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according
to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions
essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is, then,
liberty regulated by law.’154
In holding that Rev. Jacobson’s must yield to the health and safety of his community, as
determined by the Cambridge Board of Health, the Supreme Court nonetheless implied
recognized the inherent right that Jacobson asserted.
Jacobson was not alone in his outrage over the compulsory nature of state and
local vaccination laws. Similar arguments were made by vaccine opponents across the
country. When Connecticut made it a law that children must be vaccinated before they
could attend school, opponents introduced bills in successive legislative assemblies to
repeal it. Calling compulsory vaccination a “tyranny,” the issue was quickly framed as a
matter of “choice.” Said one opponent of the law to the Public Health and Safety
Committee, “[y]ou have your choice to be vaccinated and we have our choice to avoid it.
. . . Have we not a right to preserve our health? Must we be obliged to have this forced
on us?” In another attempt to repeal the ordinance two years later, one witness challenged
the same committee: “what business has an outsider to come in and tell me what course I
shall take in regard to my child or children?” The term “privacy,” was never invoked per
se, of course, but it is clear these parents had an inchoate sense that government had gone
too far by inserting itself into the realm of private decision-making. There was, as yet, no
choate sense of what right they felt violate but the outrage at government overreaching
was real. As to the source of the right, however, there was a vague general sense it was a
natural right and that any law violating that right was unjust. “There is nothing that so
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undermines the people’s confidence in government,” argued one proponent of repeal, “as
the existence of unust laws—if a law is unjust, persons lose confidence in the
government, and I hold that no law is a just law which compels parents to go against their
conscientious [sic], their religious, and their scientific principles.”155
The right asserted against government intrusion into the body might have been
inchoate. But, there was no doubt amongst the people who argued against compulsory
vaccination that one existed and the United States Supreme Court in Jacobson certainly
did not dispute that one existed. A failure to precisely define that right, or situate it in the
Constitutional pantheon mattered little in the long run. On balance, compulsory
vaccination was a relatively innocuous part of progressive policy in early twentieth
century America and would pale in comparison to what would happen soon thereafter as
many state governments took upon themselves the authority to interfere in reproductive
or sexual decisions of its citizenry. As government intrusion into the body became
increasingly onerous, activists and the bar would eventually coalesce around recognizing
a formal public law “right to privacy.”

155

See H.B. 33, Proceedings Before the Public Health & Safety Committee, Connecticut
General Assembly (1905); H.B. 741, Proceedings Before the Public Health & Safety
Committee, Connecticut General Assembly (1907); H.B. 347, Proceedings Before the
Public Health & Safety Committee, Connecticut General Assembly (1911). Though
smallpox has long been eradicated, the uproar over mandatory vaccination has not.
When pharmaceutical giant Merk & Co., developed a vaccine (Gardasil) against the
human papillomavirus (HPV), a leading cause of cervical cancer among women,
Governor Rick Perry of Texas issued an Executive Order mandating vaccination of girls
in Texas schools. An ensuing uproar amongst parents and conservative groups led to
action in the state legislature which ultimately passed a veto-proof bill making
vaccination voluntary. Representative Dennis Bonner, the sponsor of the bill stated “only
parents and children and doctors [should] decide if this right.” Houston Chronicle, A-1
(17 Mar. 2007). Also see generally Jane Elliot, “Senate Votes to Overturn Perry’s
Vaccination Order,” Houston Chronicle B-4 (24 April 2007).
116

In short, the unenumerated right of privacy was not created out of thin air by
judicial fiat in 1965 as its detractors tend to claim. The right does have a foundation in
several federal constitutional amendments as well as Supreme Court case law pre-dating
the twentieth century. More importantly, though, the law review article penned by
Warren and Brandeis in 1890 recognized—but did not find—a private law right of
privacy more than half a century before Justice Douglas recognized the public law right
in 1965. Just as the private law right was in response to an increasingly intrusive press,
recognition of the public law right was in response to intrusive government which only
got worse as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries passed. The full panoply of that right
would not come until later and would not have happened without the work of people like
Bill Baird, Norma McCorvey and John Lawrence. But, the eventual development of a
public law right of privacy was too little, too late for people like Raymond Hudlow and
Carrie Buck who found themselves at the mercy of democratic majorities flirting with the
Eugenics fad that swept the world in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

2. Eugenics
Simply put, eugenics is the “science” of better breeding. The improvement of
society’s genetic stock required two things. The first requirement was that superior races
continue propagating as fast, and as much, as possible. This was referred to as “positive
eugenics.” The second requirement was that breeding by inferior races be slowed as
much as possible or stopped altogether. This was referred to as “negative eugenics.” The
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century saw a huge influx of immigration by those
other than from southern or eastern Europe. These immigrants possessed a much greater
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rate of fertility than native white Anglo-Saxon Protestants whose fertility rate was
decreasing. What many feared was that inferior races from the rest of the world, together
with degenerate whites and African-Americans in this country, would eventually
outnumber the former and overtake them in society leading to what was characterized as
“race suicide.”156
“Race” is a very fluid concept now and but was more so during the late nineteenth
century. As Simone Caron points out, eugenicists of the time period frequently referred
to an American “race” or a Protestant “race.” “Inferior races” were certainly thought to
have included African-Americans. But, white immigrants from Eastern Europe were also
considered a separate race and even white Americans were subjected to eugenic
sterilization if they were criminals, drunkards or otherwise unable to care for themselves
and their offspring. White women, though not white men, could also be institutionalized
and then sterilized for being “notoriously immoral” or sexually active. That said, it
would nevertheless be a mistake to gloss over the racism inherent in eugenics as applied
to slavery’s descendants in this country. Paul Lombardo notes a California physician
called for involuntary sterilization of all African-Americans as a final “solution to the
negro problem” and another in Virginia called for it as punishment (along with cutting off
ears) for black men that assaulted white women – that is assuming, of course, the accused
was lucky enough to have survived vigilante lynching long enough to get to trial.157
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It is tempting to blame this part of the Eugenics craze on racist Europeans—
particularly Germans—who, long before Adolf Hitler, maintained that certain genetic
traits made one ethnicity superior to another. But, the fact remains Americans (as well as
Western Europeans) embraced this nefarious idea long before a fanatical “Third Reich.”
Indiana was the first state in the United States to adopt a compulsory sterilization law in
1907—twenty-six years before Adolf Hitler was even appointed Chancellor of Germany.
Many other states followed and even Margaret Sanger, the founder of Planned
Parenthood and strong advocate of a woman’s control over her own reproductive system,
championed negative eugenics. “Indeed, it has been a great surprise to me,” Sanger
wrote in 1923, that medical societies throughout the country had “failed utterly to
encourage sterilization of the unfit or to educate the public that it should be done.” “I
personally believe,” Sanger wrote four years earlier, “in the sterilization of the feebleminded , the insane and the syphiletic [sic].”158
This was the climate into which Raymond Hudlow and Carrie Buck were born.
Both children were born poor but Hudlow had the advantage of being born male; Buck
did not. Carrie’s mother, Emma was born in 1872 and married Frank Buck at the age of
twenty-four. Ten years later, Carrie was born. Emma was institutionalized in 1920 and,
though also through to be a prostitute, was only formally diagnosed as a “moron.” Carrie
was ultimately placed with a foster family by the name of Dobbs but, when she became
pregnant at the age of seventeen, he horrified foster family—fearing scandal—took her to
the same colony where her mother was institutionalized. She was selected for
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sterilization under Virginia law to be carried out once the baby was born. A friendly
attorney was appointed to represent Carrie, in the hopes of establishing a precedent
conducive to carrying out these procedures in Virginia, and elsewhere, in the future.159
Unlike Raymond Hudlow, Carrie Buck was born to an unwed mother who,
herself, was confined to a Virginia home for the feebleminded. We know little about
Carrie’s mother (Emma Buck) except that she was poor and bore Carrie out of wedlock.
Carrie was later placed with a foster family who cared for her until she, too, became
pregnant out of wedlock. Fearing the family would scandalized as a result of the
pregnancy, Carrie was promptly returned to the Virginia Colony for the Epileptic and
Feeble Minded where she gave birth to a daughter, Vivian. Carrie was then diagnosed as
feeble-minded and ordered by the superintendant of that institution to undergo a
salpingectomy as permitted by Virginia’s Eugenics law. An attorney was appointed to
represent Carrie on appeal but his efforts are largely regarded by historians as a sham and
meant to obtain a favorable opinion by courts to uphold these laws.
The case reached the United States Supreme Court, which ultimately reached a
decision in 1926 upholding Virginia’s involuntary sterilization law. The Buck v. Bell
opinion was written by Oliver Wendell Holmes—one of the more famous Justices who
never became a Chief Justice—and, to this day, remains one of the more vicious opinions
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ever authored by the Supreme Court. Justice Holmes, himself from a Boston “Brahmin”
family and twice injured fighting for the Union in the Civil War, made it clear he had no
empathy for the likes of Carrie Buck. “We have seen more than once,” Holmes said, that
the public “may call upon the best citizens for their lives.” It would be very strange,
Justice Holmes noted, “if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the
state for these lesser sacrifices.” Rather than allow society to be “swamped with
incompetence,” Holmes declared, it “is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.” Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.”160
Counsel for Carrie Buck made the argument that the Virginia statute violated a
“constitutional right of bodily integrity” but that issue was never raised in the opinion—
perhaps, due to the request of Chief Justice Taft who asked Holmes to tread lightly on the
matter.161 At a time when the United States was little concerned with any of niceties of
political correctness, the Buck decision still comes across as particularly harsh. This did
not particularly concern Holmes, however, as he even related to a young protégé that the
one decision he wrote that term which gave him pleasure was the one “establishing the
constitutionality of a law permitting the sterilization of imbeciles.”162
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Part of the opinion’s severity was due to Holmes background. He was born into a
wealthy and respected Boston (Brahmin) family and was severely wounded several times
as a young man fighting for the Union during the Civil War. He no doubt had himself
and others like him in mind when he spoke in Buck of the ability of the state to ask its
“best citizens for their lives.” Holmes was also a fervent convert to the principles of
eugenics. One biographer even recounts that, in a lecture to law students at Boston
University, Holmes told his rapt young audience that it was useless to try and rehabilitate
a criminal inclined to crime by an “organic necessity.” “He must instead,” Holmes told
them, “be got rid of.”163
By the same token, however, we must be careful about ascribing too much
significance to either Holmes’s elitism or to his support of eugenics when analyzing the
Buck opinion. A foundational pillar of Holmes’s judicial philosophy lay in legal
positivism, that is to say a belief that the judiciary should afford considerable—though
not abject—deference to legislatures in formulating public policy and crafting of statutes
to accommodate changes in society. In 1881, he published a series of lectures he had
given as one book entitled The Common Law. More thematic philosophy on various
legal topics than a true legal treatise, Holmes made clear his belief in the primacy of
legislation. “The first requirement of a sound body of law is that it should correspond
with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong.”

of privacy, as well as nurturing it into an eventual public right, he also joined with the
majority in Buck. There are few biographies of Brandeis, but in the most recent, refers to
this only once and only in the notes at the back of the book. See Urofsky, Brandeis, supra
at 874 (notes for page 639).
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Following his oft-quoted phrase on the life of the law being experience and not logic,
Holmes noted: [t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than . . . syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed.”164
Consistent with that philosophy, it is worth repeating Holmes cast the lone dissent
in Lochner and would have upheld the New York legislation on the number of hours a
baker could work. He also dissented in the Coppage case and would have upheld the
Kansas legislature’s ban on so-called “yellow dog” contracts forbidding employees from
joining unions.165 Holmes voted to uphold these laws not, as his biographers points out,
because he believed in them. To the contrary, he regarded economic laws protecting
workers at the expense of employers, and thereby re-arranging property interests between
them, as so much “twaddle.” Still, Holmes believed it the job of the legislature rather
than the judiciary to decide how to address socio-economic problems that came with
industrialization. His voting record on the Supreme Court reflected that belief and while
fellow justices struck down progressive labor laws on grounds they violated liberty of
contract, Holmes dissented though his own thoughts on political economy probably
sympathized with the majority. It thus comes as no surprise that, when Eugenics
provided a theory by which to reduce or eliminate those in society deemed manifestly
unable to care for themselves, Holmes would have believed it the job of the legislature to
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determine its merit and value and whether, or not, to implement its principles. The Buck
case thus fit perfectly within the parameters of his legal philosophy.166
The sum total of all paper devoted over the years to critiquing the Buck decision
in particular, and Eugenics in general, no doubt accounts for a good part of deforestation
and there is no point to repeating any of that here. But, a few final words are in order.
Carrie Buck, who died in 1983, was re-discovered by researchers later in life. Interviews
with her, as well as her acquaintances, not to mention review of her primary school report
cars and found she was, in fact, not an “imbecile.” She certainly did not rank in the
genius range but her academic performance was certainly within ordinary levels. As for
her out-of-wedlock pregnancy—an issue which stigmatized virtually all women, but
particularly those of lesser economic means—Buck revealed she was raped by the
nephew of the Dobbs foster-family with whom she was placed. The out-of-wedlock
daughter to whom she gave birth, Vivian, was later adopted by her great aunt and uncle.
The Buck case has never been formally overruled and remains, technically, good law.
Although the commonwealth of Virginia repealed this particular law in 1974, many states
still have compulsory sterilization laws of one sort or another on the statute books.
Adding insult to injury, it is also worth noting defense attorneys at Nuremburg repeatedly
referenced the Buck case in defense of their Nazi clients. It is almost impossible to
imagine a more embarrassing rebuke to America’s image of itself as the land of the free

166

Baker, Justice From Beacon Hill, 601, 298-306; also see G. Edward White, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993) 390-409 which stresses Holmes’s legal positivism as the basis for his dissent in a
number of labor cases during the Progressive Era.
124

than the remnants of a totalitarian government relying on a U.S. Supreme Court case to
excuse genocide.167
The Supreme Court revisited compulsory sterilization fifteen years later when it
reviewed an Oklahoma statute applied to “habitual criminals.” An habitual criminal was
defined by Oklahoma as anyone convicted two or more times for felonies involving
moral turpitude. Embezzlement, political offenses and violation of revenue acts were
expressly excluded from the class of crimes involving moral turpitude. Jack Skinner
spent eleven months imprisonment in 1926 for stealing chickens and ten years for armed
robbery in 1929. He was serving his second sentence when Oklahoma passed its habitual
criminal sterilization law in 1931. A third conviction for armed robbery put him squarely
within the confines of that law and Skinner became the test case to challenge its
constitutionality.168
The majority decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma was written by Justice William O.
Douglas who ranks as one of the greater civil libertarians to ever sit on the Supreme
Court. The opinion started with soaring , and promising, rhetoric—stating the word
“right” no less than three times in two sentences—and characterizing the issue before the
Court as a “sensitive and important area of human rights.” The decision, unfortunately,
failed to live up to that initial rhetoric. Rather than address the issue of “rights” head-on,
Douglass passed and went on to craft an opinion grounded entirely on the Equal
Protection Clause instead of individual liberty. Using poultry as a point of departure,
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Douglas essentially noted that a man who stole chickens on three separate occasions
could later be compelled to undergo vasectomy whereas if three chicken owners entrusted
a neighbor to care for their chickens while they were absent, the caretaker (bailee) could
refuse to return those chickens when the owner came back and would only be guilty of
embezzlement which did not subject that individual to sterilization. Douglas reasoned
that “[s]terilization of those who have thrice committed grand larceny, with immunity for
those who are embezzlers, is a clear, pointed unmistakable discrimination.”169
That the court acknowledged a fundamental right was at stake in Skinner, but then
failed to decide the case on the basis of that right, is—to put it mildly—frustrating. Chief
Justice Stone filed a concurring opinion that also stated that the case involved an
“invasion of personal liberty” but then went on to point out a procedural problem at issue
with the Oklahoma statute that was not present with the Virginia statute. The most
promising rhetoric of the opinion beyond Douglas’s opening two sentences is perhaps
that of Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion wherein he notes: “there are limits to the
extent to which a legislatively represented minority may conduct biological experiments
at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a minority.”170
We must be careful not to ascribe to Skinner rulings it did not make and/or credit
that it does not deserve. To begin, Skinner did not overrule Buck. Indeed, Buck was
mentioned numerous times in the majority opinion and in Chief Justice Stone’s
169
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concurrence. Every single mention of the Buck case was, if not positive, at least neutral.
Nothing in Skinner overturned Buck, limited it or even criticized it. Though it is
unimaginable we would ever allow that kind of forced sterilization again, Buck remains
the proverbial law of the land. Furthermore, the Court had before it the perfect
opportunity to formally acknowledge the existence of a liberty interest in one’s own body
but did not take it. The high-flying rhetoric at the opening of Douglas’s opinion is
nothing more than obiter dicta and has no precedential value whatsoever. In addition, it
is hard to read Justice Douglas expounding on the “human right” of reproduction for men
but never mentioning that women had that right as well, or try and explain why Justice
Holmes might not have mentioned it in Buck. Was there any real difference between the
two cases other than the gender of the proposed sterilizee?
Finally, Skinner did not end Eugenics. Although a recent book on the Skinner
case correctly acknowledges that its principles and holding are problematic, part of the
title for that book—The Near Triumph of American Eugenics—suggests Skinner turned
the tide on Eugenic Sterilization. That kind of characterization over-states the value of
the case. Negative Eugenic practices continued well after Skinner though the horrors of
Nazi Germany slowed (but did not stop) involuntary sterilizations. We should also be
mindful that between 1927 when Buck was decided, and 1942 when Skinner was decided,
the world had become aware of the junk racial science of Nazi Germany and at least
suspected some of the ends to which Hitler would put negative Eugenics. The Skinner
case could just as easily be read as the Supreme Court response to policies which, if not
falling out of favor, were being put under a public policy microscope in light of what was
transpiring in Europe. Though no one has greater respect for Justice Douglas and his
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legacy of jurisprudence than me, particularly with regard to the right privacy, I must also
take issue with a recent biographer characterizing the Skinner case as Douglas’s
opportunity to explore “his views on personal autonomy” and that Douglas “ruled
expansively on behalf of human rights.” This is what Douglas could have done, should
have done and no doubt wished he had done later in his career. But, Skinner was decided
on Equal Protection grounds not on the fundamental rights so eloquently mentioned at the
outset of the opinion.171
Nobody seriously doubts the role of racism, misogyny and elitism in American
Eugenics. But, the economic aspects of compulsory sterilization deserve some final
words. Progressivism spawned a new, centralized, effort in the United States to care for
those deemed incapable of caring for themselves. No longer were individual
communities necessarily saddled with the burden of caring for the sick and the infirm;
states now created their own institutions and entire new bureaucracies to warehouse and
care for people. Those institutions were built with, and operated through, taxpayer
dollars. To paraphrase Orleck, anytime the government gives you money, there will
always be strings attached. Those strings, of course, were forfeiture of liberty and
reproductive rights.172 At least in the case of Carrie Buck, women sacrificed their
reproductive rights as quid pro quo for continued shelter and care. This exchange was
not truly voluntary, of course—Buck and Hudlow were both committed to Virginia
institutions against their will—but the legal fiction was that they exchanged those rights
171

Nourse, In Reckless Hands, 15-16, 126-134; Bruce Allen Murphy, Wild Bill: The
Legend and Life of William O. Douglas, America’s Most Controversial Supreme Court
Justice (New York: Random House, 2003) 203.
172

Annelise Orleck, Storming Caesar's Palace: how Black Mothers Fought Their Own
War on Poverty )Boston: Beacon Press, 2005) 4.
128

for care. If the public is going to provide for their care, after all, then the public will
expect that it can decide the terms under which that care is given.
But, what is rarely mentioned in any discussion of compulsory sterilization is the
economic—or, potential economic—toll that the procedure took on the sterilizee. Before
the advent of Social Security and Medicare as a means by which to provide for the
necessities of life to the elderly and infirm, parents typically relied on their adult children
and/or extended family to care for them in their old age. This was a moral duty, and a
natural law duty, imposed on children but it was never a common law duty as the one
imposed on a parent to support their minor children. Nevertheless, early on in American
history, states passed various legislative measures to impose statutory duties on adult
children to care for their parents to the extent they were financially able. Given the
endemic nature of poverty, it is admittedly unlikely that Raymond Hudlow or Carrie
Buck would have ever had children financially capable of paying to support them. But,
even if living in abject poverty, grown children can at least provide their parents with a
roof over their heads and a minimal level of sustenance. The State of Virginia deprived
Hudlow and Buck of this potential economic asset in their old age. Ironically, such asset
deprivation (or, taking of property) continued to self-inflict harm to the Virginia public
fisc. Buck lived out her final days in a Waynesboro, Virginia, “District Home” which
Paul Lombardo describes as the facilities that were built to replace county almshouses.
In assuring Buck would have no more offspring to “sap” the strength of the state,
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Virginia also made sure that she and others like her would continue to sap public welfare
monies for the rest of their lives.173
A state’s dabbling in eugenics provided more than just the opportunity cost that
could possibly recouped of a family member. It also provided for reparation payments to
those Americans affected by state eugenics programs.174 Although reparations typically
denote what opponents denote as questionable ethnic payments to groups in recompense
of for an unconstitutional restraint on liberty—for instance, interment of JapaneseAmericans at the outset of World War II—they are also represented as mistakes to be
reckoned with. Whether recognized as a clear taking of property rights under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, or a taking of bodily autonomy by the
state, the fact remains that deprivation of individual control over the body remains a
serious problem in the law.
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CHAPTER IV
PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND CONTRACEPTION

We . . . affirm the right of the individual to
determine the chronology and size of the
family and strongly disapprove of . . .
legislative restriction which would prevent
the exercise of free conscience.175

David Trubek and Louise Grossman were married in June of 1958. That fall, they
started at Yale University Law School. A degree from Yale is difficult for anyone to
attain, under any circumstances, but it was even harder for a woman in the 1950s and
early 1960s. A pregnancy during an era when women were expected to give up their
professional aspirations in order to be a mother would have immediately de-railed
Louise’s academic and professional career. Consequently, on May 20, 1959, the Trubeks
filed suit in New Haven, Connecticut, asking the court to declare the state’s ban on
dispensing birth control, and birth control advice, an unconstitutional deprivation of
liberty without Due Process of law. In their complaint, the couple alleged that Louise’s
education would be interrupted if she became pregnant and that, in any event, they did
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not want to bring children into the world until they were materially able to provide for
them.176
The State’s Attorney General admitted the factual allegations of the complaint but
denied that the Trubeks had a legitimate claim for relief. A New Haven trial court judge
agreed and, on March 26, 1960, entered judgment against the Trubeks. The young couple
appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court. Catharine Roraback, the Trubeck’s attorney,
stressed in her brief the importance of protecting Louise’s academic career from an
unintended pregnancy as well as both their desire to have children only when they had
sufficient means to care for them. The Connecticut Attorney General belittled the latter
argument in particular. What if the Trubeks never felt they had sufficient economic
resources to bear and raise children? What then? The State answered its own rhetorical
question and, essentially, argued the legislature had a right to supervise the marriage so as
to ensure the couple procreated and then raised their children consistent with their
obligations to society, in general, and as well as to the State of Connecticut in particular:
[M]arriage carries with it definite obligations and responsibilities and once
undertaken the State becomes an interested party by virtue of its desire to
see that the married couple maintain a permanent marriage status with the
intention to discharge toward society and one another those duties and
obligations which result from a marriage relationship. Such a relationship
involves the morals and civilization of organized society.177
The Connecticut Supreme Court summarily rejected the Trubeks’ arguments on
the premise that “previous decisions” rendered their claims untenable. Trubek v. Ullman
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never went any further than the Connecticut Supreme Court. 178 Still, Connecticut’s ban
on dispensing birth control to married couples—indeed, every state’s ban on distributing
contraceptives to married couples—would fall five years later in the landmark case of
Griswold v. Connecticut. The Trubek case is nevertheless more illustrative of my privacy
arguments than Griswold. On the one hand, Rorabach never expressly asserted “privacy”
as a definitive constitutional right on behalf of her clients though she did stress individual
rights such as that to get married and to engage in sexual intercourse as a result of
marriage. But, what is most interesting about the Trubek case were assertions of
economic interests including Louise’s legal education which, of course, would contribute
to future family wealth-building and the couple’s desire to choose when they had children
based on their economic resources. Though Roraback never actually articulated Louise’s
intrinsic property right to her own body, their arguments to the Connecticut Supreme
Court at least emphasized the extrinsic property rights. Therefore, though they lost their
case in Connecticut courts, the Trubeks contributed as much to the national discourse on
privacy and property rights as did Estelle Griswold five years later. Fortunately, despite
Connecticut’s legislative and judicial denial of their right to choose, Louise (and David)
graduated Yale in 1962 and are (today) emeriti faculty at the University of Wisconsin
Law School.179
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This chapter, and the two that follow, will examine the recognition and expansion
of privacy, as well as the doctrine’s later contraction, as a byproduct (casualty) of the
regulatory state. Constitutional historians all too often cite the 1950s and 1960s as a
proverbial heyday of judicial activism. I take issue with that characterization, however,
and will argue instead that both state and federal judiciaries were responding (albeit
belatedly) to a broad sweep of legislation that tried to regulate individuals and their
private lives as much as business regulation tried to control their economic lives. Calvin
Coolidge once famously noted in the 1920s that “the business of America is business”
and therefore it should come as no surprise that courts – both state and federal – rushed
into protect business from what they perceived as laws impeding commerce or regulating
their relations with employees. Courts were much slower to react, however, to laws that
regulated the individual and the private sphere. Indeed, sometimes, as in the case of
eugenics, courts no doubt perceived their inaction as comporting with their sense of
“social darwinism.”
Still, it is property that remains at the core of not just our economic lives but also
our private lives. The regulatory state diminishes property and economic interests as
much when it forces the birth of an unwanted child as it does when it seizes land to give
to private developers to improve a city’s tax base or wipes out shareholder equity in a
corporation only to give ownership of the entity that emerges from bankruptcy to its
workers. What stops lawmakers and the judiciary from seeing that difference is politics.

other notables such as Bobby Seale. She died in October, 2007, at the age of 87. See
David J. Garrow, Liberty & Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v.
Wade (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1994) 151-153; Dennis Hevesi, “Catherine
Rorabach, 87, Influential Lawyer,” New York Times (20 Oct. 2007).
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Conservatives decry judicial activism when anti-abortion laws are struck down just as
much as liberals decry judicial activism when gun restrictions are deemed to be
unconstitutional. Moreover, as I will argue in a later chapter, many liberals became
uneasy championing property rights in the latter half of the twentieth just as
conservatives became increasingly uneasy with assertion of individual rights.180 I submit
conservatives and liberals have more in common than they do differences and that
commonality is the tendency of the general public to over-regulate; that is to say, the very
sort of “excess democracy” against which James Madison warned more than two
centuries ago. If economic and social legislation are viewed in light of affecting property
rights, I submit both sides would agree the adversary is not an activist judiciary but,
instead, overreaching legislatures.

A. The Home as a Private Sphere
As shown in the previous chapter, the so-called “right of privacy” began its
incarnation as a legal doctrine within the realm of private law. The private affairs of one
person were legally protected from intrusion by another private entity. With the possible
exception of Justice Louis Brandeis, who helped craft the notion of “privacy” as a
common law doctrine to begin with, nobody conceived of privacy as a bulwark against
overreaching by state or federal government. Brandeis argued privacy should protect an
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individual and his business activities from federal intrusion in Olmstead v. United States
and a proto-privacy argument was made by the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States.
But, its use as a public law, doctrine, endowing citizens with a constitutional right that
could be asserted against government, was not fully adopted until 1965. In retrospect,
though, its historical antecedents are clearly if one cares to look for them.
Anti-Federalists waged their 1787-1789 campaign against the constitution by
highlighting the complete absence of any provisions safeguarding the states or the people.
Not only was there nothing prohibiting the federal government from keeping a standing
army,181 but the proposed framework of the new government vested enormous powers in
the federal government. One of those—the power to levy and collect taxes—raised the
ire of many Americans for whom the memory of British abuse of its taxing power was
still fresh in their minds. One Anti-Federalist, writing under the pseudonym “Brutus,”
raised an immediate warning about the potential of this power to invade the sanctity of
one’s home:
The power, exercised without limitation, will introduce itself into every
corner of the city and country—It will wait upon the ladies at their toilett
[sic] and it will not leave them in any of their domestic concerns; . . . it
will enter the house of every gentlemen . . . it will attend him to his
bedchamber, and watch him while he sleeps.182
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The same fear can also be seen in the acquiescence of James Madison to a Bill of Rights,
which not only prohibited quartering government troops in private homes but also refused
entry into the home by law enforcement without a warrant from a magistrate.
As noted previously, Ruth Bloch’s research indicates a similar fear during the
early republic that government would intrude into the privacy of the home. This
prompted a growing reluctance to invade the sanctity of the home which led, in turn, to a
growing tolerance of domestic violence that would not have been as countenanced under
British rule. Indeed, the home is the key to understanding early development of a nascent
sense of privacy. William Blackstone proclaimed that “the law of England has so
particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it [styles] it his
castle and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity[.]” James Otis used the same
principle during his passionate argument against the legality of Crown Writs of
Assistance long before independence was ever seriously entertained in this county. Even
after independence, this very principle continued to hold sway. Thus an insolvent debtor
could hide personal property in his home and that property could not be reached by
creditors, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled, but this was not a benefit to the debtor
so much as “an incidental protection resulting from the provision of the law that every
man’s house is his castle.” Indeed, a New York Supreme Court held, a sheriff had no
right to forcibly enter to execute on a debt as a “man’s home is his castle not for his own
personal protection merely but also for the protection of his family and his property
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therein[.] This was also so in Kentucky though a Sheriff could enter a man’s castle to
retrieve a slave belonging to someone else.183
At the regulatory state grew over time—particularly during the so-called
Progressive Era—we see in retrospect that privacy, or privacy-like principles, were
occasionally mustered by federal courts to strike down state legislation seen to have
strayed too far into the private sphere. For instance, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme
Court was called upon to review the legality of a state law—enacted in the context of
World War I—that prohibited teaching of the German language to any student short of
the ninth grade. Although the case could just have easily been analyzed under a students’
right to learn the German language, the Court chose to frame the right as one of a teacher
to pursue a career of teaching the language. To that end, the Court ruled that Nebraska
overstepped its police power by banning the teaching of a foreign language. “Liberty” is
not merely a freedom from bodily restraint, the Court noted, but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by men.”184 The choice of what career to pursue is, perhaps, not quite as
personal as the decision to bear children or engage in consensual sexual conduct in the
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privacy of the home, but the Court nevertheless likened it to these very same private
decisions to rule that Nebraska had gone too far.
Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court was faced with the issue of
whether an Oregon law compelling enrollment of students in public schools amounted to
an unconstitutional destruction of private school property interests. In ruling that it did,
the Supreme Court held that the Oregon “Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control.” “The child is not the mere creature of the state,” the Court held, and
“those who nurture and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” In short, it was the parents’
decision and not the State to determine how best to educate a child. The Court, as it did
in Meyer, simply indicated that there was a realm of private decision making beyond the
reach of the state. In the end, however, it was not so much the interests of parents, or
children, that motivated the Court as it was the destruction of property owned by private
schools. Despite its high flying rhetoric on the sanctity of home and family decisionmaking, in the end, the Court held that enforcement of Oregon’s law amounted to
destruction of the schools and thus property. The law could not stand.185
These cases—at both the state and federal level—certainly seem related but, at
first glance, it is difficult to expressly articulate a unifying theme to connect a maxim as
simple as “a man’s home is his castle” to the willingness of the United States Supreme
Court to limit the reach (indeed, overreach) of state law into the sanctity of home and the
private sphere. In light of Griswold, however, as Ruth Bloch suggests, that unifying
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theme is a right of privacy. The founders never expressly articulated such a right in the
Constitution, in part, because they did not see the necessity. Government was
decentralized and the rise of the regulatory state was a century into the future. Still, when
Madison and others debated the proposed bill of rights in the First Congress, there was a
sense that a resort to unenumerated rights might be necessary in the future as the federal
(and later state) leviathans emerged to regulate and control as much of people’s lives as
possible.

B. Estelle Griswold and the Emergence of Privacy
Privacy, as a personal right that could be asserted as a constitutional barrier
against government intrusion into the private sphere, did not emerge until the landmark
case of Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965. Estelle Griswold was the executive director of
the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Together with Lee Buxton, M.D., of the
Yale University Medical School, she would succeed in doing that which the Trubeks and
Buxton were unable to do five years earlier.186 The proponents of birth control had, for
many years, tried to rescind the legislative proscription against it in the state of
Connecticut. But, as David Garrow painstakingly recounts, the Catholic Church had a
virtual lock on the legislature in Connecticut which made repeal virtually impossible.
Birth control proponents had tried for years, and failed, to combat the Church on
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rescission of these laws. So, why was the Roman Catholic Church so concerned about
birth control?
Roman Catholicism can trace its doctrinal objections to birth control back to St.
Thomas Aquinas and his expounding of natural law in Summa Theologica. As far as the
Church was concerned, the chief purpose of the “conjugal act,” was procreation and any
interference with that purpose was interference with God’s grand design. It was only
after family planning advocates began gaining ground across the country that the Roman
Catholic Church was forced to take a more active role in defending these laws. Thus,
Pope Pius IX issued his Casti Connubii in 1930 calling birth control a “new and utterly
perverse morality” and his successor, Pius XII, reiterated that view in 1951 and referred
to an “intrinsic immorality of contraception.” At the core of their concern was the idea
that, by removing the stigma of an unwed pregnancy, there would be no more deterrent to
“promiscuous intercourse.”187 Indeed, it is almost impossible to underestimate the
importance of that stigma in Connecticut.
The Connecticut Supreme Court had held (two decades earlier) in State v. Nelson,
that the state police power could be deployed to preserve and protect public morals. Its
“plain purpose is to protect purity, to preserve chastity, to encourage continuence and self
restraint, to defend the sanctity of the home, and thus to engender . . . a virile and virtuous
race of men and women.” A skilled attorney could dissect this argument in a heartbeat
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and Catharine Roraback was nothing if not skilled. She argued in the Trubek case that, if
this was actually the aim of the Connecticut statute, it misfired badly insofar as her clients
were concerned. The Trubeks were married in 1958. Therefore, even assuming
prevention of unmarried sex to be a legitimate objective of the State of Connecticut, that
objective was nonsense in this case as the couple was already married. Still, closed
minds are impervious to logic, and that argument had no affect whatsoever on the
Connecticut Supreme Court in 1960. Whether it would have affected the United States
Supreme Court in 1965, however, is anyone’s guess.188
Nevertheless, the facts presented it in 1965 were enough to start a slow
transformation in the law. Griswold and Buxton, after notifying authorities they were
going to dispense contraceptives and contraceptive advice to married couples at Yale
University, were arrested the night of their presentation to students. They were both
fined $50 for violating Connecticut law. The penalty was not particularly severe but it
was enough to get them into the federal court system in which they could challenge the
idea that the State of Connecticut was a party to the marriage contract and could regulate
a married couple’s use of birth control. Justice William Douglas made it clear at the
outset that the Court rejected any on the sort of “Due Process” arguments that weakened
the Court’s perceived sense of constitutional legitimacy after its ruling in Lochner v. New
York. Although I would argue that this was a mistake, in light of my prior arguments,
Justice Douglas nevertheless justified the Court’s decision on the basis that it did not sit
“as a super legislature to determine the wisdom, need and propriety of laws that touch
economic problems business affairs or social conditions.” No real authority was cited for
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this proposition, though the Court might well have cited the negative press it sustained
after the Lochner decision as well as the attempt by the Roosevelt Administration to
“pack” the Court in its own favor.189
Still, despite an expressed reticence to do so, the Supreme Court very much relied
on existence of unenumerated rights to decide in Griswold. There are, Justice Douglas
wrote, “penumbras, formed by emanations from guarantees” in other parts of the Bill of
Rights which demonstrates the existence of a right to privacy. What Douglas meant was
certain amendments, like the Third and Fourth, discussed previously indicate a zone of
privacy over which the government cannot trammel. Douglas was entirely correct. The
history of American Jurisprudence clearly demonstrated that their existed a private sphere
which was off limits to the government. Indeed, as Douglas correctly noted, the Court
dealt with a right “older than the Bill of Rights” and even older than political parties
themselves.190 That right, as nobody summarized better than Justice Brandeis himself a
generation earlier, was the right to be left alone.
Not everyone, however, agreed with Douglas’s concept of “penumbras formed by
emanations.” Chief Justice Earl Warren, together with Associate Justices Goldberg and
Brennan, would have found a right to privacy encompassed within the concept of
unenumerated rights as delineated by the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution. That
amendment, as discussed in previous chapters, acknowledges the existence of rights
outside those set forth in the Bill of Rights themselves.191 As mentioned previously,
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though I sill wince when reading the “penumbras formed by emanations” language of the
Griswold opinion, I maintain Justice Douglas was right. The Third Amendment to the
United States Constitution bars quartering of federal troops in the privacy of one’s own
home and the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable search and seizures without
permission of a judge. It is hard to imagine how the framers could have any been any
more explicit about a zone of privacy around the home. But, in my opinion, Goldberg,
Brennan and Warren were correct about the locus of a right to privacy. As discussed
earlier, when Madison proposed those amendments that eventually became the Bill of
Rights, he expressly got around the expressio unius argument with the Ninth
Amendment. Indeed. it is difficult to imagine how the founders, with all their
expressions about a man’s home being his castle, would have countenanced intrusion by
the federal government into the private sphere of intimate decision-making without such
an idea in the back of their minds.
That said, it is important to note that there are many misconceptions about
Griswold and it is important to emphasize both what the Court held and what it did not
hold. First, Griswold did not signal that there exists of a general “right to privacy” as
most people think. The ruling, in fact, applied only in the context of the marital
relationship and only recognized a right of privacy only to those who people involved in
such a relationship. Single persons could not obtain contraceptives a result of the
Griswold ruling. Indeed, numerous moral strictures against sex out of wedlock continued
to apply to those not married. Second, as noted earlier in this chapter, the right to privacy
was not created out of thin air but was consistent with a general feeling of antipathy at
government intervention in the home stretching all the way back to the early republic.
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The founders may not have enacted a general constitutional ban against all government
intervention into the private sphere, but that failure was more likely than not a result of its
failure to conceive that local government would attempt to regulate private behavior to
this extent in the first place. Third, the Supreme Court did not overturn a ban against the
distribution of contraceptives in general. Until the advent of federal Comstock laws,
neither states nor individuals were particularly bothered by the existence of
contraceptives or the availability of contraceptive literature. Indeed, it is entirely
appropriate to think of the Griswold case as a reaction—albeit a belated one—to
government overreaching that occurred nearly a century before. Still, Griswold was
extremely limited and it would take someone like Bill Baird to challenge its underlying
premises and make contraceptives available to everyone.192

C. Bill Baird and the Extension of Privacy
On April 6, 1967, Bill Baird addressed a crowd of roughly 2,000 students who
had come to the Hayden auditorium at Boston University. His address included
presentation of various demonstration boards to which were attached different
contraceptive devices. Police were waiting to pounce on Baird the minute he broke the
law and thus, at the end of his talk, when he invited students to come up and help
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themselves to contraceptives he brought with him, Baird was arrested. The Suffolk
County Grand Jury indicted Baird two months later on charges of
displaying/disseminating birth control devices. The criminal statute which Baird was
charged with violating was enacted almost a century earlier as part of a nationwide antivice and “morality” campaign launched by Anthony Comstock.193
Comstock was born in New Canaan, Connecticut, in 1844 and, by the age of
twenty-nine, had appointed himself the moral guardian of America, in general, and its’
youth, in particular. In one of his several books, Comstock described the object of his
crusade as “to warn honest and simple-minded persons, to shield our youth from
debauching and corrupting influences; to arouse a public sentiment against the vampires
who are casting deadly poison into the fountain of moral purity in the children; and at the
same time to expose to public indignation the infidels and liberals who defend these
moral cancer planters.” This kind of work would keep anyone busy and, by all accounts,
Comstock was indefatigable in battling vice for more than a quarter of a century. The
federal Comstock law of 1873 made it illegal to display, sell, lend or give away, among
other things, “any drug or medicine, or other article whatever, for the prevention of
conception, or for causing unlawful abortion.” Not satisfied he had rid the nation of
“vice” at the federal level, Comstock turned to the states where he pushed for enactment
of so-called “mini Comstocks.” The General Court of Massachusetts passed its own
version in the winter of 1879 and, like its federal counterpart, banned exhibition, sale or
distribution of “any drug or medicine or any instrument or article whatever for the
prevention of conception or for causing unlawful abortion.” Comstock later got himself
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appointed to the position of Postal Inspector thereby giving him broad powers to enforce
these laws. Moreover, many feminist organizations were suspicious of Baird in general
and, in particular, resented the activities of a man in the liberation of women’s rights.194
These were the organizations aligned against Baird. Unlike those who opposed
Griswold just a few years earlier, Baird faced opposition from states themselves and from
various feminist organizations which resented a man, rather than a woman, working for
“the cause.” Unfortunately, because he was a man, these organizations largely turned on
him and left him to his own devices whereas, had a woman taken up his positions, they
would have almost certainly have supported him as they did Griswold. Baird was
arrested for dispensing birth control advice and contraceptives to students in
Massachusetts. The treatment afforded him, unlike Griswold and Buxton, however, was
horrendous. He was imprisoned in the infamous Charles Street Jail and left there (in its
horrendous conditions) to rot until federal courts granted him a release.
Baird was certainly no stranger to Catholic doctrine on birth control. He once
approached the physician who headed the Meadowbrook Hospital (now Nassau County
Medical Center) on Long Island and asked for assistance in dispensing of birth control
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devices for women in New York. The doctor, a devout Roman Catholic, declined.
Hoping a more scientific, and less secular, argument might sway him, Baird pointed out
the dangers of over-population and ensuing pollution of planet that over-population
would cause. The head of the hospital, a man charged with the care of suffering people,
simply replied that the “four horsemen” of the apocalypse – disease, pestilence, war and
famine – would resolve those problems soon enough. Faced with such intractability, not
to mention the apparent willingness of a man charged with healing to let others suffer and
die rather than go against his own religion, it is no wonder Baird turned to direct action
that night at Boston University.195
Baird pled not guilty to the charges against him and waived his right to a jury
trial, preferring instead, to try his chances with a single judge. A short hearing was held
on October 17, 1967, and Judge Donald Macaulay found him guilty of both offenses.
Baird was not immediately sentenced, however. Recognizing the important legal issues
involved, and with the consent of all parties, the judge made use of a provision in
Massachusetts Law to immediately “report” a case to the Commonwealth’s highest court
for final resolution. Sentencing would be stayed until such time as the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts decided whether Baird’s case, like that of Estelle Griswold
several years earlier, was of Constitutional dimension.196
The case made its way to the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts which rendered a decision on May 1, 1969, reversing one of Baird’s
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convictions but upholding the other. As to the charge of displaying contraceptive devices
during his lecture at Boston University, the Court found the demonstration boards were
part and parcel of the lecture he delivered to the students that evening and that the lecture
itself was protected by the First Amendment. Thus, his conviction in Case No. 29689
was reversed. Baird’s conviction for disseminating contraceptives, however, was
allowed to stand. The Supreme Judicial Court never squarely addressed the question of
whether privacy rights in general, and the right of access to contraception, should be
extended to single persons. It was noted, instead, the Commonwealth had long had a
blanket statutory prohibition against the dissemination of any contraceptives. That statute
was amended in 1966 to allow physicians or other similarly trained professionals to
disseminate them. This amendment was interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court to
mean the legislature was regulating the credentials of those who could distribute
contraceptives so as to prevent any “undesirable, if not dangerous physical
consequences.” Prohibiting the distribution of such devices by “indiscriminate” persons,
the Court reasoned, was certainly within the realm of legitimate legislative (police) power
to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public.197
Baird and his lawyers filed a petition for a writ of certiorari so as to advance the
Massachusetts conviction to the United States Supreme Court. A writ of certiorari is the
vehicle by which most appeals are taken to the United States Supreme Court and,
essentially, the justices enjoy complete discretion in choosing which cases they want to
hear. The justices denied the writ thereby paving the way for Baird’s jail stay. Many
have no doubt speculated why the Court would choose to hear the Eisenstadt case in
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1971 but refused to hear the direct appeal in 1970. Roy Lucas, lawyer and a famed
reproductive rights activist, may have found the reason in 2003 while reviewing some
internal documents recently released by the Court. Among those documents, Lucas
reported, was a note to Justice Douglas from one of his law clerks about the Eisenstadt
case. The clerk reminded Justice Douglas that the state conviction on which Eisenstadt
was based had been “deadlisted” the year before because the petition for writ of certiorari
was one day late. This was noted by the clerk as a non-jurisdictional defect, meaning the
Court still could have voted to hear the case, so there may have been other reasons why
the justices did not want to review Baird’s conviction. But, still, it is interesting to
speculate whether the ordeal Baird endured next might have been avoided if the mails
were quicker or his lawyers more expeditious.198
The case was returned to the Suffolk County Superior Court for sentencing on the
remaining convection for dissemination of contraceptives. The docket of the case
provides no further report of what happened in the Superior Court after the report of
Judge Macauley to the Supreme Judicial Court. But, commitment records for the
notorious “Charles Street Jail” in Boston show that Baird (now prisoner #999) arrived to
serve his sentence on February 20, 1970.199
Certainly no jail stay could ever be deemed “pleasant” but Boston’s Charles Street
Jail, built in 1848, had deteriorated to a point that it became almost a poster-child for the
prison reform movement of the 1970s. A class action lawsuit filed by some of its inmates
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resulted in factual findings that (1) cells that were 8’ wide by 11’ long and originally
designed to hold only one prisoner at a time now held two; (2) no hot water in the cells or
shower rooms; (3) ceiling pipes in the kitchen leak into the food while it is prepared; (3)
mosquitos bred year round in the jail, and roaches and waterbugs were prevalent; (4) rats
were a “serious, continuing problem,” (5) toilets in the cells were “corroded and filth
encrusted;” (5) the noise in the jail was overwhelming at times and lasted twenty-four
hours a day. This latter point was even corroborated by the trial court judge who, along
with his clerk, volunteered to spend the night at the Charles Street Jail to experience the
place for himself. The court reported as follows:
On the night of the Court’s visit (the inmates were unaware of our return
to spend the night), the noise seemed to increase after midnight and
approached a virtual bedlam that lasted till dawn. At least a dozen radios,
turned to various rock music stations, seemed to be turned up to full
volume; and for hours from a nearby cell, whether above or below we
couldn’t tell, a deep-voiced inmate, evidently deranged, shouted an
obscene incoherent monologue, beginning, ‘Ah want mah beer, you hear?
Ah want mah beer . . .’ over and over like a broken record.200
Writing about his experience years later, Baird recalled that he was forced to
report to jail and live in these unhealthy conditions, despite the fact that he was sick with
pneumonia at the time. He was forced to chase rats out of his cell and pick bugs out of
his food. His weight dropped from 175 pounds to 146 pounds while there and he, too,
noted the constant screaming at “all hours of the night” as addicts and alcoholics went
through withdrawal. Though guards subjected him to demoralizing strip searches, he was
fortunate enough to escape the various threats of violence—even death—communicated
to him anonymously prior to his reporting to the jail.201
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While Baird languished in these deplorable conditions, his attorneys prepared for
a collateral attack on his conviction in federal court. As noted previously, the case of
Eisenstadt v. Baird did not spring directly from Baird’s conviction by the Suffolk County
Superior Court. The final decision on that case came from the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. How Baird got to the nation’s highest court was through a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts shortly after his incarceration. His petition alleged that he was held in jail
in violation of several of his constitutional rights including the right to privacy. District
Court Judge Julian, though noting Griswold v. Connecticut only applied to married
couples, and that “[u]nmarried individuals are still excluded, went on to reason that even
if such a right did exist for the single coeds to whom Baird showed and distributed the
contraceptive devices, Baird did not have the “standing” or legal ability to assert that
right on behalf of the coeds.202 He was thus denied issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Barid’s writ was denied on March 20, 1970, and an appeal was immediately taken
to the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston.203 A week later, without even reviewing
the case, the Court ordered Baird’s release from the Charles Street Jail after he served
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thirty-six days of his three-month sentence. That the appellate court would take such an
unusual step, before it even reviewed the legal merits of the case, did not bode well for
the Sheriff of Suffolk County. The decision, which explained the release, came a few
months later. Reasoning a law which forbids the availability of contraceptives to
“unmarried persons who will nevertheless persist in having intercourse, means such
persons risk for themselves an unwanted pregnancy, for the child illegitimacy, and for
society, a possible obligation of support,” the Court concluded that the Massachusetts
statute was not just the opposite of sensible legislation but it also “conflicts with
fundamental human rights.” As for whether or not Baird had the legal ability to
champion someone else’s privacy interests, the Court simply noted that he was held in
jail for violating a statute just found void and, thus, had “as much standing to protest [it]
as anyone else.”204
While Baird’s case was going through the Court of Appeals, another important
case reached the United States Supreme Court. In executing a search warrant for other
contraband, Georgia police found an obscene film in appellant’s bedroom. Appellant was
arrested and convicted for possessing that film but appealed his conviction to the nation’s
highest court. In holding that the “mere private possession of obscene matter cannot
constitutionally be made a crime,” the Supreme Court held the Constitution protected
against unwarranted government intrusion into the home. “[T]he individual’s right to
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read or observe what he pleases” is fundamental “to our scheme of individual liberty.”205
Perhaps, in light of this case, the Supreme Court was even less inclined to let the State
interfere with private lives of its citizens and ban possession of contraceptives.
In any event, Eisenstadt appealed to the United States Supreme Court which
affirmed the Court of Appeals. Technically speaking, the Supreme Court did not
recognize that unmarried individuals have a right to privacy, which included a right of
access to contraceptives. Instead, the Court ruled that there was no logical justification
under the amended Massachusetts statute to allow married couples at least some access to
contraceptives while banning it altogether for unmarried persons. Allowing married
couples some access to contraceptives, while denying all access to single persons,
violated the Equal Protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Still, the operative effect is
the same, and the Eisenstadt decision is cited as standing for the proposition that
unmarried persons also have privacy rights which states cannot transgress. Indeed, in
high-flying rhetoric that was reminiscent of the bygone Warren Court, Justice Brennan
declared that “[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a child.”206 Nobody
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should doubt the importance of Griswold and nobody should doubt the importance of
Eisenstadt. It is true the Griswold case recognized a right to privacy, but did so only in
the context of the marital relationship. It was Bill Baird, and his ordeal in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, that ended in the recognition of that right for everyone.
As indelicate as it may be, I continually remind my students that it is Bill Baird, not
Estelle Griswold, whom they should thank every time they walk into a drugstore and
purchase a pack of condoms. This reminder is not meant to suggest Baird freed them to
enjoy premarital sex but, rather, he freed them to enjoy any sex without risk of pregnancy
or the threat of contracting a life-threatening disease.
The significance of the Eisenstadt case is all too often overlooked as legal
scholars and historians focus on Griswold as the progenitor of modern privacy rights.
While true that Griswold was the first to recognize spheres of privacy beyond which
government could not legislate, the holding in that case was very narrow and limited
solely to procreative decisions of married couples. Bill Baird’s case, essentially,
extended that right beyond married couples to all single adults. It is also worth noting
that Bill Baird’s incarceration at the Charles Street jail, in Boston, was far worse than the
fine Connecticut imposed on Estelle Griswold and Lee Buxton. Although the
contraceptive “troika” was not completed until 1977, when the United States Supreme
Court ruled minors also had a right of access to birth control, Baird’s contribution to the
reproductive rights movement is almost inestimable. Birth control, then as now, is an

Chief Justice Burger, in the lone dissent, opined that Massachusetts had a legitimate
interest in requiring contraceptives be distributed by doctors and warned that the Court
was returning to the much maligned era of “substantive due process” when the Court was
accused of “inventing” right (particularly contract rights) which had no basis in
constitutional text. Id. at 466-471.
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effective—but not foolproof—means of preventing unwanted pregnancies among young
adults who engage in premarital sex. Even more crucial, studies show condoms help
prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, particularly the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which thus makes access to these contraceptives more
important than ever. How many young men and women in the 1980s and 1990s owe
their being alive today to Bill Baird? Indeed, having taught contemporary civil rights and
constitutional history to college undergraduates for several years now, I am amazed by
startled looks on their faces when they learn they could not legally buy condoms prior to
1971.207 It is interesting to speculate, of course, how many women (and men) made
important contributions to the economy of this country by not dropping out to support a
child that neither they nor their partner wanted or planned for.

D. The Final Demise of Anti-contraceptive Legislation
Given Griswold and Eisenstadt, the ultimate demise of the Comstock legislation
is anticlimactic. The final part of the anti-contraception troika banning the dispensation
of birth control came in the case of Carey v. Population Services. In Carey, the Supreme
Court struck down a New York law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to anyone
under sixteen years of age. For all intents and purposes, the ban against distribution of
207
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contraceptives was dead. Although religion no doubt fueled Comstock’s fervor, the
linkage between anti-contraceptive law and religious doctrine, particularly Roman
Catholic doctrine, came later after birth control advocates like Margaret Sanger began to
gain traction in their efforts to get the laws repealed. As the Second World War slowly
consumed Europe, Sanger wrote “[e]verything that women have gained during the first
half of the century has practically been lost owing to the vital and fundamental fact that
overpopulation is a vital basic cause of world upheaval and international unrest.” There
will forever be “wars, ignorance [and] poverty” so long as “women respond and obey the
edicts . . . and breed for nation or church[.]” A generation later, in an interview with
Mike Wallace, she confirmed that “the population question is of great concern” and that
the availability of birth control could keep the population static so as to avoid mass
starvation.208
As Mary Ziegler points out, the population control issue is largely overlooked by
contemporary historians and legal scholars because Roe v. Wade changed the dynamic of
the debate from one based on policy rhetoric—including a focus on overpopulation—to
“rights-based” rhetoric stressing privacy and individual bodily autonomy. She concedes
the change was a “sensible one” but correctly points out that, subsequent to Roe, the
overpopulation argument operated parallel to the rights-based arguments rather than in
tandem therewith.209 Still, the conflict between personal rights policy and overpopulation
policy continues. This writer, however, with all due respect to the latter comes down on
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the side of the former. A “right” is either a “right” or it is not. This country was
grounded, I maintain, on the view that government (state or federal) are excluded from
intimate decision-making. In stressing over-population, however, Ziegler and others
seem to cede that the decision of whether or not to beget a child is left up to what is best
for the community. If the community is already overburdened with excessive children,
Ziegler and others would seem to argue, then the community should be able to dictate
what children, if any, a couple could bring into this world. I argue that this is as much a
part of state control as permitting the state to deny citizens access to birth control. Just as
couples should have the right to refuse to bring children into this world, they should also
have the right to do so if it fits within their plans for the future. Prohibiting the right to
choose carrying a child to term is every bit as onerous as forcing a woman (or married
couple) to carry that child to term if they do not wish to do so.
I recognize that the United States and the People’s Republic of China have
differing views on the importance of capitalism and individualism in the economy. But
the decision of whether or not to bear an atomistic individual, to either assist on the
family farm or go on to his or her own objectives, must be one that belongs to the family.
If capitalism is to stand for anything, then it must be for the right of an autonomous
individual to decide his or her fate within the system. If it stands for the proposition that
each atomistic individual is incapable of making individual for himself, then it might as
well abrogate the concept of free-will altogether.
Recognition of privacy rights was too little, too late, to preserve the bodily
autonomy of such unfortunates as Carrie Buck or Raymond Hudlow. But, at least by
1977, privacy rights were recognized to the extent that virtually anyone could obtain birth
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control together with contraceptive advice. This was radically different from a
generation earlier when nobody could obtain birth control advice. But, if privacy allowed
women or anyone else the right to make intimate personal decisions about whether to
bear a child, then what about other intimate personal decisions? What about the right to
terminate a pregnancy once conception occurred? Or the right to engage in consensual
sexual conduct with which a majority or the public may disapprove or even other actions
in the privacy of one’s own home to which the public may object? These were all issues
to be addressed in the future. But, for now, anyway, states were compelled to withdraw
their presence from the intimate decision of whether a two people should bear children as
a result of the sexual act.
These decisions came too late, of course, to benefit Louise and David Trubek but
the two young Yale law graduates could take comfort in the fact that they helped laid the
philosophical groundwork to ensure young woman entering a professional school were
no longer forced to play “Russian roulette” with their fertility and economic future.
Families could plan for that future, and decide when to have children on their own terms,
relative to their own financial goals and economic aspects rather than have the State make
the decision about whether to bear children for them. Still, what about those for whom
contraceptives were not foolproof, or those for whom private decision-making sought to
exclude either state or federal government altogether? These issues would have to wait a
little bit longer.
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CHAPTER V
PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND ABORTION

Texas is going to shrink government until it
fits in a woman’s uterus.210

In 1963, roughly ten years before abortion was finally legalized nationwide by the
United States Supreme Court, famed reproductive rights activist Bill Baird was at a
hospital in New York City when he heard an earth-shattering scream. He rushed into the
hallway to see what was going on and what he found was an African-American woman
soaked in blood from the waist down. Whether because of pain, or terrified at the amount
of blood she was losing, the woman continued screaming. Already mother to nine
children, on welfare, and barely surviving at a subsistence level, she had tried to abort a
pregnancy of her tenth child with a coat hanger wrapped in gauze. When she inserted the
home-made device into her vagina, however, she slipped by merely a “half inch” and
inadvertently cut through the wall of her uterus, puncturing a major blood vessel. The
woman later bled to death. How could something like this happen in the richest, and
supposedly freest, nation on earth? “This is insane,” Baird thought. He could have taken
this woman to almost any place in the world—India, Pakistan, or elsewhere—to obtain
birth control that was outlawed in the United States but, more than likely, provided
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˝courtesy of taxpayers of the United States government. But here, in her own country,
she could obtain neither contraceptives nor a legal abortion.211
This was not an isolated incident and there is a reason why the “coat hanger” and
other tropes came to be seen as metaphors for either back-alley abortions or selfadministered abortions gone awry. Betty Cleveland, and another female defendant, were
both declared criminally responsible for the death of a male infant in 1965 after using a
“catheter [and a] wire coat hanger” to abort an unwanted fetus. When President Jimmy
Carter visited Hartford, Connecticut, in 1977, a local columnist noted that our chief
executive never even mentioned women who faced unwanted pregnancies and would
“attempt home remedies of the coat hanger variety.” Even the 1961 novel Revolutionary
Road focused on a married couple, the wife of which, died as a result of a selfadministered abortion. The ability to obtain an abortion—a practice that has occurred
since antiquity—was virtually invisible in the 1960s and early 1970s and women were
dying as a result of that invisibility.212 Still, that fact barely registered on the national
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dialogue, or the nation’s conscience, at the time. How could this have come to be the
case in a nation that not only prided itself as being the freest on earth but also cast itself
in distinction to the Soviet Union which was, at the time, arguably, one of the most
oppressive regimes on the planet?
The answer to this question lays some of the groundwork for American debates
on individual rights versus authority of the regulatory state. As I discuss later, for most
of our history, the United States not only accepted abortion in early stages of pregnancy
but also turned a blind eye to terminating a pregnancy even in later stages of gestation. It
was only, relatively, recently that state and federal law tried to ban abortions outright.
Thus, I will argue, the 1973 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade
did not create a new right out of whole cloth—as its detractors contend—but, rather, was
a modest attempt to restore the status quo of a woman’s right to terminate pregnancy
before fetal movement—a right which had existed at common law for centuries before
Roe. Admittedly this adds nothing new to our reproductive rights discourse as historians
have made these same arguments since the outset of backlash against the Roe decision.
But what I do suggest is that the historical, legal and philosophical parameters of
the discourse have been unduly narrowed by framing it as a simple dialectic between
“pro-choice” and “pro-life,” or “right to life” versus “right to privacy.” That
narrowness—or misdirection of argument—over abortion has blinded us to other contexts
for framing the debate. It is these other contexts to which I devote this chapter and the
two that follow. Before I explain those contexts, however, I concede that I use a very—
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perhaps, overly—simplistic model to frame my arguments. On one side are those who
generally oppose the regulatory state when it comes to economic interests like taxes and
business regulation but then support restrictions on privacy rights including abortions.
Let us call these individuals “conservatives.” On the other sides are those who oppose
the regulatory state when it comes to issues like privacy but are far less concerned when
it comes to economic issues like taxes and business regulation. Let us call these
individuals “liberals.” Again, I concede these characterizations are overly simplistic, and
most people fall somewhere in the middle between these two positions, but such
characterization will allow for economy of language as I present my arguments.
My first argument is that conservatives and liberals may have more in common on
the issue of abortion than they think or want to admit to themselves. The rise of business
and economic regulation in this country occurred at roughly the same time as intrusive
morals legislation, particularly the federal and state Comstock laws. For example, in the
mere seventeen year period between 1873 and 1890, Congress enacted not just the federal
Comstock law, but also the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act,
while the U.S. Supreme Court upheld legislation permitting states to regulate fees
charged by grain elevators owned by railroads. The rise of the regulatory state, in other
words, negatively impacted the interests of both conservatives and liberals. Legal
restrictions on women—and to a lesser extent, gays—only increased during the twentieth
century as it did with African-Americans. So too did restrictions on economic and
property interests as a result of the New Deal and the Great Society. My purpose here is
not to pass judgment on the moral rectitude of any of this legislation but to point out that
conservatives and liberals both lost out with the rise of the regulatory state.
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My second argument is related to my first but diverges insofar as I address the
issue of rights rather than the rise of federal and state regulation. Critics of Griswold,
Eisenstadt and Roe all point to the fact that the word privacy is mentioned nowhere
within the text of the Constitution. Advocates of textualism also generally adhere to the
principle that language that appears in the Constitution should be read and understood in
light of its original meaning. There are several problems with this kind of argument,
however. One of those problems, as discussed previously, is that the Ninth Amendment
clearly points to the existence of unenumerated rights, or rights outside the body of the
Constitution. So, the fact that the word “privacy” is not mentioned anywhere in that
document is hardly relevant.
The other problem with a textualist approach to privacy rights—the problem that I
will discuss in this chapter—is that abortion was perfectly legal, and socially acceptable,
up through the midpoint of pregnancy. The founders, many of whom were lawyers
themselves, would have been surprised to hear the limitations on intrusive government
that they were debating as part of the proposed “Bill of Rights,” would not have stopped
at least the federal Leviathan from reaching into the sanctity of one’s home, and the
privacy of the bedchamber, to end to a practice long been permitted under AngloAmerican law jurisprudence.
Privacy rights—as I argued before and will continue to argue here—are the direct
descendant of property rights. Privacy evolved out of the notion that we have certain
rights in our homes and personal possessions over which the government cannot trammel.
Moreover, as discussed in earlier chapters, though men did not own women as chattel
property the same way slaves were owned, the law certainly regarded them as owning
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certain property rights in their wives’ bodies including, but not limited to, the power of
restraint, the right of sexual access to their bodies and ownership of any earnings they
made through their own labor. This was the law in virtually every state when the
Constitution was ratified in 1789. Did those property rights simply disappear?
My answer is no. It took a constitutional amendment—the Thirteenth
Amendment—to abolish slave property and no such amendment was ever passed with
respect to women. So, to whom did those property rights revert? I argued earlier, in the
case of emancipated slaves, that those rights reverted to freedmen themselves, and I argue
here the property rights in women’s bodies reverted to the women themselves. The same
law that recognized reproductive rights of men in their wives bodies, must now recognize
that those rights belong to wives (or women) themselves. To the extent they do not,
states and the federal government should, as Susan Looper-Friedman contends, treat this
as a seizure of property under the Fifth Amendment and compensate for the reproductive
interests being taken by states or federal government though the process of eminent
domain.213 For those who challenge the notion of property rights in the body as absurd, I
refer you to chapter six of this work where I discuss the sale of body tissues (e.g. sperm,
eggs, plasma) and lease of the body (e.g. prostitution in Nevada or surrogacy). The fact
of the matter is American political culture has always recognized bodily property rights,
in one form or another, for men but have been slow to acknowledge those rights for
women.
In short, the arguments I will make in this chapter play-off the contradictory—and
oftentimes nonsensical—contradictions in American law and history with regards to the
213
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rise of the regulatory state and protection of property interests. “Conservatives” who
frequently rail against the regulatory state in economic matters, tend to support regulation
of bodily property rights whereas “liberals” who attack regulation of privacy rights rarely
concern themselves with evisceration of economic rights. The adage goes that “politics
makes strange bedfellows” and, perhaps, if these two groups would ever jump back into
bed together they could affect public policy changes that please both of them.
But, obviously, this is not my concern here. My objective both in this chapter and
the others related to it is to highlight parallels between economic and social regulation
which, heretofore, have gone unnoticed. I also mean to draw attention to historical
antecedents for assertion of contemporary privacy rights which can be found in American
debates over property rights stretching as far back as eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
just as the antecedents of reproductive rights can be found in Anglo-American common
law that imposed no restriction on abortion until well after fetal movement.

A. The History of Abortion Prior to Roe v. Wade
The hubris and hyperbole surrounding the yearly anniversary of Roe v. Wade is
almost enough to convince someone the United States Supreme Court rejected centuries
of both moral and legislative imperatives when it struck down a Texas abortion law
prohibiting termination of all pregnancies—even those in the first trimester of
gestation.214 Nothing could be further from the truth. Abortion has existed since
antiquity and was completely legal in this country, at least up until fetal movement, for
most of our history. Surgical abortion, as well as the sale of abortifacients to the public,
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was, more or less, open and tolerated. But, just as the rise of the regulatory state in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century imposed new burdens on capital, so too did it
extend regulations over exercise of one’s bodily property. Government, in short, sought
to exercise as much control over the personal-body as it did over the economic-body.
As long as there have been sexual relations between men and women, there has
been abortion. Plato certainly advocated infanticide for children born “defective” or of
“inferior parents” and, as this was recognized as a common form of birth control at the
time, there can be little doubt that he would have approved of abortion as well. Indeed,
as to offspring conceived from incestuous relations, Plato was less vague—the “fetus
[should not] see the light of day.” Aristotle also advocated abortion for deformed
children and in those instances where a state’s population limits were exceeded.215 Stoics
believed a fetus was not alive until it drew its first breath and thus, explains Jeffrey
Reiman, Roman law never banned abortion and only regulated it to the extent necessary
to protect the rights of the father to his child. After adoption of Christianity as the official
state religion, infanticide was made illegal in the empire but Roman law still turned a
blind eye toward abortion. “Abortion” appears nowhere in any translation of the Old or
New Testaments, but early Jewish and Christian commentators—in contrast to their
imperial rulers—viewed the practice unfavorably. Still, even as late as the thirteenth
century, Thomas Aquinas argued that it was the killing of an animated fetus that was
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homicide and what animated the fetus was entry of the soul. Reiman speculates this may
have been an early conception of what later developed as the quickening doctrine.216
The idea of fetal animation also took root in secular law at approximately the
same time. Henri de Bracton, in his Laws and Customs of England, wrote that abortion
was only a common law homicide after the fetus was formed or animated and this was
determined by quickening. William Blackstone intoned that “[l]ife is the immediate gift
of God[.]” Aborting the child prior to quickening carried no legal punishment at all but
even after quickening, Blackstone pronounced, ancient law characterized abortion as
“homicide or manslaughter.” It was “not murder.” In his own day, however, Blackstone
made clear that the degree of the offense had dropped and it was only a heinous
misdemeanor.”217
There was no positive law (statute) banning abortion in Great Britain until well
after American independence and thus, during colonial and early republican periods of
this country, American courts adopted English/British common law which admitted there
was no criminal act either in administering abortifacients, or performing a surgical
procedure that resulted in abortion, until a woman was quick with child or, in short, there
was fetal movement. The so-called “quickening doctrine” made perfect sense for a time
period, such as the eighteenth century and before, when neither the mother herself nor her
doctor could be sure that the absence of a regular menstrual cycle meant the woman was
with child or whether there was some medical disorder preventing a normal menstrual
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cycle. Therefore, until such time as fetal movement occurred, the mother and the
abortion provider were justified in believing there was a medical reason preventing the
monthly menstrual cycle and in doing whatever was necessary to remove that
obstruction. This was the common law that existed at the time of the formation of this
country and, to a large extent, became the law of the states (when codified) thereafter. To
the extent abortions were carried out in a clandestine manner, Cornelia Dayton points out,
it was to hide not the abortion procedure itself but the fact that the abortion was meant to
conceal the sin of sex outside of marriage which, particularly in New England, remained
a grave offense during colonial times.218
The first American abortion statute was enacted in 1821 in Connecticut but, as
James Mohr points out, that law was directed almost exclusively at the administration of
a purgative, a substance that induced violent vomiting as a means to abort a fetus. The
statute was not meant to ban abortion itself. Nor did it address the growing practice of
applying various surgical instruments to induce the female uterus to expel whatever mass
was located therein. It was aimed, instead, at the health of the mother and the manner of
abortifacient that could be given her. Even in subsequent statutes, adopted by later states,
the bans on abortion were directed more toward proscribing certain purgatives, or even
limiting the type of quack physicians who performed abortion procedures, than the
procedure itself. In short, early American abortion statutes were never meant to outlaw
the process per se, but were meant to protect the health of the mother and to regulate the
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medical profession insofar as who (or what) was allowed to administer medical and
obstetric advice.219
The seminal case on abortion during the early republic was Commonwealth v.
Bangs where Isaiah Bangs was indicted for administering a “dangerous or deleterious
draught or potion” to a Lucy Holman in an attempt to facilitate an abortion of a “bastard”
child of which she was pregnant. The jury found him guilty but, on appeal, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the
indictment against him on grounds that it failed to aver Lucy Holman was “quick with
child.” There was no crime, in other words, to procure an abortion, or to administer an
abortifacient, unless fetal movement (or quickening) was present at that time. Even if the
woman was quick with child, the court noted, the crime was only a misdemeanor.220
Abortion was not a crime in America, in short, absent the presence of fetal movement
which typically did not occur until midway during the second trimester. Only in
England, by virtue of Lord Ellenborough’s statute, was abortion deemed a felony before
fetal movement.221 But, by the time this statute was enacted, the United States was well
on its way to distinguishing itself (as much as possible) from British law.
Early American anti-abortion statutes sought not only to protect women from
administration of abortifacients that were poisonous, or otherwise deleterious to their
health, but also to protect them from so-called quack physicians that administered
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surgical abortions with almost no training. When Sara Grovesenor died after a surgical
procedure administered by John Hallowell, an uneducated and untrained self-described
“physician” in Pomfret, Connecticut, in 1742, Grovesnor’s paramour escaped prosecution
altogether and Hallowell was prosecuted, not for performing the abortion itself, but for
the death of his patient. During the next century, as state laws restricted the extent to
which non-regular physicians could practice surgical abortion, the eye was always on
protecting the health of the mother (as opposed to the health of the fetus) if not protection
of profits of burgeoning medical professionals from untrained outsiders.222
The Bangs case was only, technically, binding only on Massachusetts, but its
principles were cited in a variety of jurisdictions by other American courts. In Mitchell v.
Commonwealth, for instance, a Kentucky appellate court reversed a criminal conviction
and a $375 fine imposed against one, George Mitchell, for administering a “deleterious
potion inducing an abortion in an unwed mother” because the indictment failed to include
an allegation that the mother was “quick with child.” In New Jersey, the State Supreme
Court ruled “[i]t is not murder to kill a child before it be born, even though it be killed in
the very process of delivery.” It was immaterial, the Court held, whether life commenced
at the time of conception. “In contemplation of law, life commences at the moment of
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Id. at 20-45. Mohr characterizes this time period as a clash between “regular”
practitioners and “quack” practitioners. Indeed, as discussed supra, the formalization of
the medical profession and creation of the American Medical Association (AMA) were
integral to regulating abortion services in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries; Dayton, supra, at 36; In the end, the so-called “doctor” who administered the
abortion was given twenty-nine lashes while the young man who impregnated the girl,
and obtained the “doctor,” was not prosecuted. Id. at 47.
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quickening.”223 The point at which abortion became illegal, therefore, was sometime
during the mid-point of the second trimester.
Abortions may have been relatively uncommon at the outset of the nineteenth
century, but according to the research of several historians, its incidence literally
exploded by the onset of the mid- nineteenth century. James Mohr reaches this
conclusion in his book, Abortion in America, by examining the number of medical
journals and newspaper advertisements of the time which advertised, in one form or
another, the availability of abortion services. The fact that periodicals advertised
abortions, as well as abortifacients and the professionals who provided such services,
Mohr concludes, demonstrates that abortion services were widely available during the
nineteenth century and that abortion providers were rarely, if ever, prosecuted. One
provider in particular, an English immigrant, Ann Lohman, who promoted herself under
the pseudonym of Madame Restell, made a considerable fortune providing abortion
services despite arrests by authorities.224
Demographers of the nineteenth century noted a precipitous drop in fertility
during the mid and latter part of the nineteenth century suggesting there was no true
crackdown on either birth control, abortion or the sale of abortifacients until the latter
part of the nineteenth century. Indeed, until such time as passage of the federal
Comstock laws, and the mini-state Comstock laws, nobody paid much attention to either
contraception or abortion in the United States. It was only during the Gilded Age, when
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the excesses of capitalism caught the attention of labor reformers, that the “excesses” of
sexual behavior also caught the attention of social reformers and restrictions on
contraception and abortion began to appear. The timing of these two movements towards
regulation was not coincidental.
At roughly the same time “muckrakers” like Ida Tarbell and Upton Sinclair
exposed abuses in the oil and meat-packing industries (respectively), and agitated for
legislation to curtail their excesses, social reformers targeted vice and sex in post-bellum
America. The influx of people to big cities, and resultant transformation of the United
States from a largely rural, agrarian, society to an urban, industrial, society was perceived
by many to have brought an end to the bucolic “innocence” phase of antebellum life and,
in turn, engendered a more licentious, contemporary, society. Efforts by social reformers
like the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), various temperance organizations
and, later, societies for control of vice, targeted urban landscapes in an attempt to turn
back the clock on social reform. Contraception and abortion was simply collateral
damage resulting from the efforts of men like Anthony Comstock to control and limit
sexual activity in general and that of women in particular.225
Historians rarely accept the notion that any one person is responsible any one
change over time and, so it is tempting to reject (as overblown) the argument that
Anthony Comstock, and the state laws that bear his name, was responsible for this social
change. Other factors—like the professionalization of the American Medical Association
(AMA) and its wish to drive non-professionals from the practice of obstetrics—played a
large part in the enactment of anti-privacy legislation but Comstock and his fellow, social
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purifiers, played an enormous role in criminalizing practices which heretofore were
perfectly legal in this country for centuries. In enacting the federal Comstock law,
moreover, the federal government banned not just sale of birth control devices through
interstate commerce but also banned the mere the exchange of information on
contraception and abortion—something which today would be struck down as a clear
violation of the First Amendment, and something that would later be raised in the Baird
case as it wound its way through the federal courts, but was upheld as constitutional at
that time. The anti-vice campaigns of Anthony Comstock and his followers, therefore,
were as significant to the rise of the regulatory state in the private sphere as social and
labor reformers were to the rise of such regulation in the economic sphere in the latter
half of the nineteenth century.
This is not to suggest there was no opposition to these laws or women just
passively accepted regulatory control over their bodies. To the contrary, many women
fought back to re-take their bodily property rights. The JANE organization in Chicago,
for instance, provided a compassionate and safe—albeit clandestine—atmosphere in
which a woman could obtain an abortion. A founding member learned from her
boyfriend (a medical school student) how to perform an abortion and she, in turn, taught
others how to do the procedure as well. Ironically enough, the organization was raided
only once and that was just before the Roe decision was handed down. Politicians and
police alike needed such an organization to send their girlfriends and mistresses
whenever the need arose. Other organizations, such as the Association to Repeal
Abortion Laws (ARAL) directed women to foreign providers. Activists like Rowena
Gurner and Patricia Magginnis personally investigated, and then subsequently monitored,
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a list of safe physicians over the border in Tijuana, Mexico. Doctors were anxious to
remain on this “list,” so as to increase business, and thus had an incentive to provide a
sterile, medically-sound and compassionate environment.226
The existence of these surreptitious organizations went a long way toward
showing women were not going to simply accept the regulatory state’s denial of their
rights sitting down. But, it is one thing to defy the law and quite another to formulate a
legitimate reason to oppose what Martin Luther King, Jr. would denounce as an “unjust
law.” That formulation was eventually provided by feminists like F.W. Stella Brown, a
Briton who, as early as 1915, argued for “absolute freedom of choice” for women and
that abortion was an “absolute right.” In 1933, William J. Robinson, an American
physician, argued women had a right to their own bodies and, as a result, all abortion
laws should be repealed. Although these laws addressed the immediate issue of abortion,
only, I will argue in subsequent chapters these ideas champion not just a woman’s
autonomy over her own uterus, but also a general human right to autonomy of the body.
Because of the intrinsic and extrinsic property interests one has in one’s own body, I
maintain, that there can be no economic liberty in a free-market system in the absence of
bodily autonomy. Thus, the ability to women to control their own reproductive system is
absolutely intrinsic to the perpetuation of our capitalist system.227
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B. Privacy, Abortion, and Roe v. Wade
As discussed above, contraception and abortion faced few federal or state
regulations until the latter half of the nineteenth century. There was no federal or state
recognition that conception marked the beginning of life at the time of the founding and,
thus, there was no need to regulate birth control or abortion until well into the nineteenth
century. The notion the regulatory state even had any business inserting itself into the
private sphere in this manner would not come until later in the century with an influx of
religious beliefs into these concepts. Many founders and legal commentators in
antebellum literature would no doubt be amazed by the extent to which both the federal
and state governments inserted themselves into the private decision-making of private
individuals.
On January 2, 1973, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the anxiously
awaited Roe case. After disposing of several technical legal issues, Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority came to the ultimate question in the case which was whether the
Texas law was constitutional. The Court held it was not. In so ruling, the Court correctly
noted that anti-abortion laws were “of relatively recent vintage” and, at the time the
Constitution was drafted and ratified, women “women enjoyed a substantially broader
right to terminate the pregnancy” than she did in 1973. “[the] right of privacy,” the Court
concluded, “whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action . . . or . . . in the Ninth Amendment's reservation
of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.” 228
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As noted previously, however, for all the uproar Roe has engendered in nearly
forty years, the ruling is actually quite limited. First, it only returns abortion
jurisprudence to what it was at the time of ratification of the Constitution. This is
something conservatives, who tend to favor original meaning, should favor. Second, the
Court rejected the argument I would make which is that a woman should be recognized
as having far greater rights in her bodily property. As to the issue of whether a woman’s
right was “absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time,
in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses,” the Court came down on
the side of the regulatory state. “Appellant's arguments that Texas either has no valid
interest at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no interest strong enough to support
any limitation upon the woman's sole determination, are unpersuasive.” The right to an
abortion was “not unqualified” the Court held. Only in the latter third (trimester) of
gestation could states ban abortion altogether. On the pivotal issue of whether a fetus
constituted a “person,” so states could regulate to protect it under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court answered in the negative. Although this went a long
way to restoring the law to what it had been before a rash of anti-abortion laws in late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it also provoked a long-line of anti-abortion
agitation (which continues to this day) insisting life begins at conception rather than fetal
movement which was the standard in Anglo-American jurisprudence.229
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Id. at 153, 163-165. The issue of whether a fetus was a “person” for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment is much more important than my recitation of the Roe holding
would indicate. The Constitution provides, inter alia, that no state shall deny and
“person” life, liberty or property without due process of law. Amend. XIV, U.S. CONST.
If a fetus is a person, then it logically follows that the state can erect whatever barriers it
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Suffice it to say that nobody—not even abortion proponents—were ever happy
with the Roe decision. To abortion opponents, this was the epitome of judicial
activism—a substitution of judicial policy preferences for the will of the people as
expressed through their elected representatives. “Legal scholars,” even liberal ones, were
plunged into a rhetorical hell of trying to justify the decision as anything but a return to
the dreaded doctrine of substantive due process. Laura Kalman, characterizes this as an
“epistemological crisis”—or, more appropriately, an orgy of handwringing—as legal
historians sought to eviscerate the reasoning of Roe and distance themselves from what
was perceived to be a re-implementation of the discredited doctrine of substantive due
process. If Roe had no sound foundation in the constitution, their reasoning went, then
neither would racial desegregation in cases like Brown v. Board of Education.230 Liberals
in the 1960s and 1970s, in short, saw racial injustice as a more important issue than
gender injustice and the latter would have to take a back-seat to the former. If abortion
was justified on such an ephemeral basis, this would throw racial desegregation into
doubt as well.
But, for a few—perhaps only myself—Roe was nothing but an exceedingly
modest attempt to restore the status quo to what it had been only a generation or two
before. In restricting regulation of abortion to the second trimester, the Supreme Court,
essentially, restored state law to what it had been at the time of the founding. Abortion
could not be banned outright until a time roughly coinciding with quickening or fetal
wants to deprivation of life of that fetus. But, if the person is not a fetus, as I will argue
later in this chapter, then the state cannot afford it constitutional rights which supercede
the life in being (e.g. the mother).
230

Ely, Democracy & Distrust, 15-21; Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal
Liberalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996) 59.
178

movement. This was well and good for those who insisted on bringing an originalist
interpretation of the Constitution and would have frozen our development of
Constitutional law at the precise moment the Constitution was ratified and became law.
Where the Court fell short—in my opinion—was in its failure to characterize abortion (or
privacy, more generally) as an absolute right of individual autonomy. But, in the Roe
decision, women were not afforded autonomy over their own body and this is why I refer
to the decision as “modest.”
Other critiques, besides mine, can also be found among feminist legal scholars.
Sandra van Burkleo argues many criticize the Court’s decision as being grounded in the
more amorphous “right to privacy” as opposed to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As Ruth Bloch observes, for all its benefit, Roe fails to address
“that the capacity to become pregnant places and unequal burden on women.” Others
criticize the decision for doing nothing to lessen the control of husbands, fathers and male
physicians over reproductive rights. Though I decline to pass judgment on any of these,
because I have a different perspective as a man than many of these scholars have as
women, I nevertheless maintain that more liberalism (rather than less) is the solution to
the problem. Women have as much right to the operations of their own body as men do
to theirs and, accordingly, the solution to the problem is to recognize individual and
bodily autonomy for everyone rather than just a select few.
I also recognize that, like other property restrictions, there are some out there who
would argue that restrictions on abortions are necessary for promotion of the salus
populii. While this may be true, I have yet to see a viable argument to that effect. Fire
code or zoning regulations may have benefitted neighboring land owners in the early
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nineteenth, and late twentieth, centuries. But how would such regulations on a uterus
benefit its next-door neighbor? How does it benefit one property owner when a
neighboring property owner is prevented from aborting an unwanted pregnancy? More
importantly, how is the property owner injured if the abortion is permitted? This is the
irony in the conservative opposition to abortion. Restrictions placed on abortion are,
oftentimes, far more deleterious of property rights than restrictions placed on real or
chattel property.

C. The History of Abortion after Roe V. Wade
The high-water mark of abortion rights, for our purposes here, was not the Roe
case but, rather, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth231. That case involved a Missouri
statute which, like many after Roe, required spousal consent prior to abortion of a fetus.
Parallels between this and coverture laws are so obvious they almost need not be said.
That a husband would need to consent to an abortion, or the use to which his wife body
was kept, was about the same as the need for his consent for his woman to work outside
the house or to keep her earnings for such labor. Indeed, the fact that state positive law
would be called into effect to protect the right of the husband was about as indicative of
coverture as possible. Spousal consent, for all intents and purposes, reified the ownership
of the husband in the body of the wife and it is difficult to imagine how, granting an
absolute veto on abortion, was any different from the sort of absolute veto over delivery
granted by state law prior to that point. The Supreme Court, to its credit, agreed.
It seems manifest that, ideally, the decision to terminate a pregnancy
should be one concurred in by both the wife and her husband. No marriage
231
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may be viewed as harmonious or successful if the marriage partners are
fundamentally divided on so important and vital an issue. But it is difficult
to believe that the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a marriage, and
of strengthening the marital relationship and the marriage institution, will
be achieved by giving the husband a veto power exercisable for any reason
whatsoever or for no reason at all. Even if the State had the ability to
delegate to the husband a power it itself could not exercise, it is not at all
likely that such action would further, as the District Court majority
phrased it, the “interest of the state in protecting the mutuality of decisions
vital to the marriage relationship.
We recognize, of course, that when a woman, with the approval of
her physician but without the approval of her husband, decides to
terminate her pregnancy, it could be said that she is acting unilaterally.
The obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband disagree on this
decision, the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail.
Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the
more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the
two, the balance weighs in her favor.”232
Though the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the woman, in this case, the fact that
it expended so much of its reasoning in doing so, is almost counter to its point and lends
credence to the very idea the husband has control over his wife’s body. Even worse, the
Court’s diversion into this area of reasoning all but telegraphs to the reader that the Court
takes seriously any law giving the male veto rights over bodily decisions made by the
female. Although coverture is, ostensibly, no longer a part of American common law,
how much control by a husband will be accepted over the body of his wife? Indeed, how
much control of the state over the body of the resident is acceptable? These are the kinds
of questions that should be asked, not just by pregnant women or their spouses, but
anyone who believes in bodily autonomy and the proposition that government (be it state
or federal) has absolutely no business regulating in this area.
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CHAPTER VI
CONTEMPORARY ASSERTIONS OF OWNERSHIP IN THE BODY
(1990 TO PRESENT)

The reluctance (or even failure) of the United States Supreme Court to consider a
right of privacy as being anchored in either a penumbra formed by emanations of other
rights from the Bill of Rights, or as guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment to the United
States Constitution as would be the argument of this author, the fact remains that
American history and American law nevertheless refuses to treat the “body” as anything
else but a repository of property rights even if it refuses to recognize it as a matter of law.
As noted earlier in this dissertation, men sell sperm, women sell eggs and surrogates rent
out their wombs on a variety of occasions. Many other bodily tissues are sold on the
open market even if the law forbids it.
This is the drawback of addressing this issue solely from an issue of legal history
and why I emphasize that it must be reviewed from the basis of not only history and
philosophy and law but also practical reality. As explained below, whether the legal
system like it or not, the fact remains that component parts of the human body have been
commodified if not in the law at least in the economy. The law has simply not kept up
with reality.
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A. Privacy and Contemporary Claims of Right to the Body

Now what I contend is that my body is my
own, at least, I have always so regarded
it.233

John Wood of South Carolina was in a plane crash in 2007 that not only claimed
the life of his father but also necessitated the amputation of his leg below the knee. No
doubt, like many, Wood did not take the loss of limb well and insisted he wanted to be
buried (or cremated) as a whole man with the amputated leg included with the rest of his
body. Accordingly, he instructed the surgeon removing his leg to return it to him. The
surgeon complied but, later, Wood fell on hard times and was forced to put most of his
possessions into a storage unit. He wrapped up his severed leg, carefully placed it inside
a barbecue smoker and then put the smoker into a rented storage unit for safe-keeping.
Wood’s financial hardships only worsened and he, subsequently, defaulted on payment of
rent for the storage unit and its contents were auctioned-off to pay for that rent.
Some of those contents, including the smoker with the severed leg, were acquired
by Shannon Whisnant. Upon opening the smoker, and finding the leg, a startled
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Mark Twain as cited in “Mark Twain, Osteopath: Appears at Public Hearing Before
Assembly Committee,” New York Times, page 1 (28 Feb. 1901). America’s famed
humorist appeared before the state Committee on Public Health to speak in favor of his
right to attend an osteopathic doctor. A bill to license them to practice in New York was
opposed by the New York County Medical Society. Twain intoned he believed “we
ought to retain all our liberties. We can’t afford to throw any of them away.” Id. “If I do
[my body] harm through my experimenting it is I who suffer not the state.” Id. Twain’s
remark that his body is his own foreshadows arguments that would be made later that
century and beyond.
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Whisnant contacted authorities out of concern that the gruesome discovery was evidence
of a possible crime. Police presumably traced the leg back to Wood, learned of its origin
and subsequently assured Whisnant it was not the evidence of a criminal act. So assured,
Whisnant wanted the leg back so he could put it on display with the intent of charging an
admission fee for the “pleasure” of viewing a severed limb. Wood, having learned what
had happened to it, however, wanted his leg back so he could be buried with it. The
conflict between these two men came down to the pivotal question of who, if anyone,
could claim ownership rights to Wood’s severed body part. Was Wood’s leg simply
another piece of chattel property, like the barbecue smoker itself, legally acquired by
Whisnant at auction? Or, was it something more than property which could not be
bought and sold?
This question—like all other weighty matters of American jurisprudence—was
relegated to the judiciary for ultimate resolution. Unfortunately, the legal forum that
eventually ruled on this matter was neither a state nor federal court but, apparently, The
Judge Mathis Show (a self-described courtroom “reality” series on television). Noting
both men were probably enjoying the publicity from this macabre incident more than
anything else, “Judge” Mathis ordered the leg to be returned to Wood but ordered Wood
to pay Whisnant compensation. It is not clear whether this order was actually complied
with, nor is it clear just how binding court-television rulings are on the parties involved,
but the audience of this “reality” show was given a glimpse into an issue which carried
far more significance than they probably realized at the time.234

234

For background information on the Wood/Whisnant case, see Patricia J. Williams,
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As farcical as the facts of this case sound, they nevertheless raised very important
questions as to the ownership rights in one’s own body. As discussed in Part II, property
and contract are important unenumerated rights in the American civil liberty
constellation. They played a significant role in Anglo-American history as well as the
history of the Enlightenment and they were certainly at the forefront of American
thinking when the Constitution was drafted and ratified. But, two centuries is a long
time. Words change as do the meanings attributed to those words.
Furthermore, as I discussed earlier, the concept of owning property rights in the
body fell into disfavor by the latter part of the nineteenth century and midpoint of the
twentieth century. These kinds of ownership rights, though, did not pass to the people of
those bodies affected but, instead, passed to the state. Governments, state and/or federal,
began to exercise control over the human body and any claims that such exercise was
contrary to the principle enshrined in the Declaration of Independence or Constitution
was dismissed as so much “legal argle-bargle.”235
To whom do our bodies, or even the distinct and severable parts our bodies,
belong? Can we claim property rights in our bodies? Can those rights, assuming they
keep amputated leg,” at abclocal.go.com/wtvd/story?section=news/national_
world&id=5737378 (accessed 14 Feb. 2013). A British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
news report suggests the resolution of the matter might have been slightly less dramatic
than the one on Judge Mathis. The BBC reported that once police were satisfied the leg
was not part of a criminal investigation, it was sent to a funeral home until Wood could
pick it up. Whisnant tried to get the funeral home to release the limb to him, but they
refused. North Carolina Pair Feud Over Leg, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/ 7024124.stm
(accessed 14 Feb. 2013).
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indeed exist, be sold or leased to others? The answers to these questions have very
important philosophical, political, economic and constitutional ramifications for us today.
Furthermore, these questions become increasingly more complex with the passage of
time as advances in medical science have—for better or worse—led to greater and greater
commodification of body parts. Today, few would question simple body tissues like
plasma, sperm or eggs can be sold in the open market. But, what about more complex
tissues like human organs? Can those tissues also be sold in an arms-length transaction?
Furthermore, what of a transaction which does not encompass an actual sale of human
tissue but is for something less like, for instance, the rental of a body part? Specifically,
how should surrogacy contracts, which involve a short-term lease of womens’ uteri as
opposed to a permanent sale of body tissue, be treated? Should these sorts of contracts be
treated the same way that leases of other real or chattel property interests are treated?
These are the questions to which I turn in this chapter of my dissertation.
The early chapters of my dissertation argued that institutions of chattel slavery,
coverture and familial patriarchy literally gave white men recognizable and enforceable
property interests in slaves as well as wives and children. From the middle of the
eighteenth century to the middle of nineteenth centuy, however, those rights were lost.
Consequently, the rhetoric surrounding them faded from our national discourse. Indeed,
by the 1950s, it is difficult to find evidence of anyone who expressly claimed to own a
property interest in the body of another. But, this does not mean that the idea of
ownership in a human body disappeared entirely. People still exhibited some vague
notion they owned some form of inchoate, or undefined, property interests in their own
bodies. There simply existed no real vocabulary to express that right. Part of that lack of
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vocabulary stemmed from the rejection of ownership rights in others. Part of it also
stemmed, however, from a rejection of substantive due process discussed earlier.
Property, like liberty of contract—indeed like the right of privacy—is an unenumerated
right and, after the demise of Lochner v. New York, recognition of such unenumerated
rights in the Constitution fell out of favor both politically and theoretically. Property,
contract and any other unenumerated right is now under fire from whatever place on the
political spectrum voicing an objection thereto.
Important issues of public policy like abortion, same-sex marriage or bodily
autonomy fit into the rubric of liberty or equal protection as guaranteed by the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Unfortunately, what is
oftentimes too easily overlooked is the rhetoric of property rights as a source for these
liberties. Property, as denoted earlier in this dissertation, is the polestar from which all
other rights in Anglo-American constitutionalism flow and the absence of ownership
rhetoric in our current discourse on privacy issues—from abortion to same-sex
marriage—illustrates the disconnect of contemporary constitutional discourse from that
of the Enlightenment and founding eras.
My contention in the ensuing chapters is to advance the argument that the idea of
privacy has replaced the idea of property with regards to our collective sense of
ownership and control of our own bodies. Before making that argument, however, in this
chapter, I make the argument that the notion of property rights in ourselves still exists.
Regardless of terminology assigned thereto, or the hermeneutics of a particular word, we
nevertheless understand to our core that we have some degree of control over what
happens to our own bodies and, at least in some circumstances, that control should not be
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given to third persons. This is both the essence of American property rights, in general,
as well as the notion that there exists within each of us a certain degree of bodily
autonomy that remains free from any government intervention
This chapter is devoted to studying the various ways in which property rights are
still asserted in bodies outside the triangulated rhetoric of slavery, coverture and
patriarchy. I begin this study with the philosophical problems inherent in treatment of
corpses. On the one hand, Anglo-American common law dismissed the idea that dead
bodies either were property or could own property. But, on the other hand, by not
recognizing corpses were of value to outside third-parties (e.g. grave robbers) or the
family of the decedent itself, Anglo-American law allowed untold indignities to be
visited upon the cadavers of dead relatives without recompense and deprived surviving
family members of any financial windfall that occasionally grew from exploitation of the
cadaver. The deceased may not, legally, be recognized as an economic value to anyone,
but the realities of nineteenth and twentieth century medicine forced both society and the
courts to recognize those interests as, at the very least, quasi-property.
The status of a human cadaver in a grave-robbing nineteenth century world,
however, pales in comparison to the value of severable parts of human anatomy in
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Who owns the tissues and cell-lines which, through
the wonders of modern medicine, can save lives or provide research for scientists who
can, at least, prolong lives? In an age where organ transplants can mean the difference
between life and death, should people be allowed to sell their organs on the open market?
Some of these questions are, admittedly, ethical and well beyond the scope of my
dissertation. But, the mere fact I pose them, however, is proof-enough the human body
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and its various components have been commodified. Whether courts or legislatures
recognize them as such, the fact remains that tissues, organs and even genes are valuable
economic units bought and sold on the open market every day. State and federal law may
refuse to recognize these economic transactions but, as I argue in this chapter and the
next, a failure to recognize the transaction is largely superfluous. The owner of these
body parts nevertheless views them as valuable products that each, individual, body
introduces into the stream of commerce.

1. Ownership of Corpses
Before actually addressing the issue of ownership rights in one’s own body, I first
pause to look at property interests in the human corpse. It may seem counterintuitive to
begin a chapter on property rights in our own bodies with this particular issue but I have
several reasons for doing it here rather than elsewhere in the dissertation. First, with the
demise of slavery and coverture, and the transformation of the cultural status of children,
this is one area of law and history where property rights have, to varying extents, still
been asserted in the body of the other—or, at least the body of a deceased other. Second,
over time, the stigma of treating a corpse as property has diminished and as such allowed
for increasing rather than decreasing recognition of it as an economic unit as was the case
with slaves, women and children. Finally, with the exception of surrogacy arrangements,
the rest of this chapter is concerned with tissues severed or withdrawn from the body.
The contested history of ownership of those tissues has grown alongside, if not directly
out of, the claim of property rights to human cadavers. Therefore, I begin the chapter
with this issue.
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Historically, Anglo-American common law always treated a corpse as res nullius,
or the property of no one. Part of the reason for this, explains Norman Cantor, is that
burial or any other disposal of human remains was strictly within the purview of clergy
and ecclesiastic courts for many centuries. Families had no say in the matter and, thus,
no res in which to assert an ownership interest. When secular courts took jurisdiction
over these matters in seventeenth century England, there was no change in the legal status
of the body. Early Anglo-American jurists declared dead bodies did not have the legal
status of property—without ever specifying what legal status they did have—but
proceeded, in many cases, to treat a cadaver as if it was chattel anyway.236
The seminal case on English legal status of a corpse does not really discuss that
status at all but, rather, theft of shrouds from those corpses. Sir Edward Coke, Chief
Justice of England’s King’s Bench, reported on the case of a William Haine who “digged
[sic] up the graves of divers [sic] several men, and of one woman, and took the winding
sheets from the bodies and buried the bodies again.” Coke noted that “[t]he property of
the sheets was in the executor, administrators” or others handling the estate. “[F]or the
dead body,” Coke explained, “is not capable of any property.”237 Coke went on to
compare a cadaver to a lump of earth that could not be the subject of property claims
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itself. As Ngaire Naffine notes, this is the origin of the resnullius rule that dictated the
legal status of a corpse for centuries in English and American law.
This was the view transmitted down to Blackstone and, eventually, imported to
the American colonies. In describing the English law of “things,” Blackstone wrote
“though the heir has a property in the monuments and escutcheons of his ancestors, yet he
has none in their bodies or ashes” nor could any civil action be brought against someone
who disturbed those remains. A grave robber’s theft of the burial shroud could be
prosecuted as a felony, or a civil action could be maintained by the executor who owned
a property interest in that shroud. The owner of the soil in which the body was buried
could also sue for trespass when a body snatcher disturbed it. But, citing Coke,
Blackstone agreed that the human cadaver was res nullius.238
Naffine points out that many countries which follow the English common law
tradition continue to cite the res nullius doctrine, or some derivative thereof, but then
usually proceed to treat the corpse as it was property anyway.239 There is no clear
consensus in American jurisprudence as to the exact legal status of a corpse. Because
property law and disposal of a corpse are both matters of state law in this country, we
have fifty jurisdictions that make their own decisions on these matters and a federal
system that will only get involved if there appears to be a constitutional deprivation of
property. But, the clear trend of the last century has been a drift toward recognizing at
least degree of ownership rights in dead bodies. There are two reasons for this.
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First, as medicine professionalized over the course of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, the question of whether a corpse was legally recognized as property
became increasingly irrelevant. The proliferation of medical schools, and a growing
public fascination with anatomy—both inside and outside of the medical profession—led
to a surge in demand for cadavers for dissection. Where there is demand, a market will
almost always develop to meet it. Grave robbing/ body snatching became an increasing
problem in Great Britain and America. Confident they could not be tried for felony theft,
as a body was not property, grave robbers saw little disincentive in snatching newly
buried bodies and selling them to medical schools. Indeed, so great was the demand of
schools for cadavers, if grave robbers could not keep up, medical students sometimes
took matters into their own hands and exhumed the recently deceased themselves.240
Corpses may not have been recognized as legal property insofar as Coke and Blackstone
were concerned, but they certainly held economic value for someone. Legal recognition
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of property rights in the corpse was, thus, largely irrelevant. A black market in their trade
gave them value irrespective of the law. In eventually treating cadavers as property to
some degree, legal theory was merely catching up to economic reality.
The second reason American jurisprudence moved away from the res nullius
theory of English common law was that, without recognizing some degree of ownership
interest in a corpse, aggrieved families had no recourse when wronged. A general maxim
of American tort law is that for every wrong there is a remedy. If a body was simply a
lump of earth as Coke believed then a family has no right of recovery for misfeasance or
nonfeasance with regard to that lump of earth. It takes little in the way of imagination to
conceive a scenario where an aggrieved child or widow would turn to courts for help but,
without acknowledging some degree of property interest in the deceased, nothing could
be done.
One of the first cases to address the issue in this country was Pierce v. Proprietors
of Swan Point Cemetery in 1872 where the Rhode Island Supreme Court was called upon
to determine if a state court of equity could exercise jurisdiction over a suit brought by a
decedent’s daughter after disinterment of her father’s body from a grave where it had laid
for thirteen years. The daughter asserted her father’s remains were her property and she
wanted those remains returned to their original resting place. The pivotal question in the
case was whether there existed a property right in the corpse of the decedent. If there did
not, then a court of equity had no authority to consider the case. In answering that
question, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island cited the pertinent English precedent
discussed above. The Court noted the difference between U.S. and English common law
in that ecclesiastic jurisdiction over burial existed neither in this country nor in that state.
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Still, it was unwilling to depart from English precedent and, so, declared the decedent’s
remains were not property—or, at least not property in the ordinary sense of the term.241
“[T]he body is not property in the usually recognized sense of the word, yet we
may consider it as a sort of quasi property, to which certain persons may have rights, as
they have duties to perform towards it arising out of our common humanity.” Though
calling it quasi-property, the Court was quick to point out “the person having charge of it
cannot be considered as [being] the owner of it in any sense whatever; he holds it only as
a sacred trust for the benefit of all who may from family or friendship have an interest in
it[.]”242 If the Court meant to circumvent a theory of ownership in the decedent’s
remains, invocation of the trust metaphor was a bad choice. A trust is simply a situation
where a trustee holds property for the benefit of another (the beneficiary). By invoking
the metaphor of a trust, the Court in Pierce reinforced the notion that the decedent’s
remains could be treated as property.
In Louisville N.R. Co. v. Wilson, the Georgia Supreme Court was called upon to
determine if a widow had a claim against a railroad company which, after being hired to
transport a coffin containing her husband’s remains, left that coffin on a platform
(overnight) where it was subject to rain and other elements. The widow could clearly
recover for rain damage to the coffin and burial shroud. But, could she maintain an
action for damages against the railway company for “great humiliation, shame and
mental suffering.” The court held she could. After remarking that “[a] corpse in some
respects is the strangest thing on earth,” the court went on to cite the ruling in Pierce and
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conclude that the railroad could not treat the decedent, on the one hand as property
capable of being shipped by a common carrier but then, on the other hand, deny it was
property when mishandled and the widow sought damages.243 In short, just as economic
realities transformed what was once res nullius into valuable property irrespective of its
legal nomenclature, society’s growing litigiousness and expansion of tort law in
nineteenth century America asserted pressure on the legal system to change. Coke’s
lump of earth was now regarded as quasi-property.
The quasi-property nomenclature stuck. In 1911, Arkansas lawyer W.C. Rodgers
wrote an article formally characterizing property rights in a cadaver as being quasiproperty. A human body after death, he explained, held a unique position which, on one
hand, exhibited certain elements of property but, on the other hand, was clearly not
property.244 This characterization, remains today,245 though is quickly being rendered
obsolete by advancements in modern medicine. A federal Court of Appeals ran headlong into this reality in Brotherton v. Cleveland where a wife, knowing her husband’s
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I do not mean to suggest a quasi-property theory has been accepted everywhere. See
e.g. Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Assn., 514 N.E.2d 430 , 435 (Ohio App.
1986)(calling the “quasi-property fiction” both “ancient” and “discredited”) or that it has
not proved problematic even for jurisdictions which have adhered to it. See e.g. Bauer v.
North Fulton Med. Ctr., 527 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. App. 1999)(“quasi property right in a
corpse is not percuniary in nature nor should it be); Roach v. Stern, 653 N.Y.S.2d 532,
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deceased and to cremated remains). The theory remains problematic even to its
proponents though, as discussed above, the legal treatment of corpses is almost
superfluous given that it has been treated as a valuable commodity in Anglo-American
society since the eighteenth century.
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aversion to organ donation, refused to allow any “anatomical gifts” to be taken from his
body after death. Apparently unaware of that refusal, a coroner harvested his corneas
under Ohio law allowing removal of such tissue without consent of a surviving spouse so
long as the person removing the tissue is unaware of any objection. The Court held that
whatever rights the widow held in the body of her deceased husband, that interest rose to
the level of a “property interest” for purposes of protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution regardless of how it might have been
treated under state law. “The human body is a valuable resource,” the Court aptly
observed, and establishing rights in that resource has been, and will continue to be,
modified by scientific advancement.246 Characterization of this sort was prophetic at the
time and, in the two plus decades since Brotherton, it has only proven too true as I
discuss in the material that follows.
Many contemporary scholars continue to argue that the corpse as a whole, rather
than the sum of its parts, should still not be treated as property. Norman Cantor posits
only that a state’s reasons for refusing to recognize a corpse as property are “defensible”
though he never explains why except to say such refusal would have collateral benefits
under state law like prohibiting creditors from holding a dead body hostage until debts
are paid. A prohibition against that action, as well as other nefarious activities, however,
could easily be accomplished by some very simple state statute. Stuart Banner suggests
that “[c]alling the body a kind of property seemed to desecrated the notion of being
human.” This is a noble sentiment, to be sure, but ignores economic history and reality
that has existed since the days of grave robbing. Human bodies, whether we like it or
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not, are valuable assets—either in the strict financial sense of the term or in a sentimental
sense of the term—and refusing to recognize that fact appears to give those who would
exploit that property a leg-up over those who claim it.247
Ngaire Naffine, though, hits upon the real problem with this issue in my
estimation. Any frank reconsideration of the corpse’s status as res nullius must take
place in light of the “legacy of slavery”248 in America. To that I would also add the
legacy of coverture and a time when children were treated as mere economic factors in
household economies. But, if the nineteenth and twentieth centuries taught The arguable
flaw in this argument, however, is that slavery, coverture and patriarchy in general denied
or inhibited the accrual of wealth to the life in being which accrued it. This is not the
case in with regard to a cadaver where, obviously, the life in being no longer exists. A
corpse has no ownership interest of itself but, to its family, those interests can be
inestimable in terms of sentimental value or, to the less sentimental of those amongst us,
in financial value to the extent the severable body parts could be used as a repository of
spare parts. The pivotal question in all of this is whether we recognize the world as it
exists or whether we lament for the world as it ought to be. Bodies after death have been
treated by the courts as property whether we like it or not. More importantly, however,
state legislatures have not stepped in to counteract treatment by the courts thereby giving
such treatment a stamp of approval.
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2. Ownership of Living Human Tissue
Body parts from living, or dead, human beings have been a mainstay of American
life since long before America, as an entity, even existed. Internal organs and blood were
a mainstay of Mayan, Aztec and various other Mesoamerican religious rituals well-before
Columbian contact and after that, even in North America, bone, teeth, hair and other
items from human bodies were occasionally used as some sort of ornamentation by many
indigenous tribes. Europeans settlers on the American continent were only the latest to
use components from the bodies of the dead for commercial, ornamental or practical
purposes. Moreover, such uses were generally accepted without any sense of the moral
opprobrium that manifested itself with regard to use of other body parts in later
generations.
Newspapers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for instance, advertised
for women who were willing to sell their hair to make wigs. This transaction invited no
protest nor, apparently, did later advertisements for lactating mothers to sell breast milk.
Both commodities were very much in demand and the free market introduced a segment
of society willing to meet that demand in return for compensation.249
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Banner, American Property, 241-248. Indeed, what high school student at one time or
another has not read the classic short story of Della who sells her magnificent hair to a
wig maker for twenty dollars so she can buy a watch chain for husband, Jim, only to
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the Magi,” in The Complete Works of O. Henry (Garden City: Garden City Books, 1937)
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Later, as medical science advanced, markets also developed for blood and plasma
necessitated not only for surgery but also for emergency, and trauma treatment in
hospitals. Skin grafts also became widely available for treatment of burn patients thereby
creating a market for human skin as well. Blood and skin, though, were perceived as
presenting something more personal than hair, or apparently breast milk, prompting both
ethicists and the legal system to find an open market for these body tissues more
problematic. In the early 1950s, Gussle Perlmutter was admitted to Beth David Hospital
in New York for treatment of a medical problem during which she was given blood
contaminated with the jaundice virus causing her to contract hepatitis. She sued the
hospital, not for negligence but under a theory that the blood given to her was a product
sold in the stream of commerce and, because it was tainted, violated state law that a
product sold carried an implied warranty of fitness. In other words, Perlmutter argued the
blood infused into her body was every bit as much an item of chattel property as a pill or
something else like a car or toaster. A majority of the New York court ruled against her
finding the blood given her by the hospital was only an “incidental service” subordinate
to the primary service provided for “care and treatment.” A dissenting judge, however,
found little to distinguish the purchase of blood in this instance from the purchase of food
in a restaurant.250 If blood were like food purchased in a restaurant, then it was mere
chattel property. The majority of Perlmutter rejected that approach but a close read of
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the opinion reveals the majority was much more worried about making hospitals absolute
insurers of the integrity of the blood supply they used than they were about treating such
blood as a commodity in the stream of commerce.
The Perlmutter case was decided roughly a generation before the aforementioned
Brotherton case but each of them speak to the same issue which is how to regulate the
market for human tissue. Whether the tissue was blood, as in Perlmutter, or a cornea as
in the case of Brotherton, the inescapable fact is that these body parts have economic
value in the open market even if the American legal system is slow to take those markets
into account and enforce property rights in body components. Federal and state
legislatures showed themselves equally slow to act and, when they did, it was to prohibit
the commodification of body components rather than to regulate a market which, in fact,
already existed.
In 1984, the United States Congress passed, and President Reagan signed, the
National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) which, in part, was meant to circumvent the
formation of an interstate market in transplantable organs. Improved surgical techniques,
and advances in drugs to counteract tissue rejection made organ transplants increasing
more feasible as a standard medical practice. Most of NOTA was directed at building a
nationwide network to facilitate organ transplants but a small part of that law also
criminalized buying, and selling, transplantable organs.
The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee expressly stated its belief
that “human body parts should not be viewed as commodities.” A prohibition on the
buying and selling of human organs was “directed at preventing the for-profit marketing
of kidneys and other organs.” A violation of NOTA was thus criminalized and, for a
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violation, could bring up to a $50,000 fine or five years imprisonment or both. “[B]lood
and blood derivatives,” however, were expressly exempted from the purview of federal
law. The distinguishing characteristic for Congress between blood and other
tissues/organs was that the former could be “replenished” and its donation did “not
compromise the health of the donor.”251
If the intent of Congress was to protect the health of the donor, though, why was
there no prohibition on not-for-profit sales of organs? Part of the answer to this lies in
economics and the very real possibility of economic exploitation. Nobel Prize-winning
geneticist, Joshua Lederberg, said at a symposium in 1963 that the rapid pace of medical
advances would soon impose “intolerable economic pressures on transplant sources.”252
Indeed, as Russell Scott succinctly puts it, many opponents to the enforcement of
property rights in the body do so on the basis that “under free enterprise, only the poor
will sell body parts and only the affluent will be able to buy them.”253 There is no
indication, however, that a private market for transplantable organs would significantly
slow, or even stop, public donation to tissue banks thereby eliminating a supply for the
less affluent.
Moreover, if it was fear of economic exploitation that inhibited recognition of a
commercial market for these tissues, and the enforcement of property rights therein,
history lends considerable evidence to suggest that this proverbial ship already sailed a
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long time ago. Henrietta Lacks, an African-American woman, was born to a poor family
in Maryland on August 1, 1920, and died of cervical cancer at the young age of thirtyone. Her life, and contribution to medicine, might have slipped into oblivion but for the
work of Rebecca Skloot who detailed—in The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks—the
woman’s contribution not only to medical science but also to the multi-billion dollar
American bio-technology industry which profited, and continues to profit, from the
remnants of her body. When Lacks first detected her cancer tumor, she asked her
husband to take her to Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore for further examination and
treatment. While Johns Hopkins, and its’ so-called “night doctors”—physicians who
were oftentimes suspected of having performed medical experiments on ill-informed and
unsuspecting “black folks” in the community—was viewed with fear and dread within
the Maryland African-American community, it was also one of the very few hospitals at
the time which would treat black patients in the segregated Jim Crowe south during the
1950s.254
Medical science to that date had not yet found a strain of replicating cells for use
in laboratories until Lacks developed her own particularly aggressive form of cervical
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cancer. A biopsy of those cancer cells, Skloot reported, continued to replicate themselves
at an almost unbelievable rate which caught the attention of both the scientific and
medical community. Neither Lacks, nor her husband, ever signed a release form or gave
permission for those cells to be the subject of further study and experimentation let alone
for sale to other medical facilities. In fact, they had no idea these cells were grown,
harvested and sold to laboratories around the world the same as any other rare and
valuable scientific commodity. But, were these cells of any true scientific or economic
value? As it turns out, the answer was yes and the emerging field of biotechnology
cashed in on them handsomely. When it came time to test a polio vaccine, the biotech
industry geared up for mass manufacture of so-called HeLa (a name taken from the first
two letters of her first and last names) cells taken from Lack’s diseased cervix. The
benefit of the HeLa Cells for this project was that they were (1) particularly susceptible to
the Polio vaccine and, at the same time, (2) replicated themselves far faster than any other
cells involved in the research. A cure for Polio was eventually discovered with help from
the HeLa cell strain. Still, as her descendants point out, they received no economic
benefit whatsoever from her contribution to medical science whereas the pharmaceutical
industry did rather well. Polio is all but eliminated in the western world but most of
Lacks’s descendants cannot ever afford health insurance for themselves.
Should the Lacks family have received compensation of some sort? There are
two reasons for answering that question in the negative. First, the cells were a boon to
medical science and mankind. Skloot reports that HeLa cells not only travelled into
space as part of a NASA experiment, but also were instrumental in testing cancer
chemotherapies, devising in-vitro fertilization and finding treatments for Leukemia,
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Influenza and Parkinson’s disease. The argument can be made that humanity should
profit from these achievements this rather than a single individual. But, if there is
validity to this argument at all then bio-tech companies should not profit either and they
have made considerable sums of money harvesting the cellular remains of a woman who
has been dead for over half a century. Johns Hopkins claims it never profited from HeLa
cells nor did it follow anything other than accepted practices at that particular time in
conducting a biopsy on Henrietta Lacks in the 1950s.255 That may well be true but, as
Skloot reports, as of 2010, a company named Invitrogen sells various products made
from the HeLa line from $100 to $10,000 per vial. Similarly, “American Type Culture
Collection” sells HeLa cells for up to $256 per vial. In short, cells harvested from
Lacks’s diseased cervix are a proverbial cash cow that has been enjoyed by almost
everyone but the heirs of the woman who provided those cells.
Second, disregarding what we now know is the scientific value of the HeLa cell
line, there is an initial knee-jerk reaction to prevent commodification of this material so
as to protect Lacks, her family and others similarly situation from economic exploitation.
This would be of particular concern, here, when a poor black family sells biological
material to what is (essentially) an all-white biotech industry. By preventing her from
selling an interest she owned in her own cancer cells, the argument might go, Lacks
would not be subject to exploitation by those who might manipulate her poverty and
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relative lack of bargaining power during the Jim Crowe era. Setting aside for a moment
the rank paternalism of this reasoning, a refusal to acknowledge commodification of
HeLa cells, as a legal fact, allowed the biotech industry to exploit it as an economic fact
at the expense of Lacks and her descendants. Nobody would argue that, if this biological
material had been chattel or real property, Lacks’s descendants would have a claim of
entitlement to the economic benefit of the property. But, the political, legal and moral
refusal to recognize the body as property—an economic fact irrespective of whether law
and government recognizes it—arguably does more to exploit the family and heirs of
those property owners than anything else.256
In the early part of 2012, an entirely new chapter was opened up on the body of
Henrietta Lacks. Scientists announced they mapped the human genome of the HELA
cells and then posted that information online where it could be accessed by anyone. As it
was in the twentieth century, so too in the twenty-first century, the question that must be
answered is whether the genome mapping done by scientists is of private property,
belonging to the Lacks heirs, or whether it is now public property—in the public domain,
as it were—and can be accessed by anyone for any reason. The temptation, for this
writer, anyway, is to fall back on the familiar theories of race and gender that posit that
HELA property has been stolen from the Lacks heirs whom, as mentioned above, would
typically be viewed as entitled to some sort of recompense for this biomedical discovery.
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Skloot reports that Lacks was not the only one who was exploited at the hands of the
biotech industry. John Moore, an Alaskan surveyor, underwent an emergency
splenectomy for Leukemia. Unusual proteins in his cancer cells were harvested without
his knowledge, patented by a biotech company and were eventually valued at more than
$1 billion. Moore sued his doctors and became the first individual to legally “stake a
claim” to a property ownership in his own tissue. Id. at 199-203.
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But, unfortunately, the appropriation of biomedical technology without approval of the
owners of that property has been way too pervasive to assign it a gender or racial
prejudice. If anything, class rather than race or gender, would seem to be the common
denominator in the appropriation of biomedical technology without recompense to the
original owners of that information.257

3. Surrogacy and the Body as Rental Property
If the narrative of HELA cells, and the demand for transplant organs prove
nothing else, they at least show the human body is a valuable asset which has been both
mined for scientific research as well as scavenged for transplantable tissue. But, one
aspect of property rights in the body that has not yet been explored in this dissertation is
the right (power) to lease the body. It is important to remember, as discussed in my
introduction, that ownership of a res does not equate to a physical ownership of the res
itself but, rather, various interests in that res. Thus far in my dissertation, I have looked
at only two of the proverbial bundle of sticks of ownership rights: (1) the power to
possess the res as manifested by white patriarchal control over bodies of children, wives
and slaves, as well as (2) the power to exclude anyone else from control of the resas
manifested in arguments over privacy. If we indeed own property rights in our own
bodies, as I maintain in my introduction, then it is worth considering whether other rights
from the so-called bundle of rights associated with property ownership has ever been
shown to exist. Surrogate parenthood—particularly, gestational surrogacy—exposes and
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reveals an entirely new narrative on bodily ownership and introduces into the calculus of
bodily rights the liberty to lease the res thereby giving the human body even greater
similarity to chattel or realty leased in the ordinary course of business.
Before I begin that argument, however, I am compelled to define my terminology.
By surrogacy, I mean the procedure in which a woman is artificially inseminated with
sperm from another man who is oftentimes, but not always, married to someone other
than the surrogate and intends for the surrogate mother to carry the fetus to gestation and
deliver it to him for purposes of child-rearing. The surrogate (biological mother)
contributes the egg as genetic material to a fetus but is intended by everyone else to the
arrangement to have no parental relationship with the fetus at all. The surrogate is,
nevertheless, the biological mother and also has a claim to the custody and control of the
child once born. I also use another term, gestational surrogacy, by which I mean a
process (like in-vitro fertilization) where the surrogate mother provides no genetic
material to a conceived fetus but agrees to carry it to birth. A gestational surrogate, in
other words, simply rents out a uterus for that time-period which is necessary to carry the
fetus to term.
Scientific contribution to non-traditional parenthood was ubiquitous in the
twentieth century. Artificial insemination began with farm animals but the technology
soon spread to human beings with the offer of relieving the pain of infertility that
afflicted many couples. Louise Brown, the first so-called “test tube baby” was born in
1978 and, though the genetic product of both parents, she was conceived in the laboratory
in vitro. Infertility research provided not only hope to couples who could not conceive
children in the traditional method, but also created a market for the very materials
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necessary to achieve procreation. Commercial markets thus developed for both young
men and young women—almost all of which were exclusively white—who sought to
market sperm and eggs in the growing commerce of infertility.258
The market in those materials was, no doubt, uncontroversial, until the case of In
re Baby M in the 1980s thrust the notion of surrogate parenthood into popular
consciousness. In February of 1985, William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead entered
into a surrogacy contract in which Whitehead agreed to be inseminated with sperm from
Stern and carry the fetus to term. Once the child was born, Stern’s wife would adopt the
baby and Whitehead and her husband were to, respectively, take the necessary steps to
relinquish parental rights and refute a presumption of paternity. Once this was done,
Stern would pay Whitehead $10,000.259
A girl, “Baby M,” was born on March 2, 1986, and though Whitehead initially
surrendered the child pursuant to the contract, she became inconsolable and begged for
the child’s temporary return. Fearful for her mental state, the Sterns relinquished the girl.
After that, Whitehead refused to surrender custody back to the Sterns thus prompting
William Stern to file suit to enforce the contract. The New Jersey trial court ruled for the
Sterns and found the surrogacy contract enforceable for two reasons. First, citing
Lochner v. New York, and the long discarded doctrine of liberty of contract, the court
ruled the parties had a constitutionally protect interest in negotiating as to the
fundamental right to decide whether to “bear and beget” a child. Second, by denying the
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surrogate (woman) the opportunity to sell her procreative material, but at the same time
allowing a male to sell his, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 260 That the trial court would invoke liberty of contract to allow the
bargaining of a component part of the right to privacy (the decision of whether to bear
children) in return for a quid pro quo suggests that the trial court judge (at least)
perceived a clear philosophical linkage between property, privacy and contract. But, he
was apparently the only one to see that link.
The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously reversed that decision and held the
surrogacy contract invalid. Part of that ruling was based on the Supreme Court’s finding
the contract interfered with, or violated several statutes unrelated to the issue of
surrogacy. But, on the pivotal question of the contract’s enforceability, the Court found
that would be a violation of public policy. “This is the sale of a child, or at the very least,
the sale of a mother’s right to her child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the
purchasers is the father. Almost every evil that prompted the prohibition on the payment
of money in connection with adoptions exists here.” The Court went on to note that,
while the Sterns were not rich and the Whiteheads were not poor, there was a clear
financial incentive. Whitehead volunteered to be a surrogate in order to give another
couple the gift of life, but she also admitted she needed the $10,000 fee to take care of her
own family. “There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy.” In
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In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1165 (N.J. Super.Ct. 1987). As to the equal protection
part of this ruling, the court was speaking in general terms. William Stern obviously had
not sold his sperm in this case but such sales were allowed everywhere including the state
of New Jersey. Although New Jersey had no positive law (statute) that banned
surrogacy, the court expressed a judicial ruling to that effect in this case would essentially
treat men differently, and allow them greater rights, than women in the sale of
reproductive materials – essentially commodifying sperm and eggs as property.
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New Jersey, the Court held, “the surrogate mother’s agreement to sell her child is
void.”261 The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed neither the liberty of contract issue
nor the equal protection issue which played such a prominent role in the trial court
decision.262 Because it did not, there is no clear indication whether the Supreme Court
simply thought the trial court was off-base with its decision or whether it found the public
policy concerns overwhelmed the bases for the trial court’s decision.
Because In re Baby M did not involve a solely gestational surrogacy, there was
also no discussion of the right of Whitehead to lease her uterus. The transfer of her
genetic material was also involved and that, as well as the financial aspect of the contract,
clearly troubled the Court. Still, the use of property rhetoric by the Court is telling. The
Supreme Court compared the surrogacy arrangement to a sale of the child. A sale
connotes a transfer of chattel or realty pursuant to contract and the court’s use of that
word in reference to the Baby M clearly indicated it thought the child was being bought
and sold much like livestock or a slave a century and a half earlier. More importantly,
though, the Supreme Court’s language that this was the “sale of a mother’s right to her
child” harkens back to the rights in property and property in rights rhetoric employed by
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537 A.2d at 1248-1250. Although Stern and Whitehead both went on to assert various
other constitutional rights associated with privacy, none of them argued a property right
inherent in the child.
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As noted in a prior chapter of this dissertation, the liberty of contract principle fell into
disfavor during the New Deal and, thus, the trial court left itself open to criticism for its
reliance on Lochner v. New York. I have found at least one critic who pounced on this
problem citing the United States Supreme Court for the proposition “there is . . . no such
thing as absolute freedom of contract.” Patricia H. Werhane, “AGAINST the Legitimacy
of Surrogate Contracts,” in On the Problem of Surrogate Parenthood: Analyzing the
Baby M Case, ed. Herbert Richardson (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987) 21-30.
“Should a contract, any contract, be legally or morally binding even when it is entered
into voluntarily by both parties when and if it entails selling, renting, or indenturing a
human being?” Id. at 24
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James Madison. John Phillip Reid, it should be from my first chapter, argued AngloAmericans owned/possessed a property interest in their rights under the British
Constitution. We see similar rhetoric employed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
Baby M case to describe Whitehead’s rights as a mother more than two centuries later.
Indeed, there are many important rhetorical observations to be gleaned from In re
Baby M but perhaps the most important is the procedural disposition by the Court. The
New Jersey Supreme Court never disputed that there were important property interests at
issue in the case. Indeed, the Court expressly accused the surrogacy contract as one
which conveyed a property interest in the minor child from the Whiteheads to the Sterns.
It is this interest which is important from the case. The Court never once argued the
interest did not exist. Rather, the Court struck down the surrogacy contract itself and
ruled that such matters could not be the matter of such contracts to begin with.
As noted in the first chapter of this dissertation, American law has consistently
whittled away at liberty of contract and this whittling reached its zenith during the Great
Depression and the New Deal. If Congress, or the courts could step in and regulate the
extent to which labor contracts could be regulated during the 1930s, it should come as no
surprise Congress would try and regulate these contracts as well. On May 14, 1987, Rep.
Tom Luken of Ohio introduced legislation into Congress known as The Surrogacy
Arrangements Act of 1987 by which he intended to ban surrogacy contracts altogether. It
is important to remember surrogacy contracts involved two interests, which are pivotal to
this dissertation. On the one hand, they involve property interests in a surrogate mother
that are sold in the case of traditional surrogacy (i.e., genetic material if a surrogate
mother is artificially inseminated) and, on the other hand, lease of the womb if all that is
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involved is gestational surrogacy. This is important because the Luken bill only
addressed surrogacy in its traditional sense rather than gestational surrogacy. In short,
Lukens did not deny that lease of a uterus was a valuable property right in and of itself
nor did he contest that what happened was the conveyance of genetic material from one
person to another. To the contrary, the point of Lukens’ bill was to prohibit the
functionality of the surrogacy contract. Why is this distinction important? Because
Lukens never denied the status of these contracts as properties but, rather, contested
women were not sufficiently capable of negotiating them away by contract in the first
place.263
The bill was referred to his own House Subcommittee on Tourism,
Transportation and Hazardous Materials where, ultimately, it died.264 But, before its
death, Luken held hearings, which, not unexpectedly, overwhelmingly featured witnesses
who favored banning, and even criminalizing, commercial surrogacy contracts. A federal
ban on surrogacy contracts was, in the end, never passed. Still, the anti-surrogacy
rhetoric employed at the federal hearings is fascinating. While de-legitimizing contracts
embracing this practice, those against surrogacy implicitly acknowledged surrogate
mothers were selling a valuable commodity even if they disagreed as to the precise nature
of the commodity being sold.
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The issue of whether a contracting party is sufficiently competent to contract away the
subject of the contract is one that this dissertation has addressed before and has been the
subject of numerous scholarly publications. The overwhelming legal authority of late has
been that surrogacy contracts are void not only for being against public policy but also
that they overreach.
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Luken himself, in opening remarks, made clear his views that as he sought to ban
the transfer of a property interest. Even if state law had not yet acted to negate
acquisition of such a property interest, Luken noted, Congress would intervene to make
sure they did not.
It is reported that babies are being snatched from their mother’s arms
immediately after birth by bounty hunting process servers armed with a
piece of paper, a surrogacy contract. If commercial surrogacy transactions
are allowed to continue, these private arrangements will produce worse
results than the black market area of adoption that we know too well. The
breeding of human beings for transfer of ownership creates a new class of
people whose lineage and ownership reflect our society’s worse biases in
class, greed and gender.265
Luken made clear it was not the existence of these arrangements, in general, he
sought to ban but, rather, the “commercialization of such arrangements.” By nodding to
the commercial value of such contracts, he impliedly recognized that (irrespective of state
or federal law at the time) Americans had increasingly entered such contracts to exchange
interests that they considered valuable. As with grave robbing in the era of medical
school expansion, body parts—and in this case, rental of body parts—were valuable
economic interests whether legally recognized or not.
Representative Luken also noted, albeit mistakenly, the Baby M case was “the
first legal case since the passage of the 13th amendment [sic] wherein a U.S. Court has
ordered the consummation of a contract for the conveyance of title to a human being.” In
re Baby M, as stated above, did not uphold the surrogacy contract. Moreover, the gist of
the contract was not the conveyance of a human being as Rep. Luken would have
preferred to classify it, but rather the conveyance of her genetic material by the biological
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mother. The father of the girl, after all, was not a southern slave owner, as in Lukens’s
analogy, but rather a parent himself who sought termination of parental rights of the
mother the same as a maternal recipient of donated sperm. Rep. Tom Tauke of Iowa
summed up his side of the problem perfectly:
[This issue] raises the question of whether or not human beings are
property that can be conveyed. It also raises the question of whether or
not the act of creation is a service which can be sold. If we conclude that
human beings are property that can be conveyed and that the act of
creation is a service that can be sold, that obviously has profound
implications not only for the status of human beings in our society but also
for the society itself[.]266
Lukens’ objective of imposing a nationwide standard on surrogacy throughout the
United States failed. His 1987 bill languished in committee until it died and, when he
reintroduced the very same bill into the next congress, it too denied in committee.
Legalization of surrogate parenthood arrangements was thus left to the states. But,
whether legally recognized or not, was largely beside the point. Both the national and
state regulatory schemas recognized the existence of such contractual arrangements.
Rental of reproductive organs was—whether states like it or not—a fait accompli and the
question to be answered in twenty-first century was not whether to recognize the practice
but how, and to what extent, to regulate it.267
In the end, Congress never banned surrogacy contracts leaving the matter up to
the states and a number of jurisdictions have acted to ban them. A handful of states,
though, have enacted regulatory frameworks under which legal surrogate contracts may
be entered. The sticking point for many in the surrogate motherhood debate was not so
266
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much employment of the surrogate as an incubator for the fetus, although this caused no
small degree of consternation among both traditionalists and feminists,268 but that the
fetus carried the surrogate’s genetic material thus surrogacy arguably comparable to baby
selling. Development of in-vitro fertilization, however, removed that objection. The
surrogate was no longer transferring her parenthood claims over her baby to the natural
father and his wife. Indeed, the fetus has no genetic material from the surrogate mother.
Thus, as Bree Kessler quips, “surrogacy now is not the surrogacy of the Baby M” era
decades ago. Kessler analyzed a 2008 Newsweek report about a significant number of
military wives who contracted to be surrogates to supplement family income while a
husband was overseas fighting in the Middle East. While acknowledging there remained
potential for abuse, Kessler notes state sanction of surrogacy allows private citizens the
agency to act within what they perceive to be their own economic best interests to
alleviate risks of poverty.269 Contemporary surrogate mothers, in other words, view the
renting of their uteri as being little different from rental of various real estate interests
like apartments or farmland.
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Opponents of surrogacy arrangements, which include many feminists who would
otherwise argue in favor of a woman to control her own body, argue such contracts
exploit the economically vulnerable. See e.g. Henrik, Kjeldgaard Jorgensen,
“Paternalism, Surrogacy and Exploitation,” 10 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal (2000)
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While lawmakers and ethicists may wish it otherwise, the cold hard fact remains
that history has shown that the human body continues to be a proverbial treasure-trove of
many valuable, physiological, resources. Advancements in medical science and biogenetic engineering only continue to emphasize this point. Just as eighteenth and
nineteenth century grave-robbers (in both Great Britain and America) benefitted from the
professionalization of medicine and its need for human cadavers, medical research
laboratories in both twentieth and twenty-first century America benefitted from all the
tissue and/or genetic material harvested from patients who, oftentimes, received no notice
let alone compensation whatsoever for the benefit their bodies provided to the greater
advancement of science in general or medicine in particular. We need look no further
than the descendants of Henrietta Lacks for proof that bodily tissues (in her case, the
renowned HELA cells) were valuable in both the economic and scientific sense of that
term. Still, for all the profit made from biotech research based on experimentation from
Lacks’s cancer cells, her family has received no compensation and, as one descendant
expressly noted, the family cannot even afford health insurance of their own. If the
reason public policy makers refuse to recognize the valuable property interests in the
bodies of persons is to prevent exploitation of the poor, it would seem to me that such
exploitation has already occurred.
Further, the Lacks case emphasizes the extent to which race and gender play a
part in denying acknowledgement of property rights to African-Americans in general, and
women of color in particular. Semen donors, as noted above, continue to be paid for their
services and (for the most part) are mostly white medical students. Female egg donors,
likewise, are largely white and enjoy the economic benefit of selling biological material
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in the free market. Fearing women of color will be exploited, however, the law views the
sale of their bodily economic interests as exploitative and thereby denies them not only
the agency they should otherwise have over their own body but also denies them the
claim to economic value therein. Lacks and her relatives collected no royalties, let alone
the free health care they desired from Johns Hopkins University Medical School which
surreptitiously obtained those cells from their ancestor in the first place. If Johns
Hopkins has not profited from those cells, at the very least, bio-tech industry associated
with it has obscenely profited.
NOTA and SSA also show that the federal government, at the very least, viewed
body tissues as property rights in and of themselves or Congress would not have tried to
regulate their trade in order to protect the owners of such rights. When Congress acted to
restrict the trade of bodily organs, or use of a surrogate mother, their concerns may well
have been based in the morality of those transactions but the very fact that they legislated
in those areas confirmed that the interests upon which legislation was being drafted
passed on the economic—and, thus, property interests—of those matters upon which the
legislation was passed. In short, Congressional action—though it would have denied the
existence of property rights in these areas—confirmed their very existence simply by
legislating upon them.
More importantly, however, for purposes of this dissertation, federal government
action in the case of NOTA and SSA, as well as private (in)action in the case of Johns
Hopkins University and Henrietta Lacks, indicates a clear—albeit, clearly contested—
consensus that human body tissues may constitute valuable property rights which should
have arguably been recognized in the private sphere if not in the public. If those rights
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are not recognized in the owner from which the tissue was derived then, at least arguably,
some ownership interest should be recognized in theirs of the owner. Recognition of
such an interest reinforces the idea that there exists a sort of property—hence, privacy—
interest in one’s own body.

B. Property, Contract, and Same-Sex Marriage

Conservatism cries out we are going
to destroy the family.270

On May 18, 1970, Richard John (Jack) Baker and his partner, James McConnell,
walked into the District Court of Hennepin County, Minnesota, and applied for a
marriage license. The astonished clerk, who surely thought the two young men had lost
their minds, turned them down on grounds that state law only allowed marriage licenses
to opposite sex couples. Jack Baker was not shy about controversy—having been an
“out” student body president at the University of Minnesota at a time when many states
criminalized same-sex intimacy—so, the young law student promptly filed a lawsuit
asking for an order directing the clerk to issue them a marriage license. Not surprisingly,
he lost at the trial level. His appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court was the first samesex marriage case to reach a high court anywhere in the United States and, again, not
surprisingly, he lost.
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While judicial decisions on same-sex marriage, today, produce lengthy opinions
giving thorough consideration to arguments on both sides, the Minnesota Supreme Court
refused to even take the case seriously, brushing off Baker’s many constitutional
arguments in just a few pages. The Court found no “irrational or invidious
discrimination” in the state’s marriage statute and, in an opinion already dripping with
condescension, dismissed any similarity between Baker and McConnell’s situation to the
recent United States Supreme Court decision striking down anti-miscegenation laws.
After all, the Court said, there is a “commonsense” distinction between marriage
restrictions based on race and those based on gender.271
This was not the end of the story. Ever the enterprising law student, Baker found
another way to legalize their relationship and had his partner file a petition to adopt him
which was granted in 1971 by a (presumably) sympathetic judge in Minneapolis. Despite
McConnell losing a librarian’s position at the University of Minnesota, and Baker
receiving heightened scrutiny when he applied to take the state bar examination two years
later, the end-result was worth it to the young men. Baker, who was from out-of-state,
finally obtained his sought-after $300 quarterly discount on law school tuition as his nonstudent partner (and now “father”) was already a Minnesota resident.272
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More than four decades later, our contemporary debate over same-sex marriage is
typically framed as a dialectic that pits equal protection arguments against a JudeoChristian tradition which frames marriage as a social status to regulate procreation of
children. But, as I argue in this chapter, that binary overlooks another, older, facet to
marriage that is largely absent from our contemporary debate. That facet is the same
liberty of contract and freedom of property rights we have discussed so far. Baker and
McConnell, undoubtedly, had many reasons for wanting to marry, but the explanation
they gave Time Magazine in 1971 cited the aforementioned tuition discount and
inheritance rights. Then as now, whatever religious or social attributes it may connote,
marriage also bestows very real, very important, economic benefits. The recent flurry of
same-sex marriage cases relies largely on equal protection claims and I do not dispute
that these are valid arguments. More and more people in this country, and particularly
those in the judiciary, realize that that equality of treatment means just that – that all
people should be treated under the laws unless there are legitimate reasons to refrain from
doing so and nobody (to my knowledge) has ever advanced a plausible argument for
failing to apply that principle in this context. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in
a fractured five to four decision, recently concluded barring same-sex marriage violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.273 While the Obergefell
opinion is to be celebrated by those of us who believe equal treatment under the law is a
prime imperative of American Constitutionalism, particularly after passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there may also be some (including this writer) who
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regrets there was nothing (even an ancillary reference) to property rights in the context of
same-sex marriage.274
Overwhelming societal research, as I discuss later in this chapter, recognizes the
almost incontestable existence of a “wealth effect” that follows from marriage and the
pooling of resources between married couples. Although I do not deny that the
availability of those benefits to same-sex couples is a violation of equal protection rights,
274

Oddly enough, one of the few references to property rights in the whole same-sex
marriage debate came from a couple opposed to its recognition. Phillip and Sandra
Unruh filed, a self-described opposite-sex married couple, filed a motion on October 22,
2014, to intervene in a challenge to a Kansas ban on same-sex marriage laws in Kail
Marie v. Robert Moser, MD., U.S.D.C. for the District Court of Kansas, Case No. 14-CV2518. The Unruhs argued, in pertinent part, they had (1) a “marriage contract” under
Kansas law, (2) they have an “inalienable property right in their marriage that is protected
by the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution [and] the Kansas Constitution” of
which they could not be deprived without Due Process of Law, and (3) any change to
Kansas law would amount to “a taking of their property rights in marriage without [D]ue
[P]rocess of Law. See Motion to Intervene in Marie v. Moser, http://www.scribd.com
/doc/244022349/2-14-cv-02518-13 (accessed 1 Jul. 1915). While the merits of the
Unruhs’ motion are arguable, at best, it is surprising that it took an opponent to same-sex
marriage to actually raise the issue of the property rights rather than a proponent. On the
other hand, two days after their motion was filed below, the District Court denied them
the opportunity to intervene. Among other things, the Court ruled that it doubts “whether
plaintiffs can show that their marriage constitutes a protectable property interest under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution or that this case’s
disposition will impair their ability to protect that interest.” See Memorandum and Order,
United States District Court for the District of Kansas, https://ecf.ksd.uscourts.gov/cgibin/show_public_doc? 2014cv2518-18 (accessed 11 July 2015). While this writer may
agree with the latter part of the District Court’s ruling, he disagrees with the first part of
that ruling. I have argued, throughout this dissertation that marriage is a contract and,
further, the contract of marriage is bound up in the creation and maintenance of extrinsic
property interest. I also fail to see how the Unruhs are subject to dimunition of property
rights in their own marriage if same-sex marriage is to be permitted. But, in a nation
devoted to protection of property rights, they should have been allowed to make that
argument.
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my major concern in this chapter (as in all previous chapters of this dissertation) is that
they inhibit formation of property rights. Baker and McConnell sought not to enforce
their interpretation on anyone else but to take advantage of federal and state economic
benefits extended to married couples.
This section will analyze our current debate over same-sex marriage within the
larger context of contract and property rights we have already discussed. Specifically, I
will argue “traditional marriage,” as a religious institution, has no long-standing tradition
per se in this country and that, for most of our Anglo-American history, marriage was
thought of as a civil contract. To the extent marriage contracts allow for the creation and
ordering of private property interests, they are largely indistinguishable from any other
commercial contracts in a free market society. Marriage contracts have some differences
from ordinary commercial contracts, of course. The parties cannot simply walk away
from a marriage contract as they can a contract to sell real estate or chattel. Divorces also
required, first, an act of Parliament, then later, an act of the state legislature, and later
still, approval from state courts. Still, marriage contracts and the marital relationship
share many striking similarities to commercial relations that exist in our free-market
system.
Nobody seriously suggests, of course, that anyone in the late eighteenth century
would have countenanced marriage between two people of the same gender. About the
only consistent “tradition” to Anglo-American marriage is that it was a relation entered
into between members of the opposite sex. But, that is only because a same-sex
alternative would have never occurred to anyone in the first place. This is not surprising.
Our current knowledge of sexual orientation—as something separate and distinct from
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the sex act itself—is only a product of nineteenth and twentieth century study. Therefore,
when the Massachusetts Bay Colony deemed sexual relations between two men
punishable by death, they never meant to exterminate an entire subculture of society but
only to prohibit a certain behavior that would impede procreation of more colonists.275
In any case, to the extent contemporary opposition to same-sex marriage is
grounded on the argument that it violates “traditional marriage,” I will show our notions
of marriage have changed so many times over the centuries it is difficult to ascribe any
“tradition” to that relationship at all. This is particularly true in the confines of AngloAmerican history. Indeed, our very conception of “marriage” continues to shift back and
forth between a status (sanctioned either by secular authorities or the state) and a private
contractual arrangement. Today, American society leans more toward the former than
the latter. The reason for this is that contract and property rights themselves are not
valued as highly as they once were and we have become increasingly complacent with
government (federal, state or local) regulation of the so-called “private sphere.” Even
amongst proponents of same-sex marriage, little if any weight is given to the property
and contract arguments. Once again, this can be attributed not only to a loss of
importance afforded property rights in today’s society but also the rise of “equal
protection” arguments in the latter half of the twentieth century. The purpose of this
chapter is to both trace the historicity of these arguments as well as to show that traces of
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them can still be found, to one extent or another, in current litigation on same-sex
marriage.
Although Anglo-American nomenclature consistently represented marriage as a
“contract,” that representation was—of course—little more than a legal fiction. It is
perhaps fitting such fiction mimics a “social contract,” Carole Patemen suggests, because
women were wholly excluded from the former and never truly a party to the latter.276
Still, the notion of heterosexual marriage as a contractual avatar by and between members
of the opposite sex persisted throughout Anglo-American history and was only recently
forced back into the conception of “status” by those who wished to exclude others from
the very real economic benefits the relationship bestows.
Our knowledge of early English marriage is somewhat sketchy to say the least.
Chilton Latham Powell described it as largely adhering to the Roman civil law notion of
contract whereas Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederick Maitland point to the Teutonic
(Anglo-Saxon) tradition of “marriage by capture” or even “marriage by rape.” These
marriages later evolved into a more civilized “sale marriage” (whereby consideration was
paid by the bridegroom to his intended’s father) which Pollock and Maitland describe as
the “usual and lawful marriage.” A sale, of course, is a form of contract and thus all three
historians agree English marriage eventually took on that form. But, as the Christian
church grew more powerful, Rome sought to exercise control over marriage as part of its
“warfare against sins of the flesh.” The Council of Florence (1439) decreed marriage a
sacrament and the Council of Trent (1563) decreed a marriage not contracted in the
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presence of a priest and witnesses was void.277 There is no indication, of course, that the
Christian church sought to humanize the relationship between men and women but only
to extend its power over the political recognition of marriage.
The Roman Catholic Church’s grip over marriage in England was, relatively,
short-lived. Even before the Tridentine ecumenical council, the English Reformation was
underway. Martin Luther and John Calvin both denied marriage was a sacrament and, if
the English Reformation was slow to reject the authority of Rome, “Puritans” were quick
to reject the influence of “popery” over all civil marriages. The Marriage Act of 1653
decreed that, to be valid, marriages need only be performed by a justice of the peace. The
church was excluded from the marriage process altogether. Indeed, though only truly
legal when recognized by civil authorities, marriages were often confirmed in churches.
But, both in Puritan England and New England, the only requisite for a valid marriage
was a civil contract presided over by a civil authority. Indeed, when the very first
marriage was performed in Plymouth, William Bradford noted it was “performed by the
magistrate, as being a civil thing.” Nowhere in the gospels, Bradford explained, was
marriage “laid on the ministers as a part of their office.”278
“Our law,” pronounced English Jurist William Blackstone in 1765, “considers
marriage in no other light than as a civil contract.” The religious aspects of marriage
were left to “ecclesiastical law” rather than civil law, which was only concerned with
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whether the parties were willing to contract, able to contract and, in fact, did contract in
the proper form required by law. Though Blackstone concerned himself with British law
only, the gist of his commentaries—which were more popular here than in his native
country—found their way into American treatises as well. Judge Tapping Reeve,
proprietor of America’s first law school and author of its first treatise on domestic
relations law, wrote that “[t]here is nothing in the nature of a marriage contract that is
more sacred than that of other contracts [or] that requires the interposition of a person in
holy orders, or that it [marriage] should be solemnized in a church.” Any notion to the
contrary, Reeve said, arose “wholly from the usurpation of the church of Rome, on the
rights of the civilian.” The Vermont Supreme Court agreed. “Before the days of Pope
Innocent III [1198-1216], solemnization of marriage in churches was not known.”279
Just as marriage de-secularized in early America, it also became increasingly
more privatized. A suspicion of centralized authority, and a concomitant rise in
individualism after independence, explains Michael Grossberg, led to emergence of the
“republican family” operating as a “little commonwealth” and eschewing any form of
interference by local government. Communal regulation of the household, and by
extension, marriage, was taken for granted before the American Revolution, which, as
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Ruth Bloch demonstrates, even afforded some recourse to women suffering spousal
abuse. It was only during the waning years of the eighteenth century, and early years of
the nineteenth, communal authorities grew reluctant to interfere with the “little
commonwealths” operating within their communities thereby, as Bloch explains, not only
shielding domestic violence from authorities but giving rise to a nascent sense of
“privacy.”280
Later treatises, likewise, stressed marriage was a “civil contract,” and the
relationship of wife and husband as a civil status. Associate Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story wrote that “[t]he common law of England [and America] considers marriage
in no other light than as a civil contract. The holiness of the matrimonial state is left
entirely to ecclesiastical and religious scrutiny.” “No peculiar ceremonies are requisite
by the common law to the valid celebration of the marriage[,]” wrote legal scholar James
Kent in his Commentaries on America Law. “The consent of the parties is all that is
required; and as marriage is said to be a contract jure gentium, that consent is all that is
required by natural or public law.”281 The issues of marriage and contract were so
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intertwined that, for awhile, lawyers even argued a state legislative grant of divorce—the
means by which many divorces in early America were granted—violated the
Constitution’s prohibition on state impairment of contract. Although the Supreme Court
of Connecticut rejected such an argument, not without mentioning that, if it did not, it
would throw many previous divorces and subsequent remarriages into disarray, a
concurring judge found legislative divorce did, in fact, violate the impairment of contract
clause. The United States Supreme Court eventually stepped in and confirmed states
have the “absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation
between its citizens shall be created and the causes for which it may be dissolved.”282
Just as Enlightenment era philosophy cast political relations in terms of a “social
contract,” the same philosophy cast the matrimonial relationship in terms of a “marriage
contract.” This was largely a legal fiction of course, as men and women were hardly on
equal footing when entering these contracts, but it nevertheless shows us the mindset of
early legal scholars. Legal and constitutional theory at the scholarly level is one thing;
adjudicating marital cases in courthouses of the early republic—before many of the above
treatises were even written and existing books such as Blackstone’s Commentaries may
not even have been available—was something altogether different. Moreover, in dealing
with the practical over the theoretical, state courts also had to decide economic issues
many theorists could avoid. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in 1790, for
instance, not only characterized marriage as a “union of persons” but also a “union of
fortunes.” Marriage, thus not only united two people in holy matrimony but also
282
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provided a way to arrange their property interests and construct a means by which to
acquire property under state law.283
Property arrangements, particularly in terms of dowry, were oftentimes vital
components of the marriage contract. “True” or “counted” dowry to husbands in
Louisiana had to be listed in the marriage contract, and then delivered to the future
husband in front of a notary and witnesses, to be kept exempt from levy by the husband’s
creditors. A marriage contract could even curtail a husband’s rights under Coverture as
noted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in DeArmas v. Hampton which ruled a husband
could not sell property a marriage contract specified was inalienable. As to the economic
rights of the husband, the Vermont Supreme Court held that if the intended wife “during
the treaty for marriage, without the knowledge of her intended husband, makes a
voluntary disposition of her property, it is a fraud upon his marital rights.”284
Anglo-American history cast colonial marriage in terms of a civil contract both
because of the Puritan desire to disassociate itself from the Roman Catholic Church, and
its remnants in the Anglican Church, and because the contract metaphor more accurately
described the American view of political relations between the colonial periphery and the
imperial core. But, that discourse changed again over the course of the nineteenth
century. Historians and legal scholars have mined this period of American history and
point to a variety of factors that led to the evolution of marriage in Anglo-American
society and law. Scholars such as Sandra VanBurkleo explain that legislators and judges
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in antebellum America became increasingly uncomfortable with a contract metaphor
because, after all, contracts suggested two parties on equal footing with one another and
this was inconsistent with the notion of a patriarchal society necessary to rule the
household and slaves. Michael Grossberg argues that, while a “republican family,” with
its emphasis on egalitarianism and well-defined roles of various family members fit well
within the era’s emphasis on individuality, it led to a crisis in society’s view of family
stability in post-bellum America. A perceived laxness of morals, both within the marital
relationship and without, led to various reforms movements seeking to emphasize both
the power of the state to regulate marriage and the importance of the marital relationship
to the community.285
In 1827, James Kent described marriage as the only “lawful relation by which
[p]rovidence has permitted the continuance of the human race.” Though Kent’s
Commentaries on American Law imply a religious connotation for marriage, his analysis
of the means by which marriage is entered into is strictly contractual. A marriage
contract, for instance, cannot be entered into by a “lunatic” or an “idiot,” who lacks
capacity to contract, nor may it be entered by force or fraud which vitiates voluntary
consent on the other side. Only when marriages are entered into between those of a
certain lineal relationship, Kent notes, does cannon law coincide with common law.
There is no overriding secular principle that defines a lawful marriage; indeed, like any
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other commercial relationship, a marriage contract is valid only if it complies with the
law of the jurisdiction under which the relationship was contracted.286
Slave “marriage,” perhaps, is one place where the contract metaphor retained its
salience at least up through abolition. Henry Bibb, a Kentucky slave met his intended,
Malinda, in 1833, and was quickly infatuated. After discussing matrimony with her as a
“conditional contract,” he just as quickly became disillusioned upon discovering “[t]here
is no legal marriage among the slaves of the south.” “A slave marrying according to
law,” Bibb wrote, is “a thing unknown in the history of American slavery.” Indeed, as
state legislators, and both common law and equity courts, began to carve out a distinctly
American jurisprudence of marital relations, slaves were all but overlooked. It was not
only slaves like Bibb who continued to view marriage as a contract, but also state
lawmakers. Legislators, who could as easily have barred slave marriages by positive law
(statute), just as they regulated white marriages, left the subject almost entirely to the
common law courts. Some historians cite New England colonies and states as an area
where slaves had more rights than in the south. Catherine Adams and Elizabeth Pleck,
for instance, argue enslaved men and women “had the right to marry but a master
retained the right of sale; a slave husband could divorce his wife but he did not have
custody rights over his children[.]” New England was a world apart, though, from the
rest of the nascent states in respecting at least some parts of African-American
marriage.287
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“[I]n a state of slavery,” a Kentucky appeals court ruled in 1824, “persons of color
are incapable of contracting marriage.” Only after emancipation do they possess the
requisite legal competence to enter such a contract. The focus on “competency” in this
case is important. Much as the law said a femme covert was incompetent to contract, or
the laws of every state hold a minor is incompetent to contract today, the Kentucky
appeals court analyzed the claim of marriage solely as a contract issue (equating a slave
on the same level as a child and femme covert) rather than relying on state law regulating
either slavery or marriage. Thought other contemporary state court decisions were not as
precise, they follow the same trajectory. The Alabama Supreme court ruled slaves
incapable of “contracting marriage,” but did so on the basis the rights and duties of
marriage were incompatible with the rights of slave owners. Similarly, in analyzing
whether state laws on spousal privilege (barring one spouse from testifying against
another in court) several states ruled the privilege did not apply to slave marriages where
the participants were not able to contract marriage.288
Slave states tended to borrow the ancient Latin word contubernium to describe the
matrimonial relationships amongst their slaves. Contubernium, in Roman Law, described
marital status of slaves. In America, it was adopted to describe a relationship of “cohabitation,” but not a state of lawful marriage which a trial court in New York noted
slaves could not legally contract. As New York began the slow elimination of slavery
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within its boundaries, it was not the courts but the legislature which recognized slave
marriages through a law enacted on February 17, 1809. Though cohabitation might be
permitted under a doctrine of contubernium, ruled the Alabama Supreme Court, the status
brought with it no civil rights.289 The marital relation among slaves, therefore, remains as
an artifact of how marriage was once regulated in this country. As state legislature
moved to impose control over white marriages, through various regulatory schemes,
black marriages remained (largely) a concept controlled by common law contract
principles. This provides us a rare glimpse into a state of the law which failed to evolve
in the nineteenth century thereby reifying the notion of marriage as a civil law contract.
By the close of the nineteenth century, state and local governments were once
again imposing themselves into the marital relationship. Joel Bishop wrote in the 1891
version of his treatise that “[n]o man has the absolute right to do as he will, either as
against other men or as against the public.” This was not particularly controversial. But,
Bishop went on to write that “as in respect of some things, the public good is the
overshadowing matter” and persons may not enter into contracts that violate public
policy. What kind of contracts might violate public policy? Well, for one, characterizing
marriage as an ordinary civil contract. The executed marriage, Bishop opined, was
actually a “status”—the rights and responsibilities of which could be regulated by the
states.290
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Thus, in less than two centuries, Anglo-American political and legal thinking had
gone from rejecting status as a basis for position in society, to accepting contract as
defining that relationship, and then back to status again. However, as property and
contract rights faded into the background of constitutional protection during the latter
nineteenth century, and early twentieth century, another legal theory—that of equality of
treatment under the law—gained strength and, in fact, became the preferred theoretical
basis for challenging disparate treatment between same and opposite-sex couples.
Of all the so-called “Reconstruction Amendments,” the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution (ratified in 1868) is arguably the most important, and
unquestionably is the most litigated, constitutional provision today. Section one of that
amendment provides, in pertinent part, that no state “shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” While the plain text of the “Equal
Protection Clause” provides only applies to states, the Supreme Court has ruled similar
protections, restricting the federal government, can be found in the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause.291 But, what, precisely, does “equal protection” mean? Neither the state
nor the federal government has ever treated everyone completely “equally” and we are
probably the better for this as anyone who has ever flown commercial aviation will attest
their distrust for allowing a blind pilot. So, how far does the guarantee of “equal
protection” go? Who must be treated equally and precisely how far must the guarantee of
equality be taken?
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Generations of American law students are taught that those who are similarly
situated—for our purposes, here, gay couples and straight couples—must be treated
equally unless the government (be it state or federal) has a compelling reason to treat
them differently. No statute, at either state or federal level, prohibits same-sex
individuals from entering into any other contractual arrangement but that of marriage.
The explanation typically given for this prohibition is that marriage, historically, has been
an arrangement between partners of the opposite sex. But, is there an historic
justification for restricting acquisition of property rights between same-sex couples?
What is curious about the history of the Equal Protection Clause is that it had
virtually no history at all for nearly a century after becoming a part of the Constitution.
With few exceptions, courts all but ignored the amendment’s guarantee of equality and
allowed everything from the “separate but equal” doctrine that formed the backbone of
Jim Crowe to interment of Americans of Japanese descent during the Second World War.
“Civil equality,” declared John Burgess, “is the first principle of modern justice.” But,
discussion of the Equal Protection Clause is wholly absent from his 1902 treatise on
Reconstruction and the Constitution, 1866-1876. Famed Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
even mocked equal protection claims as the “usual last resort of constitutional
arguments” when nothing else would work. It was not until 1954, and the seminal case
of Brown v. Board of Education, that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was, finally, taken seriously. Nearly fifty years after Justice Holmes
dismissed equal protection arguments as not worthy of consideration, Justice Potter
Stewart observed the clause was now “the Court's chief instrument for invalidating state
law.” By 1996, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged “[a] prime part of the
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history of our Constitution . . . is the story of the extension of constitutional rights . . . to
people once ignored or excluded.”292
This is not to say marriage, and marital issues, were absent from Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Though a right to marry is never mentioned explicitly in the Constitution,
the United States Supreme Court has discussed its importance on a number of occasions.
Though subject to regulation by state legislatures, the Court noted in 1887, “[m]arriage
[creates] the most important relationship in life.” Marriage and procreation, commented
the Court in 1941, are “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”
Indeed, the marriage relation creates problems of large social importance which includes
protection of property interests and enforcement of marital responsibilities. Finally, after
more than a century of commentary, the Court recognized the existence of marriage as a
fundamental, albeit unenumerated right in the 1966 case of Loving v. Virginia which
struck down anti-miscegenation laws that barred interracial marriages.293
There can be no doubt that the Equal Protection Clause is a compelling argument
for advocates of same-sex marriage. After all, equal treatment of all peoples is something
this nation has aspired to, whether we have reached it or not, and carries the connotation
292
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that no person (or group of persons) should be afforded a privilege not afforded to
everyone else. But, as the Equal Protection Clause gained currency in Supreme Court
review, the notion of marriage in terms of “liberty of contract” and property rights faded
into the background. This is unfortunate because there is little in our constitutional
culture that carries the same weight as the right of free people to create and arrange
property interests as they see fit without approval of government at either the state or
federal level. Thus, while Jack Baker and James McConnell applied for a marriage
license in 1970 for economic reasons, contemporary same-sex marriage cases typically
come before state high courts based on the Equal Protection Clause arguments rather than
the question of fundamental property rights.
The Baker v. Nelson decision in 1972 may not have encouraged same sex couples
to fight for marriage rights but neither did it wholly discourage them either. A lesbian
couple who fought denial of a marriage license around the same time as Baker and
McConnell received roughly the same treatment when a Kentucky court rejected their
various arguments in less than two pages concluding they were not entitled to a marriage
license “because what they propose is not marriage.”294 Court cases continued to pop-up
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here and there, around the country, during the 1980s295 and into the 1990s296 but the
results were always the same.
Consequently, when Hawaii became the first state to rule in favor of same sex
marriage in 1993, that ruling was like a Tsunami from the Pacific that crashed into the
mainland causing jubilation in same-sex marriage proponents and striking terror in the
hearts of its opponents. The ruling in Baehr v. Lewin was actually quite narrow. Samesex marriage, said the Hawaii Supreme Court, was not implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty nor did failure to recognize it violate fundamental principles of liberty and justice
under either the United States or Hawaii constitutions. Indeed, rather than adhere to
previous federal jurisprudence recognizing an overall right of marriage, the Hawaii
Supreme Court—as had many previous state courts—qualified the right as being one to
“same-sex marriage” and indicated it was not inclined toward recognition of a “new
fundamental right.”297 But, that aside, the Court ruled, the Hawaii Constitution banned
discrimination based on sex and the prohibition against issuing a marriage license to
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same-sex couples appeared to violate that ban thereby rendering it unconstitutional under
the state constitution.298
The Baehr case was a clear victory for proponents of same sex marriage because
it changed the dynamic of the playing field. No longer could courts simply brush aside
constitutional challenges to laws restricting marriage to opposite sex couples. But, in two
ways, that victory was pyrrhic as well. First, the prospect of same sex marriage
galvanized opponents both in Hawaii and the continental United States. Hawaiians later
amended their Constitution to restrict marriage to opposite sex couples. Half a world
away, in Washington DC, the United States Congress passed and President Clinton
signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The Tsunami was effectively stopped, at
least for awhile.
Another failure of the Baehr case was that it was decided on the basis of a state
constitutional clause banning discrimination. While that is all well and good, the court’s
decision effectively rendered Equal Protection (or similar arguments) the battlefield on
which the marriage wars would be fought. Liberty of contract and the freedom to acquire
property, however, are far older than the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, as I will show
later, the property rights at issue in marriage are quite valuable and deprivation of those
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property rights, either by federal or state governments, impedes not only creation of
personal wealth as well as national capital formation, it is an even older affront to
founding principles.
Property (money) was cited as one justification by Congress in passing in DOMA
but only in the context of preserving the government’s property. The House Judiciary
Committee, for example, cited the protection of “scarce” government resources as the
fourth of its four purposes for sending DOMA to the full House. Citing veteran’s
benefits as an example, the committee explained that if it did not codify a definition of
marriage as one man and one woman into federal law, a veteran in a same-sex marriage
could ask for increased benefits for a dependent same sex spouse. Federal benefits are
extended to married couples, according to the House Committee, to “promote, protect,
and prefer the institution of marriage” and recognition of same sex marriages ran counter
to that objective. Such protection of the public fisc, however, still took a backseat behind
defense of (1) traditional marriage, (2) traditional morality and (3) state sovereignty and
democratic self-governance as reasons for making DOMA law.299 In July, 2010, that
portion of DOMA which defines marriage as the union of one man and one woman for
purposes of federal law was declared unconstitutional as having no rational basis for
support and being based on nothing more than prejudice. The Plaintiffs in Gill v. Office
of Personnel Management were all federal workers who either wanted to obtain medical
or other benefits for their same sex partners or who wanted to obtain benefits on behalf of
a deceased same-sex partner. Attorney General Eric Holder announced the Justice
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Department will not appeal that ruling, punting the ball squarely into the court of
Congress where Speaker John Boehner has stated it will be defended.300
Despite lip service to the economic benefits of marriage in legislative history on
DOMA or the District Court’s decision in Gill, It should come as no surprise that the few
states which have so far ruled in favor of same-sex marriage have done so through a state
constitutional equivalent of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The
most recent state case to do so, Iowa, in Varnum v. Brien, was based on the state
constitutional guarantees of equal protection. The Iowa Supreme Court even went so far
as to announce it would apply “heightened scrutiny” to legislative classifications based
on sexual orientation – a status even the United States Supreme Court consistently
refuses to apply.301 To date, however, the closest any state high-court has come to citing
property rights as basis for allowing same-sex marriage was the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Healthin 2003. Despite its noting that
“[a]bsolute equality before the law is a fundamental principle of [the commonwealth’s]
constitution,” the Court also noted marriage provides an abundance of legal, financial and
social benefits as well as imposes some “weighty” financial obligations. Still, equal
treatment not property carried the day as the Court ruled that there exists a “liberty” in
marriage and an absolute equality of marriage before the law.302 Equal protection
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arguments under state or federal constitutions thus seem to have carried the day with
regard to arguments on same sex marriage. Whether that trend continues, however,
remains to be seen—particularly in light of the attention afforded to economic and
property rights by the District Court in Gill.
The same-sex marriage debate currently playing itself out in California reveals
contract and property arguments have not entirely given way to “equal protection” type
arguments. In February 2004 San Francisco caught the nation’s attention when it began
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex applicants. State law only allowed such licenses to
be issued to opposite sex couples but San Francisco Mayor, Gavin Newsom, based on
rulings in other states, concluded that the California law violated equal protection
guarantees in that state’s constitution. The Mayor thus asked the City Clerk to implement
a system for allowing licenses to issue to same-sex couples and the clerk readily
complied. Lawsuits were filed almost immediately to stop the practice and, later that
year, the California Supreme Court ordered the San Francisco City Clerk to cease issuing
the licenses in contravention of state law.303
The sole question before the Court in 2004 was whether a county official could
issue marriage licenses that did not comply with California law. Not surprisingly, the
Court answered in the negative and held county officials had no authority to take it upon
themselves to determine the constitutionality of a statute they had a ministerial duty to
enforce. In so ruling, however, the Court emphasized it was not ruling on a substantive
constitutional right of marriage. This case, the Court noted, was no different than one
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that might be brought against a recalcitrant city clerk elsewhere in the State who refused
to comply with the State’s domestic partnership laws simply due to personal antipathy
against domestic partnership.304
The substantive constitutional question of marriage was squarely placed in front
of it, however, in the 2008 case of In re Marriage Cases. The California Supreme Court
began its review of the state statute mandating opposite-sex only marriage by describing
marriage as a “fundamental,” “inalienable,” “civil right.” This right—although not
expressly set out in the state’s constitution—could nevertheless be found in the explicit
constitutional guarantee of privacy as well as the state’s “due process clause.” Marriage,
the Court observed, was more than just a relationship stamped with the imprimatur of
state approval. It also encompassed “a core set of basic legal rights” including, among
many others, “mutual rights and responsibilities” toward one another. What the Court
clearly meant in this phrase was the reciprocal duties of support—in short, a property
interest—that is only acquired through a marriage or other form of contract.305
Turning then to the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution, the Court
went farther than any other had done to date and found “sexual orientation” was a
“suspect class,” which in legal parlance means that any statute which treats one
orientation different from another will be subject to “strict scrutiny.” A “strict level” of
scrutiny all but guarantees a law will be found unconstitutional and California’s oppositesex only marriage statute was no exception to that rule. California was unable to justify
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its disparate treatment and, thus, the Court ordered that marriage licenses must be issued
to same-sex couples who met all other marriage requirements under law.306
Same-sex marriage was thus legal in California as of the date of that decision—
May 15, 2008. But, the window of opportunity was not there for long. A ballot initiative
was quickly put together in time for the general, presidential, election of 2008.
California’s Proposition 8 (Prop. 8) asked the voters whether the state constitution should
be amended to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples only. The initiative passed
during the November election. Prop. 8 was immediately challenged in California courts
but that challenge went nowhere.
Clearly having grown weary of the issue,307 the California Supreme Court ruled
Prop. 8 was a legal amendment to the state constitution. The ballot initiative, according
to the Court, carved out a limited exception to the state’s equal protection, due process
and privacy guarantees. Same-sex couples had not really lost any substantive legal
rights—presumably referring to domestic partnership laws which were still in effect—
they simply lost access to use the word “marriage” to describe their relationships. But,
the Court declined to invalidate those marriages which had been contracted during the six
month window during which they were legal. Those couples who wed during that
window, the Court held, acquired “vested property rights” as lawfully married spouses.
Those rights included, among other, certain “employment benefits, interests in real
property, and inheritances.” A retroactive application of Prop. 8 would disrupt thousands
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of actions taken in reliance on California law before the election and would throw
property rights into disarray destroying the legal interests and expectations of
innumerable couples and families and potentially undermining the ability of citizens to
plan their lives according to the law as it had previously been determined.308
The latest salvo in the California battle over same-sex marriage came in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger in August, 2010, when the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California ruled Prop. 8 was unconstitutional as violative of both the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Much like the California Supreme Court ruled in In re
Marriage Cases, the federal District Court found Prop. 8 constitutionally deficient under
any standard of federal equal protection review. The Court also ruled that sexual
orientation was a suspect class and legislative distinctions based on that classification
should thereafter be subject to heightened scrutiny.309
The issue of marriage as a civil contract was given scant attention in Judge
Walker’s opinion and, even then, only in reference to evidence from a defense expert,
David Blankenhorn, of the “Institute for Marriage Values,” which the Court found
lacking in credibility. Blankenhorn characterized marriage as having “six dimensions.”
The first of these dimensions was as a “legal contract” and the second was as a “financial
partnership.” An opponent of same-sex marriage himself, even Blankenhorn conceded
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these two dimensions, as well as the other four, operated the same for gay unions as for
straight ones. While the opponents of Prop. 8 were no doubt delighted with a defense
who contradicted himself in this area, Judge Walker ultimately found Blankenhorn
“unreliable” and gave his opinions “no weight.”310
What the Perry decision lacked in contract analysis, however, it more than made
up for in its recognition of the economic aspect of marriage and its status of a means by
which to create property and to protect wealth. Citing research by University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, economist Lee Badgett, Walker pointed to various socioeconomic reasons for recognizing same-sex marriage including, but not limited to,
protection of property—particularly, in the context of income, taxation and other
economic benefits. California domestic partnerships afforded some relief from the
disparity of treatment between same-sex and opposite-sex marriage but did nothing to
address economic problems such as higher taxes and reduced access to health
insurance.311
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property rights in this country. In any event, Badgett cites both practical economic
benefits emanating from marriage, such as the claim of a non-earning spouse on joint
property, as well as more theoretical concerns like specialization of labor, reducing
transaction costs and taking advantages of economies of scale. See M.V. Lee Badgett,
When Gay People Get Married: What Happens When Societies Legalize Same-Sex
Marriage (New York: New York University Press, 2009) 43, 127, 178-181.
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Marriage, the court noted, is the foundation of the private realm of property
transmission. Indeed, “marital status” affects property, tax policy and inheritance rules.
Plaintiffs in Perry sought recognition of their marriage, the Court noted, in order to
obtain (among other things) the “mutual obligation” associated with marriage.312 In
short, the parties to that marriage contract sought to impose an obligation of support
between the two of them and pledged their respective properties as collateral to support
that pledge. Romantic allusions aside, there is little difference between this arrangement
and any other commercial obligation of support incurred by the two parties. Though
Judge Walker spent little time on the property rights created by, or associated with,
marriage, those rights must be considered in a free-market capitalist society that gives
primacy to creation, ownership and protection of private property. The economic
benefits of marriage are too numerous to list, let alone discuss, and I will not attempt to
do so here. But, there are a few broad generalizations which merit consideration for
those already concerned with the diminished importance of private property in a postLochner world.313
First, there are many incorporeal—or inchoate—property interests states allow
legally wedded spouses to claim in one other. One of the more important of these is the
reciprocal duty of support. At common law, husbands were required to provide their
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wives with (e.g. food, clothing and shelter). This duty was a vestige of Coverture and
became increasingly anachronistic in light of numerous changes to state domestic
relations laws during first and second wave feminism. Some state courts responded by
abolishing the duty of support altogether, thus leaving it to legislatures to impose
statutory reciprocal duties on both spouses, whereas other state courts simply extended
the common law duty of support to the wife by adjudication.314 So, for instance, if one
spouse is gravely ill, and without insurance or the financial means to pay for medical care
or support, the other spouse is then required by law to provide whatever is feasibly
possible for medical treatment before federal and state Medicaid programs kick-in. This
duty of support not only benefits the dependent spouse, thus making it a valuable
property interest in itself, but it also protects the property of the general public. Given
state budget crises of the last few years, requiring a domestic partner with means to care
for the other domestic partner without means, helps preserve the public fisc. This
reciprocal legal duty of support is not imposed on unmarried couples in general315 or on
same sex couples in particular.316 Opposite-sex paramours can easily obtain the benefit
through marriage but, except in a handful of states, it is not available to same sex couples.
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Most states allow non-married couples to acquire reciprocal benefits of support through
contracts, but drafting such an arrangement might not occur to people and, even if it did,
not everyone has the financial means to retain a lawyer to draft the proper document(s).
Another important property interest that one spouse has in the other is the right to
hold a third party tortfeasor liable for negligent injury which deprives them of
“consortium” in that other spouse. Spousal consortium claims under most state laws
usually extend to such intangible elements as comfort, companionship, love, affection,
sexual relations and the many other benefits that come from marriage. American
common law long held that husbands could sue third parties who deprived them of a
wife’s consortium. But, again, as a remnant of coverture, states were slow to recognize
the existence of that right in the wife although most states have now done so either by
statute or court decision.317 Suffice it to say, however, because there exists no reciprocal
duty of support between unmarried couples, and because the extent of their relationship
and assessment of damages is too speculative, unmarried same-sex couples cannot bring
an action for loss of consortium.318
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A related right is that of a spouse to sue a tortfeasor for infliction of “wrongful
death” on the other spouse. All states have enacted, in one form or another, wrongful
death statutes that permit a surviving spouse to sue for money damages when the other
spouse is killed as a result of the negligence of a third party. But, those statutes also
specify those actions may only be brought by a surviving spouse and, in a case where
there is no surviving spouse, and no surviving children, the right passes back to the
decedent’s parents.319 No state permits an unmarried same-sex partner to bring such a
lawsuit. Neither a wrongful death suit, nor a loss of consortium claim, are problematic in
states that recognize same-sex marriage. But, in those states where it is not recognized, a
dependent spouse can be left without any means of support when the other spouse is
injured or killed. It is also worth noting that, while states may allow unmarried couples
to create a reciprocal duty of support contractually, no contract can ever override state
restrictions on who can assert a loss of consortium claim or bring wrongful death actions.
These are but a few of the incorporeal property rights spouses acquire relative to
one another as a result of the marital relationship. Just as important, if not more so, is the
“wealth creation effect” of marriage. Simply put, a legal marriage creates a new,
conjoined, economic unit which can facilitate a far greater accumulation of economic
assets than is enjoyed by unmarried couples even those who are cohabiting.
Institutionalized relationships of this sort allow for division of labor, pooling of income
and economies of scale that simply are not present in single economic unit households.
Though the same benefits may arguably come from mere cohabitation, without legal
marriage, Linda J. Waite and Maggie Gallagher argue that this is not so because the
319
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legally binding marriage contract gives each spouse the security needed to specialize and
invest in each other over the long run. Cohabiting, unmarried, couples tend to be more
uncertain of the future of the relationship and hesitate to specialize or commit to take care
of the other person financially. Waite and Gallagher conclude that “being married in
itself seems to encourage the creating and retention of wealth” or, at the very least,
married couples are less likely to fall into poverty. By contrast, for unmarried
cohabitants, the length of the relationship has no effect on wealth accumulation. Indeed,
marriage counselors during the twentieth century preached that getting married, and
staying married, was the key to economic stability and entry into the middle class. The
converse is also true. A 2011 study by the Pew Charitable Trusts found that nevermarried women were sixteen to nineteen percentage points more likely to be downwardly
mobile than married women and men were six to ten percentage points more likely to be
downwardly mobile if they never married. The Family Service Association of America
(FSAA) even ran advertisements equating marriage with middle class homeownership
and suggested its natural opposite was unemployment and social instability. “Marriage is
a means of getting and staying out of poverty,” argues Rich Lowery of National Review.
“The poverty rate for single-parent families is six times that of married families.”320 It

320

Thomas J. Stanley, The Millionaire Mind (Kansas City: Andrews McMeel Publishing,
2000) 235;Linda J. Waite & Maggie Gallagher, The Case for Marriage: Why Married
People are Happier, Healthier and Better off Financially (New York: Doubleday, 2000)
26-39, 97-114; Gregory Acs, Downward Mobility From the Middle Class: Waking up
From the American Dream, The Pew Charitable Trusts (September, 2011) 11,
http://www.pewtrusts.org/ uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/
Reports/Economic_Mobility/Pew_PollProject_Final_SP.pdf (accessed 11 September
2011); Rebecca L. Davis, More Perfect Unions: The American Search for Marital Bliss
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010) 9, 30-31, 81-83; Rich Lowery, “Just Not
the Marrying Kind,” Time (5 March 2012) 13.
251

stands to reason that if the greater society was benefitted economically by encouraging
opposite sex couples to marry, the same would be true of same sex couples.
The constitutionality of same sex marriage, not to mention the basis under which
it would be deemed unconstitutional, is still very much up in the air.321 The Perry case is
currently before the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. As expected, the briefs
(including numerous amici briefs) focus primarily on Equal Protection argument and
virtually ignore the contract and economic issues which, as noted above, are critically
important to a free-market society such as ours that champions both the creation and
retention of private property. The Gill case is also on appeal and it remains to be seen
how, and on what basis, DOMA is declared to be unconstitutional. Although
conservative factions in this country continue to press for traditional Judeo-Christian
view of marriage, the second decade of the twentieth century has also seen the rise of the
self-proclaimed “tea party” movement which supposedly rejects any government
intervention into private lives of American citizens and favors, instead, individuality and
the primacy of private property. If the so-called “tea party” elements are true to their
own ideals, this would suggest a rejection of government intrusion that blocks the
acquisition and protection of private property. If the so-called “tea party” elements align
with conservative principles, however, this would tend to show they are not as loyal to
their anti-government base as previously believed.
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That said, however, I am very much aware that the swift-changing pace of same-sex
marriage may arguably render this chapter moot by the time I defend this dissertation.
Still, I would predict the decision of the United States Supreme Court will be based on
the concepts of Equal Protection and/or Liberty as those terms from the Fourteenth
Amendment have come to be delineated. Although I do not necessarily object to that
reasoning, the Court has not (outside of the Windsor ruling) given any credence to the
issue of property rights.
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To be sure, even in the absence of same-sex marriage laws, couples of any stripe
can resort to the principles of contract to protect them in their relationships. Last Wills
and testaments, for instance, can take the place of intestacy statutes and living wills can
even designate the individual to make final medical decisions in a crisis. But, the
availability of these options presume both a knowledge of such alternative arrangements
and a means by which to obtain them (i.e., hiring a lawyer). Many same-sex couples, like
their opposite-sex counterparts, will never even think to have these arrangements set out
ahead of time or may not have the financial wherewithal to achieve them. “Gay
marriage” was not even seriously considered when their opposite-sex counterparts began
to consider ante-nuptial agreements to alter traditional marriage arrangements imposed on
them by state law. Numerous States were slow to recognize the validity of such
agreements—a byproduct of the contemporary thinking that contracts between employers
and employees were unenforceable—but, over time, courts have acquiesced in the
validity of these agreements. Same-sex couples may, of course, implement them but they
do not have the same force and effect as those arrangements entered by same-sex
couples.322
The gay marriage debate must also be considered in light of passage of the
“Marriage Equality” law in New York in summer of 2011. For the first time in history,
gay marriage legislation was enacted by a state where the Republican party controlled a
part of that state’s legislature. Though passage of any equality mandate, whether based
on race, gender, sexual orientation or even national origin, should be commended in any
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circumstance, the fact is that New York all but completely overlooked the effect this
arrangement would have on property rights, now, and creation of property rights in the
future.323 The economic effect of gay marriage, though, is no secret. Social recognition
of such relationships are all well and good but, when asked a number of Long Island
same-sex couples cite “legal barriers,” “joint bank account[s]” and other such “realistic”
planning as the reason to celebrate the new law in New York. Not only is there an
economic benefit to same-sex couples themselves, but recognition of these unions also
spurs economic growth for New York amongst those businesses which hope to attract
gay couples to the Empire State to enter matrimony. Even state and local coffers will
benefit, in the short term, from what is expected to be an immediate “surge” in
applications to marry across New York. 324
Marriage means a number of different things to a number of different people,
including a very real, very sacred, secular status that is inextricably tied up with religious
connotations. That belief is certainly worthy of preservation and churches should never
be required to recognize same sex marriage. But, the fact remains Anglo-American legal
tradition, from the Reformation to American colonization, treats that status as a secular
contract and a means by which to arrange property interests of parties to that union.
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These issues are lost to our contemporary discourse, however, because of the
fundamental constitutional and social changes which occurred in the twentieth century.
The first change was a vastly diminished importance placed on both contract and
property rights during the post-Lochner rise of the welfare state. This was America’s
transition from “classical” liberalism, with its emphasis on individual rights, to “New
Deal” liberalism, which emphasized individual protection from the vicissitudes of
economic fluctuation. The second change in the twentieth century that resulted in
diminished attention to individual property rights was the long-overdue advent of Equal
Protection jurisprudence as a means to achieve social justice. Nobody can seriously
argue that, while protection of private property is all well and good, it neither achieves
racial equality nor ends gender inequality that plagued the United States for most of its
existence. Given that a truly free-market society requires absolute equality of economic
interests and an emphasis on private property rights, the absence of equality, simply does
not serve the interests of anyone in this country. Be that as it may, a rejection of private
property is neither feasible in the U.S. nor is it a practical point of departure on the debate
as to whether accumulation of economic interests is a way to overcome discrimination
between people. In short, there is a place in our current debate over same-sex marriage
for the numerous property and contract arguments that were so prevalent for most of
America’s history.
There is little doubt in my mind that a rational person would refuse to accept
anything from this thesis. Ownership of property rights in the body? Where did that
come from? One’s ownership of rights in their own body, from where do we get that? It
is nothing short of ironic that anyone who champions a free market and free enterprise
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would ever align themselves with a legal-political culture which affords a degree of
economic value to particular transactions with which many Americans would prefer not
to recognize at all. The sale of body tissue, beginning with blood and sperm, and
proceeding to the renting of human uteri as a means by which to carry on reproduction
for couples who are infertile, or prefer not to carry a fetus to term (for one reason or
another), are all clear examples of the “body” being used by those who own it to make a
profit. Surrogate mothers rent their wombs; sperm donors sell their genetic material. In
short, despite the extent to which we deny it, our bodies (or at least some parts of our
bodies) are no doubt economic assets which we possess and from which we should be
able to extract some degree of financial support when sold, rented or leased. Such
practices should not be undermined or devalued, but should (instead) be acknowledged
for the economic benefit they have brought to society and will continue to bring to
society.
Should genetic material of people like Henrietta Lacks be allowed to enrich a few
corporate interests at the expense of a family who would have enjoyed some profit had
their ancestor’s DNA been an oil or gas lease rather than a patented human genome?
What is the difference between aggressively replicating cancer cells and oil/gas deposits
subject to modern technology of fracking? Recognition of property interests, I submit,
are greatly variable not just along racial divisions but also along class divisions. Would
exploitation of the Lacks genome, for example, have continued had the donor been white,
male or wealthy? I contend it would not but this is simply a matter of speculation.
Similarly, on the issue of same-sex marriage, coupling of parties have always
shown combination of intrinsic property (meaning the parties themselves) have led to
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creation of extrinsic property in the form of the “wealth effect” of marriage. Neither
property, nor contract, as mentioned earlier in this dissertation, are expressly enumerated
within the Constitution and, thus, they carry lesser safeguards against infringement than
enumerated rights. Still, whatever one’s opinion of property and contract as
unenumerated economic rights, the fact that these intrinsic property values are so
important to creation of extrinsic property value, warrant their valuation even if not
recognized explicitly as extrinsic property rights. The arguments and decision in the
Windsor case indicate at least some acknowledgement of property right and contract
rights even though the cases subsequent thereto seem more focused on Equal Protection
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment rather than protection of property rights.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

[T]he only dependable foundation of
personal liberty is the economic security of
private property.325

There is, as I have argued in this dissertation, no real distinction between the
existence of private property and the existence of individual liberty interests in the body.
They are, in fact, one in the same and were treated the same from the founding until
today. The only reason this sounds strange to contemporary listeners is because of the
existence of what I characterize in my introduction as a lost rhetoric of Anglo-American
property rights. This phrase is neither meant as a mere rhetorical convention, nor is it
intended as a twentieth century remnant (or twenty-first century attack) against the
principles of socialism by those for whom, unfortunately, have no idea of the evil against
which they wish to inveigh.
As Francis Fukayama tells us, modern history ended with the disintegration and
defeat of the Soviet Union in 1991.326 What I mean to recall here, instead, is not that
Anglo-American principles that property and individuality were merged for most of our
history even if proponents of the former never truly acknowledged the importance of the
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latter. In short, for various reasons—both moral and otherwise—many opponents of the
collective merging of property that produced economic benefits argued it benefitted a
regime. Furthermore, to the extent the two concepts were ever acknowledged, few of
their adherents realized the significance of property rights to the exercise of individual
property rights in the body.
To argue that property in the economic context should be free from government
restraint, but then to argue for government regulations affecting both reproductive rights
and same-sex marriage, is to ignore that property exists in both the economic sense (real
property or personal property) and in the individual, and more modern, sense of
contractual relations. Regulation of intrinsic property, whether in the form of restricting
reproductive rights, or even in prohibiting same-sex marriage, inhibits creation of
extrinsic property. A failure to recognize the extrinsic ownership of property, either as it
applies in the case of same-sex marriage, or in the case of sale/rental of bodily functions
like surrogacy or the sale of same-sex organs or services like surrogacy, ignores the
concept of capital formation which is intrinsic to a property-based, free-market, society.
Intrinsic property, in short, promotes the growth of extrinsic property. Whether
there exists a moral approbation to the former, affecting the growth of the latter, is little
more than the argument as to whether a chicken affects the egg, or vice versa. Formation
of capital, in a capitalist system, requires that there exist an economic system wherein
accumulation of capital and its growth are facilitated, or at least not inhibited, by the
government. Recognition of the human body as being external property, and then
acknowledging its results—through one form of sale or another—thereby allows the
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consideration of the human body as property and thus remains true to the notion that
property and contract both feed into the notion of privacy.
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